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Preface
Incorporating psychological insights regarding human behavior to explain how indi-
viduals make economic decisions is providing new perspectives to research questions
in development economics. Understanding the way that people make the decisions
is key for the design of programs that aim at improving the livelihood of people in
poverty throughout the developing world. In this dissertation I incorporate behav-
ioral economic tools to examine how people in the Philippines make decisions in three
areas: institutions, savings and insurance.
In chapter 1, Stefan Penczynski and I propose a novel way of experimentally
measuring trust in institutions, drawing on the experimental method used to elicit time
preferences. Our method enables the elicitation of levels of trust towards institutions
in an incentivized way and is not identified by the participants as a measure of trust.
In contrast to other measures of trust, it provides a meaningful metric of subjective
probability of trustworthiness of the trustee. We measure trust in two institutions,
a formal Philippine microfinance institution and informal local money lenders. The
trust in the formal institution is robustly measured to be significantly higher than in
the informal institution. We find that unincentivized survey measures indicate a much
stronger difference in the same direction, suggesting that survey measures are driven
by further factors such as preferences. Additionally, we exploit the random variation
generated by our experiment to examine whether a higher level of trust in the formal
institution leads to a change in financial behavior. Savings in the formal institution
increase significantly when the promise of future payment is fulfilled.
In chapter 2, together with a microfinance institution in the Philippines, I imple-
ment a financial education program that focuses on savings and evaluate the effect
on participants’ savings balance. I also investigate whether the effects of the program
propagate to members of the participants’ social networks.
In chapter 3, together with coauthors Andreas Landmann and Christian Biener,
we examine the effects of contract non-performance on insurance demand. We extend
models of probabilistic insurance to allow for ambiguity in contract nonperformance
risk, and derive formally that mean-preserving ambiguity reduces demand. The re-
sults of a field lab experiment are consistent with this logic. In particular, we find
that a 10 percent contract nonperformance risk reduces insurance demand by 17.1 per-
centage points even when premia are adjusted accordingly. Ambiguity about this con-
tract nonperformance probability further decreases demand by 14.5 percentage points.
While the demand-reducing effect of ambiguity is more pronounced for high-numeracy
and ambiguity-averse individuals, it appears to be little affected by experience. The
reason for an insurance contract failure to perform does not significantly influence
the strength of these effects, but independently affects demand of low-numeracy and
ambiguity-averse individuals.
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1 Measuring Trust in Institutions:
A Lab-in-the-Field Study Us-
ing Time Preference Elicitation
1.1 Introduction
Economic transactions are based on bilateral exchange of goods, services or money.
These transactions often involve private or governmental institutions. The more the
transacting parties trust each other, the easier the organisation of important sequen-
tial exchanges. Trust has a causal impact on economic development via channels on
the financial, product and labor markets (Algan and Cahuc, 2014) and has positive
consequences for financial behavior in the microfinance sector (Karlan, 2005). It is
relevant for the demand for financial products when household financial literacy and
legal protection are low (Cole, Gine, Tobacman, Topalova, Townsend, and Vickery,
2013).1 While trust is an important economic factor, little is known about trust
directed towards institutions because it is difficult to measure.
In this study, we propose a behavioral measure of trust in institutions that is – like
all experimental measures – based on the behavioral definition of trust put forward
by Coleman (1990) and Fehr (2009). “An individual trusts if she voluntarily places
resources at the disposal of another party without any legal commitment from the
latter. In addition, the act of trust is associated with an expectation that the act will
pay off in terms of [this individual]’s goals.” (Fehr, 2009, p. 238)
The most commonly used measures of trust are hypothetical questions in surveys.
However, behavioral measures of trust capture trust more accurately than reported
measures (Fehr, 2009; Algan and Cahuc, 2014). After all, it is not clear whether
individuals that declare trusting an institution would actually behave in a more co-
operative way or be willing to transact with the institution. Therefore, measures that
rely on the actions and choices of the individual is a better way of capturing the in-
dividual’s trust levels. The most commonly used behavioral measures of trust is the
trust game by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995).2 Since the trust game is com-
monly played between anonymous participants, it captures the notion of general trust
rather than trust directed towards any specific person or institution.3 Additionally,
other-regarding preferences, such as altruism, as well as the trustor’s belief about the
1Generally, trust has been shown to be positively related to GDP (Porta, Lopez-De-Silane, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001), trade (Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales, 2009), and to stock purchases (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004, 2008).
2Another behavioral measure of trust is the gift-exchange game by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl
(1993).
3The trust game has been used extensively in laboratory and field experiments as a way to mea-
sure general trust both in developed and in developing countries (Karlan, 2005; Glaeser, Laibson,
Scheinkman, and Soutter, 2000; Barr, 2003; Tu and Bulte, 2010; Buck and Alwang, 2011).
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trustee’s reciprocity should not contribute strongly towards trust in institutions, al-
though they have been shown to matter for trusting behavior in the trust game (Cox,
2004; Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov, 2006).
We propose a behavioral trust measure inspired by the time preference elicitation
method, in which an institution is responsible for the future payment.4 We identify
trust by providing a payment securement in form of a post-dated check and examining
the difference to the unsecured setting. To test our measure and for comparison,
we implement the measure for a formal and an informal institution. Note that the
uncertainty of future payment delivery in time preference elicitation is analogue to the
situation described in the definition of trust. Indeed, the time preference literature
documents the challenge to make subjects trust completely in the experimenter and in
the completion of the future payment (e.g. Coller and Williams, 1999). Our idea is then
to look for differences in behavior between treatments in which different institutional
settings govern the future payment. If such differences occur between two random
samples of the same population, they can be attributed to different levels of trust in
the institutional setting.
There are various ways to elicit time preferences. Traditionally, multiple price lists
(MPL) have been used that confront subjects with a set of binary choices between a
smaller, sooner and a larger, later payment. Preferences are inferred from the indif-
ference point (Coller and Williams, 1999). Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m
(2008) use one MPL for time and one for risk preferences (DMPL). Recently, the im-
plementation of a Convex Time Budget (CTB) has been introduced by Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012a), allowing for an inference from the optimality of the consumption
allocation between two points in time. In order to capture differences between treat-
ments as finely as possible, we implement convex choice sets. For robustness, we add
features of the DMPL method such as separate risk preference elicitation and binary
choice sets.
Our trust elicitation is equipped to measure trust in an institution because there
is a clearly defined, known trustee: the institution that is responsible for the future
payment. In addition, an advantage of the experimental nature of the games and our
method is that they lead to the observation of incentivized, not hypothetical behavior.
Furthermore, coming in the guise of a measure of time preferences, trust is elicited
without the subjects suspecting a trust measurement or hearing the word “trust”. In
contrast to both survey and common experimental measures, our data allows us to
quantify the trust in an institution in terms of the subjective probability of following
through on a promise.
In this study, we implement our trust elicitation method alongside a trust game
and survey questions on trust in the context of a lab-in-the-field study in the Philip-
pines. The two institutions that are responsible for the future payment are on the one
side a formal regional microfinance institution called Negros Women for Tomorrow
4See Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) for a survey and references.
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Foundation (NWTF) and on the other side local money lenders (ML), an informal
lending institution.
We observe significant differences in trust in the expected direction and quantify
the subjective probability of payment completion to be 0.60 and 0.54 relative to pay-
ments with securement by check in our preferred specification. The trust in the formal
institution NWTF is throughout measured to be higher than in the informal institu-
tion ML. The survey measures of trust are differing between the two institutions to a
much stronger degree. Although they cannot be translated into an objective metric,
the results suggest that the hypothetical question for trust invokes additional elements
beyond trust, such as social preferences, that are distinct from the definition of trust
as presented above.
We further look at the determinants of trust, namely risk and social preferences,
as their effects on trust have been shown in the literature.5 While we find no effect
of estimated risk preferences on our behavioral measure of institutional trust, we do
find that reported risk preferences affects reported measures of institutional trust.
Looking at betrayal aversion, for both institutions, we find surprisingly that the more
our subjects report to avoid being betrayed, the higher their level of behavioral trust.
Effects of betrayal aversion go in the opposite direction for reported measures of
institutional trust. Overall, the analysis supports the view that behavioral measures
of trust are less related to preferences than reported measures of trust.
Finally, our experiment has the potential to provide exogenous, random variation
on the level of trust in an institution. In particular, the fulfillment of the promise of
the future payment delivery could affect trust positively and change financial behav-
ior. To investigate this, we exploit the random selection of the round to be paid which
determines whether subjects were to receive a future payment or not. Using admin-
istrative data from the formal institution, we find that the fulfillment of the promise
increases savings by approximately 25% above baseline levels. To our knowledge this
is the first instance of randomly impacting trust in the field and using this random
variation to show the effects of trust on economic outcomes.
We also contribute to the experimental literature of time preference elicitation by
investigating the relevance of payment securement for time preference measurement.
In particular, the results confirm that a post-dated check helps raise the trust in
the reception of the later payment and thus has an influence on the measured time
discount factor. We are not aware of another study that deliberately manipulates the
institutional context in order to investigate aspects of subjective uncertainty.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 shows how our study relates and
contributes to different strands of the literature. Sections 1.3 presents our experi-
mental design and 1.4 presents the theoretical background and the statistical model.
Sections 1.5 and 1.6 present the data and the main results. Section 1.7 relates reported
5See Eckel and Wilson (2004), Cox (2004), Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), Ashraf, Bohnet, and
Piankov (2006), Schechter (2007), Fehr (2009), and Houser, Schunk, and Winter (2010).
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and elicited measures of trust and preferences. Section 1.8 investigates the effect of
the possible exogenous variation of trust on savings. Finally, sections 1.9 and 1.10
discusses our findings and conclude the paper.
1.2 Related Literature
In economics, the facilitating effects of trust have been recognized since John Stuart
Mill acknowledged that the “advantage to mankind of being able to trust one another
penetrates into every crevice and cranny of human life” (Mill, 1865, p. 68). Currently,
one of the most immediately quantifiable impacts of trust in institutions is discussed
in the literature that investigates trust in the financial sector. Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2008) study the potential effects of a lack of trust on stock market partici-
pation and find that less trusting individuals are less likely to purchase stock. Trust
in financial institutions has also been linked to the 2008 financial crisis. Sapienza and
Zingales (2012) attribute the recession to a sharp loss in trust in the financial sector,
finding a correlation between low levels of trust after the crisis and people’s willing-
ness to invest in the stock market and their tendency to withdraw deposits (see also
Corsetti, Devereux, Guiso, Hassler, Saint-Paul, Sinn, Sturm, and Vives, 2010). In a
broader context, Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) explore the link between the recession
that followed the financial crisis and mistrust in public institutions in the US. All
these studies use survey measures of trust to assess trust levels towards financial and
public institutions.6 We contribute to this literature by providing a measure of trust
in institutions that relies on incentivized choices and behavior rather than on reported
levels of trust.
We also contribute to the literature on the determinants of trust. The effects of
risk preferences on trust are mixed as some studies find no statistical relationship
(Eckel and Wilson, 2004; Houser, Schunk, and Winter, 2010) while others find a
relation between trust and risk attitudes (Schechter, 2007; Sapienza, Toldra-Simats,
and Zingales, 2013). Other-regarding preferences such as altruism have been shown
to have an effect in the amount sent in the trust game (Cox, 2004; Ashraf, Bohnet,
and Piankov, 2006). Betrayal aversion has been identified to play a role in trusting
behavior (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). From the perspective of survey measures of
trust, risk aversion, betrayal aversion and altruism have been also shown to correlate
with trust (Fehr, 2009). We contribute to the literature by contrasting our behavioral
and survey measures of institutional trust and showing that reported measures are
more driven by social preferences than our behavioral measures.
Our study further relates to the strand of the literature that investigates causal
links between trust and economic outcomes in both developed and developing countries
(Porta, Lopez-De-Silane, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and
Knack, 2001; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004, 2008; Karlan, 2005; Tu and Bulte,
6They use survey data from the World Value Survey (WVS), the General Social Survey (GSS) and
the Financial Trust Index Survey (FTIS).
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2010). In developing countries, the effects of trust on financial behavior have been
documented (Cole, Gine, Tobacman, Topalova, Townsend, and Vickery, 2013; Bachas,
Gertler, Higgins, and Seira, 2016; Mehrotra, Somville, et al., 2016). Karlan, Ratan,
and Zinman (2014) identify lack of trust as a barrier to savings by poor people (see also
Dupas, Green, Keats, and Robinson, 2014). We add to these insights by exploiting the
random variation generated by our experimental design and documenting the effects
of an exogenous variation on trust towards an institution on financial behavior.
Since we employ methods of time preference elicitation, our study is related to the
wide area of experimental work that measures intertemporal discounting. In partic-
ular, the survey by Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) emphasizes that
delayed rewards are subject to uncertainty, which could be a confounding factor in
the measurement. The importance of perceived risk in intertemporal choice has been
highlighted by Halevy (2008) and explicitly investigated with the implementation of
objective uncertainty by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b). Their work points to a
disproportionate preference for certainty over uncertainty.
Since the delay of a payment comes with inherent uncertainty about its future
enjoyment, the literature has always aimed to establish subjects’ trust in the exper-
imenter’s full commitment to realize the payment. For that purpose, it is common
practice to use notarized certificates, post-dated checks or equivalent financial instru-
ments to assure the future payment (e.g. Coller and Williams, 1999; Benjamin, Choi,
and Strickland, 2010; Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m, 2008). At times, stud-
ies appeal to the reputation of the investigator, use personal checks and distribute
business cards for possible complaints (e.g. Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a,b).
The literature on experimental time preference elicitation features two alternative
elicitation methods. In order to account appropriately for utility function curvature,
Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m (2008) use two multiple price lists (DMPL) of
binary choices for the simultaneous elicitation of time and risk preferences. Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012a,b) put forward a single elicitation that features a convex time
budget (CTB) to identify curvature and discounting at the same time. This method
has been subject of controversial debates (Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m, 2013; Cheung,
2015; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2015; Andreoni, Kuhn, and Sprenger, 2015) as the
profession is converging on the preferable method.
For our implementation we use the CTB-method for the high informational content
in each choice. However, we enabled a DMPL-type estimation by further eliciting
binary choices and risk preferences. We see that binary choices are highly predictive
of the choices from CTBs. Our results are robust across both approaches. However,
advances and convergence in the literature of time preference elicitation would improve
and facilitate trust measurements of the kind we propose.
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1.3 Experimental design
In our experiment, we measure trust in institutions with a method that is similar to
time preference elicitation. For this purpose, we vary between-subject the institution
that carries responsibility for the correct implementation of the later payment. Fur-
thermore, we vary within-subject whether the payment is secured by a post-dated
check. In the following, the chronology of a session guides us through the details of
the design.
A session begins with the first part of a questionnaire (from now on pre-questionnaire)
administered individually by a research assistant. Subsequently, subjects go through
the trust elicitation task (TE), the risk preference elicitation task (RPE) as well as the
trust game (TG), each starting with its respective instructions in the plenary. One
decision from TE and RPE is chosen for payment by a random draw of the subject.
Participants then answer the second part of the questionnaire (from now on post-
questionnaire) and finally collect their immediate payments from the one decision and
the TG.
1.3.1 Trust elicitation task
The main idea behind the trust elicitation task is that a subject places more resources
in the hands of an institution the higher is her belief of receiving these resources, bare
any legal commitment, from the institution in the future. By varying the institution or
providing benchmarks in the form of a check, changes in behavior allow us to estimate
the subjects’ beliefs P of compliance by the institution. We call P the level of trust
in institution I. The intertemporal utility of the allocation of money to two points in
time depends on the probability of obtaining the future payment as follows,
DU(ct, ct+d) = u(ct) + δ
d [P · u(ct+d) + (1− P ) · u(0)] . (1.1)
Decision Subjects are presented 36 decisions which feature two delay lengths until
the later payments, d = (7, 28) days, and two payment securements S = (NC,C),
depending on a securement in form of a check being offered (C) or not (NC). For
each combination of S and d, subjects are presented with nine different interest rates
(1 + r) ranging from 1 to 40.
Drawing on the Convex Time Budget (CTB) approach of Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012a), in each of the decisions subjects choose an amount ct ∈ [a, 150] in Philippine
Pesos (PHP) for immediate payment. The interest rate 1 + r determines the future
amount to be ct+d = (150 − ct) · (1 + r). For interest rates ranging from 1 to 2.67,
the budget set begins at a = 0. For 1 + r = (4, 8, 40), we set a = (50, 100, 140),
respectively, and thus cap the earnable amount ct+d at a maximum of 400. Table 1.1
presents the parameters of the 36 decisions.
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Table 1.1 Choice parameters in TE.
Delay Securement Minimum amount Interest rate Daily rate
d S a 1 + r 1 + rdaily
7 NC 0 1 1
7 NC 0 1.33 5.20
7 NC 0 1.67 8.57
7 NC 0 2 11.41
7 NC 0 2.33 13.87
7 NC 0 2.67 16.04
7 NC 50 4 22.90
7 NC 100 8 35.59
7 NC 140 40 70.38
28 NC 0 1 1
28 NC 0 1.33 2.03
28 NC 0 1.67 2.84
28 NC 0 2 3.51
28 NC 0 2.33 4.07
28 NC 0 2.67 4.57
28 NC 50 4 6.08
28 NC 100 8 8.71
28 NC 140 40 15.08
7 C 0 1 1
7 C 0 1.33 5.20
7 C 0 1.67 8.57
7 C 0 2 11.41
7 C 0 2.33 13.87
7 C 0 2.67 16.04
7 C 50 4 22.90
7 C 100 8 35.59
7 C 140 40 70.38
28 C 0 1 1
28 C 0 1.33 2.03
28 C 0 1.67 2.84
28 C 0 2 3.51
28 C 0 2.33 4.07
28 C 0 2.67 4.57
28 C 50 4 6.08
28 C 100 8 8.71
28 C 140 40 15.08
Decision protocol The 36 TE decisions are divided in four blocks of nine questions
with different interest rates. In the first and third blocks, subjects make their choices
for d = 7 and in the second and fourth blocks for d = 28. Once a block is finished,
subjects have to wait for the research assistant to enter a code and remind them of
the features of the new block. Depending on the order of NC and C, a payment
securement is offered in the two first or two last blocks. Between the first and last
two blocks, the instructor reminds subjects of the upcoming decisions and the change
in provision of the payment securement.
From the start of the instructions, posters with screenshots illustrate in detail the
decisions and help the understanding of the subjects. In each block, before they take
the payoff-relevant decisions, participants do a trial round and go over all upcoming
decisions. For simple and intuitive use, decisions are taken on tablet computers.7
7We used AndroidTM supported tablets and Open Data Kit (ODK), an open source survey pro-
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Throughout, subjects are accompanied by a research assistant ready to explain the
decision again. Appendix A.3 presents the instructions.
Each decision involves three steps. First, subjects make a binary choice between
extreme options ct = 150 and ct = a, similar to a multiple price list choice. After
thus getting familiar with the key parameters of the decision, subjects can choose
any amount ct ∈ [a, 150] in steps of 10. Both ct and the remaining amount ct+d =
(150− ct) · (1 + r) are visualized. Finally, subjects can refine their choice to the unit
level in a dropdown menu.8 The screenshots of these steps are presented below in
figure 1.1.9
gram.
8Only steps 2 and 3 are payoff relevant.
9The screenshots correspond to the trial session that the subjects did before the real ones. The
screenshots read “Later payment in 7/28 days”. The expression “7/28” is only for illustrative purposes.
Participants were always shown choices to be delivered in either 7 or 28 days.
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(a) Step 1.
(b) Step 2.
(c) Step 3.
Figure 1.1: Screenshots of the trust elicitation task in trial round.
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Payment procedures Given our study’s goal of measuring trust in institutions,
the specific arrangements for the later payment – and the subject’s understanding
thereof – are important. While the current payments, ct, are made at the end of the
session, the future payments are delivered in cash to the subjects’ homes. The subjects
are informed that the local institution, NWTF or ML, is responsible for storage and
delivery of the money. The money itself is handed over to the institution by the
experimenters after the session.10 Later payments are delivered by research assistants
representing the two different institutions.11
We vary the confidence in the payment exogenously by the provision of a post-
dated check for the future payment in half of the decisions (C). Many experiments
measuring time preferences use similar procedures to increase the subjects’ confidence
in the realization of the later payment (Coller and Williams, 1999; Benjamin, Choi,
and Strickland, 2010; Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m, 2008; Andreoni and
Sprenger, 2012b). Since the check provides the same payment securement for subjects
irrespective of the treatment institution, it provides a benchmark setting to which we
can relate the non-secured setting (NC) in each treatment.
The checks are presented as our, the experimenters’ means of choice for payment
securement, which we do not provide for all decisions. During instruction, partici-
pants are shown a sample check, signed and post-dated with the name of one of the
participants as an example (see appendix A.3). We place a stamp of the University of
Mannheim on the check. Overall, we intend to associate ourselves, researchers from
the University of Mannheim, with the check payment, not the unsecured payments.
In contrast, subjects know that the non-secured default procedure relies on the treat-
ment institution which safeguards the money in the meantime, a procedure outside of
the experimenter’s control after the handing over of the money envelopes.
The checks were issued from Banco de Oro (BDO), the largest bank in the Philip-
pines. While BDO branches are common in cities, they are less common in rural
areas. To avoid that subjects face large transportation costs when cashing the check
subjects are informed that we offer a second possibility to cash the checks within the
community. No details are provided before the payment at the end of the session. For
this option, NWTF kindly assisted with their local offices to cash the check out of our
funds. This procedure is implemented in all sessions, but subjects are only disclosed
the details of the local option after the decisions had been made. Subjects are familiar
with this form of payment.12
10The solvency of the institution is thus not problematic. The risk of the future payment depends
only on the reliability of the institution.
11667 subjects were to be paid in the future and only four did not receive their payment due
to absence and non-traceability. Subjects were contacted several times, one was not interested in
receiving the amount (20 PHP) and the others could not be reached. From the remaining three
subjects that could not be reached, two had a check as payment securement. Additionally, 6 people
cashed their checks mostly at the local option shortly before the due date. This was known at the
time of the delivery, and the envelopes with their later payments was not given to them, since they
had cashed their checks.
12The majority of our subjects are clients of NWTF, and have loans with them. Their loans are
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To account for order effects, we randomize the order of the (NC,C) decisions.
Thus, approximately half of the subjects first make 18 NC decisions without payment
securement and then 18 C decisions with payment securement (NC/C treatment) and
vice versa (C/NC treatment).
Although our study’s goals differ from standard time preferences elicitation studies,
our payment procedures are not only symmetric between treatments, the delivery to
the homes is implemented in order to equalize the transaction costs between the
possible payment dates. This ensures an unbiased measure of time discounting and
avoids any possible interaction of transaction costs with our treatments.
Other studies such as Coller and Williams (1999); Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and
Rutstro¨m (2008); Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) minimize the procedural difference
between the current and the future payment by implementing a front end delay. Our
focus on the uncertain nature of the future payment suggests to not have the front
end payment subject to such uncertainty, but to make sure that front end payment
arrangements do not differ between treatments.13
Institutions In order to see whether the trust measure can pick up differences
between institutions, we chose two financial institutions I ∈ {NWTF,ML} in which
subjects are expected to trust in to a different extent. Both institutions are well-known
and provide lending and savings products.14
Negros Women For Tomorrow Foundation (NWTF) The Negros Women
for Tomorrow Foundation is a nonprofit microfinance institution (MFI) that operates
in the Visayas Region of the Philippines. NWTF provides loans at modest rates to
poor women from rural communities to start or expand their own small businesses
following the Grameen Bank credit methodology of group lending (Besley and Coate,
1995). The loan program has a minimum loan of 1,000 PHP and a maximum of 30,000
PHP (between 21 and 638 EUR, approximately).
Local Money Lenders (ML) Local Money Lenders are an informal financial
institution in the Philippines also referred to as “5-6” lenders. They lend money usu-
ally to poor people that might not have access to formal lending institutions such as
banks or MFIs. These types of lenders charge a nominal interest rate of 20 percent
over a time period of usually one or two months. Local money lenders do not require
collateral or any documents from their borrowers (Kondo, 2003). “5-6” lenders are
disbursed through checks. 10% of our sample report never cashing a check before (123 subjects). Out
of which 56 correspond to members of four villages in which we randomly selected participants of
the village’s household list, and not of NWTF’s client pool. From the remaining 67, 66 were clients
of NWTF at the time of the baseline. It could be that someone cashed the check with their loan
disbursement for them, but they would know how a check works.
13As a consequence, we cannot estimate a potential present-bias.
14Although the experiment features future payments with interest and thus makes saving institu-
tions fit in naturally, the trust measure can universally be applied to any institution.
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widely known by the population and usually seen as a last resort for borrowing money.
In general, this type of credit institution has a negative reputation among the popu-
lation since it is perceived as charging very high interest rates to the detriment of the
borrower.15 The identity of the individual money lender is not revealed to subjects,
but the institution is well-known in the whole population.
Our sample is in its majority current or previous clients of NWTF (95%).16 To try
our measure we want to use an institution that is equally known for everyone. One
way of guaranteeing that was to use the client pool of NWTF. As another benchmark
institution, it would be ideal to use an institution that the majority of subjects know.
We selected ML since it is a well-known institution throughout the country, partially
solving that problem. However, due to security reasons, the exact identity of the ML
could not be disclosed. We could work with the ML institution on the condition of
anonymity. This implies that people assigned to the ML treatment would draw on
their own previous experiences and private information about local money lenders
when making their choices.17
1.3.2 Risk preference elicitation task
In the experiment’s second task, subjects allocate money between a safe and a risky
lottery in 18 decisions. The parameters of the task are chosen analogously to the
TE task, the risky lottery mimics the later payment that possibly does not take
place. Winning the risky lottery multiplies the money allocated by 1 + r ∈ {2, 4},
losing it reduces the payment to 0. The 9 probabilities of winning the lottery are
pw ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9}. The safe lottery pays out the amount allocated to it for sure.
Like before, subjects allocate an amount l ∈ [a, 150] to the safe lottery and thus obtain
a prize of (1 + r) · (150 − l) when winning the lottery. The amount of a is 0 and 50
for the two values of r, respectively, analogue to TE. Table 1.2 presents the choice
parameters and appendix A.3 presents the screenshots of the task.
1.3.3 Trust game
In order to have a behavioral measure of general trust we implement the trust game.
This game is played in a way similar to the original one by Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe (1995) and does not differ across treatments. Participants are randomly
assigned to the role of investor or investee. Investors are given an initial endowment
of PHP 50. They then choose an amount ranging from 0 to PHP 50 to send to the
investee. This amount is tripled and the investee chooses how much to send back from
15The lucrative and risky business attracts many Indian nationals and has a long history in the
Philippines (Times of India, 2013).
1677 subjects were randomly selected from four villages’ household list (outside of NWTF pool of
clients). Out of which 2 are clients of NWTF and 5 had been clients in the past.
17Only 18% of subjects in the ML treatment report knowing who is the institution responsible for
the future payment.
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Table 1.2 Choice parameters in RPE.
Interest rate Minimum Amount Probability EV of ∆l
1 + r a pw PHP
2 0 0.1 0.2
2 0 0.2 0.4
2 0 0.3 0.6
2 0 0.4 0.8
2 0 0.5 1
2 0 0.6 1.2
2 0 0.7 1.4
2 0 0.8 1.6
2 0 0.9 1.8
4 50 0.1 0.4
4 50 0.2 0.8
4 50 0.3 1.2
4 50 0.4 1.6
4 50 0.5 2
4 50 0.6 2.4
4 50 0.7 2.8
4 50 0.8 3.2
4 50 0.9 3.6
the tripled amount. Participants do not know which participant has been matched
with them in the opposite role.
1.4 Theoretical background and statistical model
We assume the expected utility framework with exponential discounting
DU(ct, ct+d) = u(ct + ω) + δ
dPu(ct+d + ω) + δ
d(1− P )u(0 + ω), (1.2)
where u(·) is a separable and stationary over time utility function, ct is the payment
at time t, ct+d is the payment d periods into the future of t, ω is background con-
sumption, and δ is the discount factor. Importantly, P is our parameter of interest,
namely the probability that the subject attaches to receiving the future payment from
institution I. With probability P the subject receives the future payment ct+d, and
with probability 1− P the subject does not receive the future monetary outcome, in
this case he gets 0.18
In order to properly estimate P , we estimate the discount factor δ and the cur-
vature of the utility function. We therefore implement three statistical specifications.
Specification 1 uses only the TE data, and we implement it with two different utility
functions (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012b, similar to). Specifications 2 and 3 make use
of both the TE and the RPE data. While specification 2 is based on the choices from
the convex budget sets, specification 3 uses the binary choices (Andersen, Harrison,
Lau, and Rutstro¨m, 2008, similar to). Implementing the three specifications allows
for comparisons across methods and robustness checks of the estimates.
18We assume that the institution is believed to deliver either the full promised amount or nothing
in period t + d. We view the belief that the institution shows up to provide only a fraction of the
promised amount as very unlikely.
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1.4.1 Specification 1: theoretical and statistical model
Thanks to the CTB design, specification 1 delivers estimates of both discounting and
curvature on the basis of the TE data alone. The structure follows the setup of
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a).
CRRA utility Consider a time separable CRRA utility function for current con-
sumption ct and future consumption ct+d,
DU(ct, ct+d) =
1
α
(ct − ω)α + 1
α
δdP (ct+d − ω)α + 1
α
δd(1− P )(0− ω)α. (1.3)
Maximizing the utility subject to the future valued budget constraint,
m = ct(1 + r) + ct+d, (1.4)
the optimal consumption allocation for α < 1 is characterized by
ct − ω
ct+d − ω =
[
(1 + r)Pδd
] 1
α−1
. (1.5)
Taking logs of equation 1.5, we get the estimable equation
ln
(
ct − ω
ct+d − ω
)
=
(
1
α− 1
)
· ln(1 + r) +
(
lnP
α− 1
)
· 1S +
(
ln δ
α− 1
)
· d, (1.6)
in which 1S is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 when there is no payment
securement (NC) and 0 when there is a payment securement (C).
The random assignment of treatments allows us to obtain unbiased estimates of
our parameters by estimating
y = γ1 ln(1 + r) + γ2 · 1S + γ3 · d, (1.7)
where y = ln
(
ct−ω
ct+d−ω
)
. Rearrangements of the estimated coefficients γˆ allow us to
calculate our parameters of interest, the curvature parameter αˆ = 1γˆ1
−1, the discount
rate δˆ = exp
(
γˆ3
γˆ1
)
, and Pˆ = exp
(
γˆ2
γˆ1
)
.
Exponential utility Consider now a time separable constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) utility function:
DU(ct, ct+d) = −
[
exp(−ρ(ct − ω)) + δdP exp(−ρ(ct+d − ω)) + δd(1− P ) exp(−ρ(0− ω))
]
,
(1.8)
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where ρ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Under this specification, the optimal
consumption allocation is defined by the equation
exp (−ρ(ct − ct+d)) = (1 + r)(δkP ).
Taking logs yields a similar estimable equation independent of ω
ct − ct+d =
(
1
−ρ
)
· ln(1 + r) +
(
lnP
−ρ
)
· 1S +
(
ln δ
−ρ
)
· d,
whose rearrangement allows us to estimate the parameters of interest as before.
1.4.2 Specification 2 and 3: theoretical model and statistical specification
We use a simple stochastic specification that translates the discounted utility into
choice probabilities, allowing us to specify likelihoods conditional on the model. This
is an extension of the probabilistic approach used by Holt and Laury (2002) and
Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m (2008) that has been outlined by Harrison,
Lau, and Rutstro¨m (2013) as an appropriate analogue for CTB data. This approach
deals with corner choices and the constrained action space in a natural way and allows
for the incorporation of the RPE data.
In the two specifications, we implement a CRRA utility function for choices from
both RPE and TE. For the latter, the specification is identical to equation 1.3.
Theoretical model for RPE For RPE choices, the expected utility can be written
as
EU(l) =
1
α
pw[(1 + r) · (150− l) + l − ω]α + 1
α
(1− pw) · [0 + l − ω]α. (1.9)
Recall that subjects can allocate an amount l ∈ [a, 150] to the safe lottery. The
complementary amount (150 − l) is allocated to the risky lottery, which turns into
(1 + r) · (150− l) with probability pw when the lottery is won and 0 otherwise.
Therefore, equation 1.9 represents the situation that the subject faces depending
on the state of the world. If pw realizes and the lottery is won, then the subject’s
outcome is the amount l assigned to the safe option plus the payment (1+r) · (150− l)
from the risky lottery plus the background consumption ω. However if 1−pw realizes,
the subject gets l plus 0 from the risky lottery plus the background consumption ω.
Statistical specification Let us denote as U(z) the utility DU(c) or EU(l), de-
pending on the task being TE or RPE, respectively. We define the index ∇U (“nabla
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U”).19
∇U(z) = U(z)∑150
z˜=a U(z˜)
. (1.10)
This index translates the discounted utility into a probability. The denominator
reflects the feasible actions available to the subject, z ∈ [a, 150].
The log-likelihood of observing the K decisions zik of individual i is then
lnLi =
K∑
k=1
ln∇U(zik).
The sample likelihood is the sum over all individual likelihoods
LU =
∑
i
lnLi =
∑
i
K∑
k=1
ln∇U(zik). (1.11)
The joint likelihood of TE and RPE can be expressed as
L = LDU + LEU . (1.12)
1.4.3 Specification 3
The binary data from the first decision step in the decision can similarly be analyzed
with this stochastic specification. Just like the denominator previously accounted for
the constrained action space, it now reflects binary data with a simple two-term sum.
The index becomes
∇U(z) = U(z)
U(a) + U(150)
. (1.13)
The further analysis works analogously to the previous estimation procedure and
is – due to the binary data – the most similar to the procedure in Andersen, Harrison,
Lau, and Rutstro¨m (2008).
1.4.4 Discussion
Our way of measuring trust builds on experimental methods and estimation techniques
designed to analyse time preferences. At the time of setting up the experiment, the
two main methods are on the one hand joint estimations of multiple price lists for
time and risk (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m, 2008) and on the other hand
the Convex Time Budget method (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a).
19We refrain from the formulation with a precision parameter ν. For convex utility (α > 1) – a likely
outcome of this specification with a high frequency of corner choices (see later results and Harrison,
Lau, and Rutstro¨m, 2013) – this parameter is not separately identified from α. For us, robustness of
the trust estimates for a given level of ν = 1 is sufficient.
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For our purposes, the latter seems particularly fitting since (a) its convex budget
set nests the MPL approach, thus providing weakly more information, and (b) the
action space can reflect consequences of variations in P in fine nuances.
For example, we can construct a rough trust measure by simply relating the con-
sumption choices in the C and NC treatments. A subject’s “ct-ratio” ,
cCt
cNCt
, is equal
to 1 if the securement does not influence the money allocation over time. It is smaller
than 1 if the current consumption ct with securement is smaller and thus the invest-
ment in the future is higher. It is expected that the estimate Pˆ is 1 when the ct-ratio
is 1 and that in general ct-ratio is proportional to Pˆ .
The method has been subject of vivid discussions. On the basis of the Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012b) data, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m (2013) expect a convex
utility function that explains the frequently occurring corner allocations. They deem
these implausible results to be a consequence of poor comprehension of subjects. We
observe a smaller, but still substantial share of corner allocations. The distribution
of choices over the interval [0, 150] is shown in appendix A.1. At the same time, the
method has been applied successfully to numerous studies in laboratory experiments,
in developing countries and on children and teenagers (see Andreoni and Sprenger,
2015, for references).
We use the CTB implementation and deliberately added features of the MPL
framework in order to obtain a more holistic perspective on the trust measure.20 In
particular, the binary decision at the beginning of each choice and the elicitation of risk
preferences for each subject allow us to analyse behavior with the tools of MPL and
joint estimation. The plenary and individual instructions, the tablet implementation
and posters are in place to make sure subjects comprehend the tasks at hand.
1.5 Data and sample statistics
The experiments were conducted in the Philippine provinces of Guimaras, Capiz and
Iloilo during the months of March, April and May 2015. Overall, 1,251 subjects took
part in the experiment. The experiment took place during a morning or afternoon and
lasted about 3 hours. On average, subjects were paid 290.15 PHP (ca. 6.17 EUR).21
Subjects participating in our study are clients of NWTF22 and are randomly se-
lected from the pool of clients in the three provinces. Individuals are randomly as-
signed to four treatment groups, following the 2×2 design with two institutions and
two orders of the payment securement.23
20Recent evidence by Andreoni, Kuhn, and Sprenger (2015) suggests advantages of CTB over double
MPLs in terms of out-of-sample prediction.
21The exchange rate at the time of the experiment was 47 PHP for 1 EUR. Thus 150 PHP amount
to 3.19 EUR.
22Out of the 1,251 subjects, 77 are not NWTF members, but randomly chosen community members
of villages with NWTF clients.
23Prior to randomization, we divide our sample into 60 bins, each of which contains on average
90 clients. The bins are composed of clients in different locations, and the criteria to form a bin is
the minimal distance between villages within the bin and number of clients. The bins are randomly
28 1 MEASURING TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS
In order to recruit the participants we first get permission from the Municipality
Mayor and subsequently from the Village head, locally known as Barangay Captain.
Barangay Captains would additionally authorize the use of the village facilities, usually
the Barangay Hall, where we hold the experiment sessions. Subjects are invited to
participate in the experiment via an invitation letter delivered to their houses.
1.5.1 Trust survey questions
In the post-questionnaire after the incentivized games, we elicit general trust attitudes
and trust in institutions with standard survey questions. In particular, we use General
Social Survey (GSS) questions on trust: “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?”,
fairness: “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a
chance, or would they try to be fair” and helpfulness: “Would you say that most of the
time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?”.
The particular trust question, however, has raised concerns since it might not only
be drawing on people’s belief about others’ trustworthiness, but also on their own
preferences towards risks. (Fehr, 2009; Miller and Mitamura, 2003). Thus, we also
include a direct trust question “Do you think that most people can be trusted?” with
answer categories on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” (1) to “completely
trusted” (7) as in Miller and Mitamura (2003).
We adapt the direct trust questions to the institutions we are interested in, imple-
menting them for both ML and NWTF, for the full sample. The trust, fairness and
helpfulness questions as in the GSS are adapted for NWTF. The direct trust question
is also asked for other institutions, family members, lending center members, lending
group members and the loan officer.
1.5.2 Sample statistics
Table 1.3 reports summary statistics for the full sample and the different treatments,
as well as the equality of means t-test between the order treatments (NC/C and C/NC)
and the institution treatments (NWTF and ML).
Our sample is composed in its majority of women (97%), which is to be expected
since we are drawing mainly from the client pool of NWTF and their clients are
women.24 Subjects are on average 43 years old, they have 8.8 years of education
and their household has around 5 members. Less than half of them are employed,
and roughly half have a regular income. The people in our sample are poor, earning
assigned to one of the four treatments (NWTF, ML, C/NC, NC/C), and subsequently subjects are
randomly chosen within each bin. Using an optimally designed mechanism that guarantees similarity
across the four groups in terms of financial characteristics (loan size and amount of savings), village size
and distance from the village to the municipality center. This procedure minimizes the Mahalanobis
distance of the covariates to its cluster average weighted by the covariance matrix (see Morgan and
Rubin, 2012).
24The 44 men in our sample are not members of NWTF.
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a monthly income of approximately 1,500 PHP (33 EUR) and having an individ-
ual weekly consumption of 350 PHP (7 EUR) and of 1000 PHP (21 EUR) for the
household, implying a daily consumption of 50 PHP. Half of the participants live in a
dwelling with cement floors and 88% own their dwelling.
Subjects borrow on average 6,000 PHP (127 EUR) from microfinance institutions
and banks and save approximately one fourth of that amount. On a scale from “1–
no trust” to “7–complete trust”, the trust level is on average 6 in NWTF and 3.8
in the local money lender. Subjects report to be slightly risk averse, trying to avoid
betrayal and to be taken advantage of, and are willing to offend if offended and to take
revenge in case they suffer a serious wrong. Subjects report that the nearest bank is
approximately 32 minutes away, and 90% of the subjects have cashed a check before.
Given that the treatments are randomly assigned, we expect individuals in the
NWTF treatment to be similar to individuals in the ML treatment, and individuals in
the NC/C treatment to be similar to individuals in the C/NC treatment. The table
shows that our expectation holds in general. The number of significant differences are
within the bounds expected to occur by chance.
Some differences are worth discussing. The distance to the bank is significantly
different between subjects in the NWTF treatment and those in the ML treatment.
This difference, however, is driven by remote outliers. When we exclude the top 1
percentile, the difference loses statistical significance. Further, we provide a local
cashing option, which makes the distance to the bank not so important. The same
is true for the variable “Ever cashed a check”, as clients of NWTF receive the loan
disbursement through a check, however 77 subjects are not clients of NWTF and once
they are excluded the difference reverses. Finally, the variable that asks whether the
subject knows the institution presents a considerable difference.
Our subjects are in its vast majority clients of NWTF, therefore a large share of
the sample knows the institution. However, only 18% of subjects in the ML treatment
report to know the institution. As mentioned earlier, this is probably due to the fact
that the exact identity of the money lender was not disclosed. On one hand due to
security reasons for the money lender, and on the other hand we wanted that each
subject related the institution to whatever knowledge of a local money lender they
have.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full ML− NC/C−
Sample ML NWTF NWTF NC/C C/NC C/NC
Age 42.90 43.04 42.79 0.244 43.14 42.68 0.459
(0.675) (0.669)
Years of education 8.799 8.798 8.800 -0.00257 8.776 8.820 -0.0447
(0.165) (0.163)
Married 0.835 0.855 0.820 0.0357∗ 0.816 0.852 -0.0366∗
(0.0213) (0.0211)
Household size 5.358 5.335 5.375 -0.0402 5.381 5.337 0.0438
(0.120) (0.119)
Employed 0.473 0.490 0.461 0.0287 0.470 0.476 -0.00588
(0.0288) (0.0285)
Regular income 0.557 0.568 0.550 0.0180 0.557 0.558 -0.00124
(0.0285) (0.0282)
Monthly income (PHP) 1539.7 1491.8 1576.5 -84.73 1615.3 1471.7 143.6
(251.8) (250.0)
Background consumption 350.2 351.7 348.7 3.004 342.2 357.2 -15.03
(weekly) (22.05) (22.06)
HH Background consumption 1002.7 1025.7 981.2 44.49 1041.1 968.3 72.78∗
(weekly) (42.14) (42.14)
Official position in village 0.0794 0.0827 0.0769 0.00578 0.0711 0.0869 -0.0158
(0.0155) (0.0153)
Rooms in HH for sleeping 1.796 1.835 1.766 0.0682 1.773 1.816 -0.0423
(0.0449) (0.0445)
Cement floor at dwelling 0.496 0.506 0.488 0.0175 0.492 0.498 -0.00609
(0.0286) (0.0284)
Flush toilet at dwelling 0.887 0.898 0.878 0.0202 0.885 0.889 -0.00378
(0.0181) (0.0180)
Electricity at dwelling 0.878 0.885 0.873 0.0126 0.880 0.877 0.00334
(0.0187) (0.0186)
HH source of drinking water 0.365 0.370 0.361 0.00946 0.376 0.355 0.0205
(0.0276) (0.0273)
Own dwelling 0.888 0.883 0.892 -0.00907 0.888 0.889 -0.000225
(0.0180) (0.0179)
N 1249 533 716 1249 592 657 1249
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
(a) Pre-questionnaire data collected before experiment.
Table 1.3 Descriptive statistics.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full ML− NC/C−
Sample ML NWTF NWTF NC/C C/NC C/NC
Am’t borrowed from MFI/Banks 5959.9 5917.6 5996.3 -78.69 5861.5 6047.8 -186.3
(429.2) (428.6)
Savings in MFI/rural bank 1471.3 1431 1504.5 -73.46 1134.7 1783.8 -649.2
(397.2) (394.7)
Trust level in NWTF1 6.144 6.113 6.168 -0.0550 6.090 6.193 -0.104
(0.0784) (0.0776)
Trust level in ML1 3.831 3.822 3.838 -0.0162 3.794 3.865 -0.0706
(0.114) (0.113)
Risk preference2 4.209 4.259 4.172 0.0871 4.294 4.132 0.161
(0.147) (0.146)
Betrayal aversion3 1.660 1.666 1.655 0.0110 1.688 1.635 0.0528
(0.0854) (0.0845)
Avoid being taken advantage of3 1.827 1.760 1.877 -0.117 1.904 1.758 0.146
(0.0952) (0.0943)
Revenge if suffer serious wrong4 6.476 6.503 6.455 0.0475 6.412 6.533 -0.121
(0.0748) (0.0740)
Reciprocity5 6.421 6.433 6.412 0.0214 6.395 6.444 -0.0492
(0.0791) (0.0784)
Sociability6 4.234 4.233 4.235 -0.00199 4.221 4.245 -0.0238
(0.0704) (0.0697)
Bank distance (minutes) 32.25 35.23 30.03 5.192∗∗∗ 32.39 32.12 0.272
(1.942) (1.929)
Ever cashed a check 0.902 0.925 0.884 0.0409∗∗ 0.909 0.895 0.0138
(0.0170) (0.0169)
Knows institution 0.538 0.183 0.870 -0.687∗∗∗ 0.515 0.559 -0.0432
(0.0218) (0.0301)
Trustworthiness 5.805 5.819 5.793 0.0262 5.796 5.813 -0.0173
beliefs7 (0.0976) (0.0977)
N 1249 533 716 1249 592 657 1249
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1 1–no trust, 7–complete trust,
2 Avoid/prepared to take risks: 1–avoid, 7–fully prepared,
3 Avoid being betrayed/taken advantage of: 1–completely avoid, 7–do not avoid,
4 1–revenge, 7–no revenge,
5 If offended, offend back?: 1–offend,7–not offend,
6 Meet friends, relatives, neighbor: 1–never, 2–seldom, 3–monthly, 4–weekly, 5–daily,
7 How certain is payment in 28 days?: 1–surely not reach me, 7–absolutely certain.
(b) Post-questionnaire data collected before experiment.
Table 1.3 Descriptive statistics.
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1.6 Results
In this section, we report basic patterns in simple statistics of the data and then
proceed to the trust results from the structural estimations.
1.6.1 Descriptive statistics
In response to the experimental variations in terms of payment securement, institution,
delay d, and interest rate 1 + r, we expect four effects to show in the choice behavior.
First, the payment securement in form of the check is expected to influence the
subjective probability of receiving the later payment in a positive way. This increase
in expected future payment should result in an increased “investment” and a reduced
current consumption.
Effect 1 Ceteris paribus, choices with check provision result in lower current con-
sumption than choices without check provision.
Second, given the differences in the formality and reputation of the two financial
institutions, we expect the subjects to exhibit more trust in the more formal institution
NWTF. Compared to ML, the allocation to the future payment is then higher in
expectation and should result in an increased “investment” and a reduced current
consumption.
Effect 2 Ceteris paribus, choices with the responsible institution being NWTF result
in lower current consumption than with ML.
Third, due to standard exponential time discounting, a higher delay d makes the
investment with a given interest rate less attractive. Therefore, since under d = 28
the later payment will be discounted more heavily, the smaller present value of the
later payment should result in a higher current consumption than under d = 7.
Effect 3 Ceteris paribus, the stronger discounting under the longer delay results in
higher current consumption choices under d = 28 than under d = 7.
Finally, for similar reasons, a higher interest rate 1 + r makes the investment more
attractive and should lead to lower current consumption as 1 + r increases.
Effect 4 Ceteris paribus, a higher interest rate results in lower current consumption
choices.
For a first glance at the data, table 1.4 presents average differences over all decisions
for the three first effects. The data indeed exhibits the first two effects while the effect
of time discounting does not appear.
Column 1 shows that – as expected – without a payment securement, current
consumption is significantly higher by 16.21 PHP than with the securement. Figure
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Table 1.4 Equality of means test for ct.
(1) (2) (3)
∆ NC−C ML−NWTF 7−28 Days
∆ct 16.19
∗∗∗ 4.293∗∗ 0.245
(0.000) (0.023) (0.597)
N 45036 45036 45036
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered on the
subject level.
1.2 graphically illustrates this differences with the average choices by securement and
institutions for interest rates 1 + r < 3. For both institutions, the left panel (NC)
shows visibly higher current consumption levels than the right panel (C). The clear
downward trend in the interest rate 1 + r provides support for the fourth effect.
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Figure 1.2: Current consumption ct by interest rate and institution: NC vs.C.
Column 2 of table 1.4 shows that the current consumption is significantly higher
by 4.29 PHP in the ML treatment than in the NWTF treatment. This regularity is
also visible in figure 1.2.
The differences between institutions are quantified in table 1.5. Interestingly, with-
out check securement, the difference in the current consumption between the two insti-
tutions is statistically significant at each interest rate level as shown in the top of table
1.5. However, when the check is provided the difference in current consumption across
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the institution treatments is smaller and in most cases not significantly different from
zero as shown in the bottom of table 1.5. This suggests that as expected the check
securement reduces the relevance of the two institutions responsible for payment.
In order to arrive at the institutional trust measure we relate the choices in NC
to the ones in C, normalizing the latter to P = 1. The remaining choice differences
between institutions in C imply that even when the check is provided, beliefs or
preferences towards the institutions still matter slightly. This might result in an
overestimation of trust if the ct choice in the ideal P = 1 scenario was even lower.
Also, due to the remaining differences in C, the magnitude of differences in trust
between institutions could be underestimated.
Table 1.5 Equality of means tests of ct by interest rate (∆ct = c
ML
t − cNWTFt ).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 + r 1 1.33 1.67 2 2.33 2.67 4 8 40
∆ct 6.35
∗∗ 6.61∗∗ 4.90 6.00∗∗ 7.74∗∗ 5.96∗ 5.38∗∗ 2.37∗∗ 0.43∗
NC (0.040) (0.032) (0.107) (0.048) (0.012) (0.050) (0.013) (0.036) (0.061)
∆ct 6.26
∗∗ 4.58 3.15 4.85 4.15 4.03 3.29∗ 1.03 0.18
C (0.049) (0.137) (0.308) (0.108) (0.159) (0.172) (0.091) (0.252) (0.329)
N 2502 2502 2502 2502 2502 2502 2502 2502 2502
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered on the
subject level.
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Finally, column 3 of table 1.4 suggests that there is no statistically significant
difference in current consumption between delay lengths d = 7 and d = 28 days.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the differences by interest rate for both NC and C. Table 1.6
shows that there is no significant difference in current consumption between the two
delay lengths for any level of the interest rate. The results suggest that if there is any
discounting, it is very small.
60
70
80
90
10
0
0 .5 1 1.5 0 .5 1 1.5
NC C
d=7 d=28
Cu
rre
nt
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Interest rate r
Figure 1.3: Current consumption ct by interest rate and delay lengths: NC vs.C.
Table 1.6 Equality of means tests of ct by interest rate (∆ct = c
7
t − c28t ).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 + r 1 1.33 1.67 2 2.33 2.67 4 8 40
∆ct -0.98 -0.75 -0.99 -0.21 1.21 1.08 -0.96 -0.11 0.15
NC (0.474) (0.578) (0.459) (0.877) (0.338) (0.422) (0.300) (0.829) (0.105)
∆ct 2.01 1.31 -0.13 -0.20 -0.01 2.40
∗∗ 0.36 0.19 0.05
C (0.180) (0.343) (0.920) (0.880) (0.991) (0.049) (0.687) (0.652) (0.517)
N 2502 2502 2502 2502 2502 2502 2502 2502 2502
Notes: p-values in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered on the
subject level.
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1.6.2 Estimation
Specification 1: CRRA utility Table 1.7 presents two-limit Tobit Maximum
Likelihood estimates following section 1.4.1.25 In columns 1-2, the estimated CRRA
curvature αˆ is estimated around 0.77, a level in between estimates of Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012a, αˆ ∈ [0.71, 0.92]) and Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m (2008,
αˆ = 0.26). The daily discount rate δˆ is estimated to be close to 1, with a level signifi-
cantly higher than 1 in NWTF.26
Removing the payment securement is estimated to significantly change the per-
ceived probability of receiving the later payment. This probability is 0.44 in the
NWTF sample, higher than the 0.34 in the ML sample. Therefore, compared to a
benchmark with a payment securement that is independent of the institution, the
trust in a non-secured payment from NWTF is higher than for ML. The difference is
statistically significant, we reject the null hypothesis that PˆNWTF = PˆML (χ
2
1 = 15.71,
p < 0.001).
When including background consumption in the utility function, we set ω =
−50.25 PHP, the average daily consumption in our sample. As shown in columns
3-4, this reduces the estimates of the CRRA parameter as in Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012a) and in Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m (2008) due to the required cur-
vature at the shifted wealth level. However, the reduction is stronger in our case and
more in line with the results of Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m (2008). In this
specification the probability Pˆ of receiving the later payment is 0.53 for the NWTF
sample and 0.46 for the ML sample. The difference is again statistically significant,
we reject the null hypothesis that PˆNWTF = PˆML (χ
2
1 = 16.04, p < 0.01).
Overall, compared to an independent benchmark with payment securement, we
can see that the trust in the institution as expressed in the probability of receiving
the later payment is relatively low. As we expected, the level of trust in NWTF is
higher than the level of trust in ML. The differences in the levels between the two
institutions are, however, gradual and smaller than expected.
Specification 1: CARA utility The exponential CARA utility specification is a
useful robustness check that is independent of background consumption levels. Results
are presented in columns 5-6 in table 1.7. As before, we estimate our model separately
for both NWTF and ML. We find that the curvature parameter ρ is estimated to be
0.005, similar to the parameter estimated by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a). The
differences in discount rates are qualitatively similar to the previous specification.27
25Due to the estimation technique, we restrict the sample to the choices with unconstrained action
space for 1 + r < 3.
26The curvature αˆ is not statistically different between the NWTF and ML treatments (χ21 = 0.75,
p = 0.386). However, we reject the null hypothesis that δNWTF = 1 (χ
2
1 = 8.70, p < 0.01), while we
do not reject δML = 1 (χ
2
1 = 0.00, p = 0.949).
27Similar to our CRRA utility estimates, we find that curvature when estimated for the NWTF
sample is not significantly different to curvature when estimated for the ML sample. We do not reject
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Table 1.7 CRRA and CARA parameters estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NWTF ML NWTF ML NWTF ML
Curvature αˆ (CRRA) 0.770 0.781 0.111 0.128
(0.0099) (0.0119) (0.0259) (0.0327)
Curvature ρˆ (CARA) 0.005 0.005
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Daily discount rate δˆ 1.004 1.000 1.002 0.9995 1.002 0.9998
(0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0010)
Pˆ 0.437 0.345 0.534 0.464 0.602 0.536
(0.0197) (0.0232) (0.0140) (0.0174) (0.0117) (0.0147)
Back. cons. ω -0.01 -0.01 -50.25 -50.25
Observations 17232 12792 17232 12792 17232 12792
LL -38084.6 -27636.4 -21608.8 -16253.4 -66977.4 -47398.4
Uncensored 9244 6354 9244 6354 9244 6354
Clusters 718 533 718 533 718 533
Notes: Two-limit Tobit Maximum Likelihood estimators. Standard errors in parenthesis calculated via
the delta method.
Compared to the benchmark setting with check, the probability attached to receiving
the later payment by the institution, is 0.60 for NWTF and 0.54 for ML. The dif-
ference is statistically significant, we reject the null hypothesis that PˆNWTF = PˆML
(χ21 = 19.86, p < 0.001). For now, we favor this specification over others since it is
independent of ω and makes use of the choices from the CTB.
Specification 2 and 3: convex choice sets and binary choice data Table 1.8
presents the results from the probabilistic specification that are based on both the
TE and the RPE decisions.28 Due to many corner allocations, the estimates for α are
indeed such that the curvature is greater than 1, as hypothesized by Harrison, Lau,
and Rutstro¨m (2013).29 At the same time, the daily discount rate is now lower at
values around 0.97. This difference to the earlier estimates results probably from the
compensation of the now risk-loving attitude towards the risky future payment.
Finally, table 1.9 presents the results of estimating our probabilistic model with
the binary data. We find that Pˆ is estimated to be 0.52 for NWTF and 0.43 for the
ML. Results are lower when background consumption is included, but the difference
between the institutions persists. Estimates for the curvature parameter are consid-
erably lower than those found for the convex sets. For NWTF, αˆ = 0.334 when no
background consumption is included and αˆ = 0.669 when background consumption is
-50.25. For ML, these values are 0.266 and 0.572, respectively. These results are in
ρNWTF = ρML, (χ
2
1 = 0.01, p = 0.907). However, we reject the null hypothesis that δNWTF = 1,
(χ21 = 7.94, p = 0.005), while we do not reject δML = 1, (χ
2
1 = 0.04, p = 0.851).
28Results based on only the TE decisions are qualitatively similar and reproduced in appendix A.2.
29The data is suggestive of the existence of both types of players, those with predominant corner
allocations (α > 1) and those with mostly interior allocations (α < 1).
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line with those of Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m (2008). The discount rate
is estimated to be at or slightly above 1 throughout the different specifications.
Table 1.8 CRRA parameters estimates from probabilistic specification.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NWTF ML NWTF ML
CRRA Curvature αˆ 1.853 1.910 2.308 2.374
(0.045) (0.052) (0.065) (0.075)
Daily discount rate δˆ 0.984 0.974 0.984 0.974
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Pˆ 0.313 0.271 0.303 0.258
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Background consumption ω -0.01 -0.01 -50.25 -50.25
Observations 38772 28782 38772 28782
LL -176938.54 -131316.57 -177324.97 -131661.89
Table 1.9 CRRA parameters estimates from probabilistic specification, using the bi-
nary choices.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NWTF ML NWTF ML
CRRA Curvature αˆ 0.334 0.266 0.669 0.572
(0.018) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026)
Daily discount rate δˆ 1.010 1.002 1.022 1.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Pˆ 0.523 0.437 0.291 0.103
(0.032) (0.041) (0.050) (0.074)
Background consumption ω -0.01 -0.01 -50.25 -50.25
Observations 38772 28782 38772 28782
LL -25212.08 -18935.396 -25802.883 -19381.035
1.6.3 Individual Estimates
To conclude the results of these data we explore the possibility of estimating individual
trust estimates. Tables 1.10 to 1.12 present statistics of individual estimates of trust,
curvature parameter and discount factors for specifications 1, 2 and 3. For each
subject, we estimate the parameters of equation 1.3 using our different econometric
specifications, restricting ω1 = ω2 = 0. The parameters Pˆ , αˆ and δˆ are estimated using
the two-limit Tobit maximum likelihood estimator shown in table 1.10, restricting the
sample to the unconstrained choice sets for 1 + r < 3. In tables 1.11 and 1.12, we
estimate the parameters jointly using the trust elicitation and the risk elicitation tasks,
with the data from the convex budget sets and the binary data, respectively.
Using the Tobit model, we are able to estimate the trust parameters for 740 sub-
jects as shown in table 1.10. Although convergence is achieved for 925 subjects, 185
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subjects have an estimated αˆ ≥ 1, which leads to implausible estimates of the trust
and delta parameters, given that the optimality condition only holds for α < 1. We
therefore restrict our analysis to subjects with αˆ < 1. The median estimated trust is
0.67, slightly larger than the estimates presented in table 1.7. The median estimated
αˆ is 0.63, slightly lower than the estimates for the full sample. The median δˆ is 1.
The differences might be due to the non-reported subjects. Their average current
consumption with and without securement is smaller than for reported subjects. This
might be the reason for median individual estimates of αˆ being lower compared to the
results in table 1.7.
Individual parameter estimates of specifications 2 and 3 are presented in tables
1.11 and 1.12. When we estimate the individual parameters using our probabilistic
model with the convex budget sets data, the estimated median Pˆ is 0.38, similar to
our estimates in table 1.8. The estimated median αˆ is 2.22 and the estimated median
δˆ is 0.96. The number of subjects for which we are able to estimate the parameters at
the individual level is considerably low, at 385, due to the strong data requirements
of this method. For each subject, we only have 54 data points in total, which might
not be enough for such a demanding estimation procedure.
Estimates of individual parameters in this model with the binary data are pre-
sented in table 1.12. The estimated median Pˆ is 0.46, in line with our estimates
presented in table 1.9. The estimated αˆ is 0.60 and the estimated δˆ is 1.01, both in
line with our results. As before, we find that the number of subjects for which we
are able to individually estimate the parameters is low with 442. Compared to the
probabilistic estimation using the convex budget set data, and similar to the previous
estimation, we find that the median estimate of αˆ is closer to the common estimates
in the literature when the parameters are estimated using the binary data.
Figure 1.4 illustrates the distribution of Pˆ for the three specifications. Notice that
Pˆ > 1 can be interpreted as a higher probability attached to receiving the payment
without securement.
Table 1.10 Individual estimates, specification 1, α < 1, 1 + r < 3.
N Min Max 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc.
Pˆ 740 0.00 8.25e+09 0.00 0.67 5.28
αˆ 741 -1545.31 1.00 -1.82 0.63 0.98
δˆ 741 0.00 4.74e+19 0.89 1.00 1.11
Table 1.11 Individual estimates, specification 2.
N Min Max 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc.
Pˆ 385 -4.14 39.23 -0.13 0.38 4.36
αˆ 385 -0.52 12.39 0.67 2.22 6.13
δˆ 385 -44.32 2007.04 -0.81 0.96 1.17
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Table 1.12 Individual estimates, specification 3.
N Min Max 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc.
Pˆ 442 -30.70 47.75 -0.63 0.46 5.45
αˆ 442 -0.07 60.16 0.17 0.60 3.93
δˆ 442 -0.97 250.88 0.70 1.01 7.55
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(c) Specification 3, binary data.
Figure 1.4: Histograms of Pˆ using specifications 1-3.
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All estimation techniques considered so far infer a lot of information from few
observations per person and fail frequently mostly due to lack of variation. In order
to yield an approximate trust measure on each individual, we introduce an additional
simple indicator, the ct-ratio =
c¯Ct
c¯NCt
, which relates the mean consumption choices in
the C and NC treatments. It is equal to 1 if the securement does not influence the
money allocation over time. It is smaller than 1 if the current consumption ct with
securement is smaller and thus the investment in the future is higher than without. It
is expected that the estimate Pˆ is 1 when the ct-ratio is 1 and that in general ct-ratio
is proportional to Pˆ .
In order to incorporate the data corresponding to r ≥ 3, we implement a linear
transformation of ct ∈ [a, 150] into [0, 150], for r ≥ 3. We further align the mathemati-
cal value with the economic interpretation as follows. 28 subjects have c¯NCt = c¯
C
t = 150
and would have a ratio of 1. We decide, however, not to include these subjects since no
trust in the institution is involved when the prospect of a future payment is avoided.
Furthermore, 98 subjects have c¯NCt = c¯
C
t = 0 and thus an undefined ct-ratio. We set
their ct-ratio to 1 since these decisions involve maximal future payments and they are
uninfluenced by the payment securement. 25 subjects have a c¯NCt = 0 and c¯
NC
t > 0,
which does not allow to quantify the ct-ratio. Thus, in total 53 individuals have no
ct-ratio.
For this measure, table 1.13 compares statistics of the individual estimates for the
full sample and across the treatments NWTF and ML. Similarly, figure 1.5 illustrates
its distributions. Based on these data and in contrast to the findings in the previous
estimations, no differences between treatments can be identified. The median ct-ratio
is well below 1, reflecting that subjects have a smaller current consumption and thus
more investment into the future with payment securement.
Table 1.13 Summary of transformed individual ct-ratio estimates.
N Min Max 5th Perc. Median 95th Perc.
Full Sample 1198 0 52.50 0 0.86 1.73
NWTF 687 0 52.50 0 0.86 1.68
ML 511 0 18.86 0 0.86 1.75
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Figure 1.5: Histograms of the ct-ratio distribution.
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1.7 Reported and Elicited Trust
Our elicitation tasks, the trust game and the survey question provide us with a wide
array of data to investigate differences between elicited and reported measures as well
as relationships between trust, social preferences and risk preferences.
1.7.1 General and institutional trust
The amount invested in the trust game is commonly seen as a measure of general
trust since players are confronted with a random, anonymous opponent from a known,
general population. The reported measure of trust in our questionnaire is the question:
“Do you think that most people can be trusted?” Participants can answer this question
on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “1–not at all” to “7–completely trust”.30
To measure institutional trust, we ask participants the question: “Do you think
that NWTF can be trusted?” Participants can answer this question on a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from “1–not at all” to “7–completely trust”. In the case of the local
money lenders, the statement was formulated as “Please indicate how much trust you
have in the local money lender.” Participants can answer this question on a 7-point
Likert scale ranging from “1–no trust” to “7–complete trust”.31
The top part of table 1.14 presents the amounts invested and received in the
trust game. Out of 50 PHP, subjects on average invest 25.7 PHP and return 30.8
PHP. The levels of trust and trustworthiness with a return on investment slightly
higher than 1 are in line with other results in the literature (Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe, 1995). Comparing the ML and NWTF samples, we see that there is a slight
but insignificant difference between treatments. In ML, slightly higher amounts are
invested and returned.
For the validity of our previous results on institutional trust it is comforting that
the two samples do not differ in general trust neither as measured in the trust game
nor as self-reported. Furthermore, as expected, we see that the responsible institution
in the TE task does not have an influence on general trust.
The bottom part of table 1.14 reports stark differences in trust ratings between
NWTF and ML, irrespective of the sample. While NWTF’s rating are on the top end
of the scale, ML only gets middle ratings. The institution being responsible in the
TE task has little influence on the trust reports. In the ML sample the difference is
30We also implemented an alternative measure of trust, following the World Value Survey (WVS):
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful
in dealing with people?” The answer categories are “Most people can be trusted”, “Cannot be too
careful”, “Depends”, “Do not know”, “Refused”. We use a more direct and fine-grained question of
trust, since it has been identified that the trust question as implemented in the WVS can lead people
to agree with both most people can be trusted and can not be too careful since both risk preferences
and beliefs influence trust. Miller and Mitamura (2003) show that the confound in this question can
be problematic when measuring trust.
31We are aware that the accidental difference in the wording of the question makes a comparison
less clean, but we do think that the questions are sufficiently similar and do not drive the strong
results.
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small and insignificant. For NWTF, the ratings are slightly, but significantly higher
in the NWTF treatment, probably due to the familiarity subjects have with NWTF
in combination with the TE task.
Although the Likert-ratings come without a metric, the reported differences in
trust differ qualitatively from the trust measured in the TE task. It is possible that
the self-reported trust levels include evaluations of further aspects of these institutions,
like general preference, fairness of their terms and conditions, helpfulness, and others.
Factors which are not part of the trust in the institution in terms of the belief in the
institution’s compliance.
Table 1.14 Trust game and survey questions.
Full Sample NWTF ML ML-NWTF
treatment treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Invested amount in TG 25.70 26.31 25.26 1.048
(8.62) (9.03) (8.28) (0.688)
Returned amount in TG 30.82 31.67 30.19 1.480
(14.49) (15.34) (13.81) (1.185)
General trust level 4.31 4.32 4.29 0.030
(1.35) (1.34) (1.37) (0.077)
Trust level in NWTF 6.14 6.11 6.17 -0.065
(1.37) (1.36) (1.38) (0.078)
Trust level in ML 3.83 3.82 3.84 -0.013
(1.99) (1.98) (2.01) (0.114)
Observations 1249 533 716
Notes: The trust survey questions are based on a 7-point Likert scale: 1–no trust, 7–complete
trust. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. In parenthesis is the standard deviation (columns
1-3) and standard errors of the equality of means test (column 4).
1.7.2 Trust and Social Preferences
We can investigate some candidate preference factors by looking at the relationship
of trust with risk and social preferences. Fehr (2009) reports that risk and social
preferences correlate with reported trust.
We explore this question with survey measures of social preferences such as be-
trayal aversion, reciprocity and sociability. Betrayal aversion is measured with the
question “Generally speaking, do you try to avoid that others get in a position where
others can betray you?”. Participants can answer this question on a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from “1–completely avoid” to “7–do not avoid at all”. The extent to
which people are willing to reciprocate wrong-doing when experiencing an offense is
reflected in the statement “If someone offends me, I will also offend him/her.” Subjects
answer the question on a Likert scale from “1–I will offend” to “7–I will not offend”.
Given that more sociable people are more likely to have access to information re-
garding the institutions’ reputation we measure sociability by asking “Do you meet
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friends, neighbors or relatives often?” with possible answers “1–never”, “2–seldom”,
“3–monthly”, “4–weekly”, and“5–daily”. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2012)
have documented the link between sociability and the transmission of trust attitudes.
To measure risk preferences we ask participants “Are you, generally speaking,
a person who is fully prepared to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks?”
Respondents answer on a 7-point Likert scale going from “1–try avoiding any risk”
to “7–fully prepared to take risk”. Additionally, we use the data from the RPE task
to structurally estimate individual risk preferences.32 Our measure, α, implies risk
aversion if α < 1, risk neutrality if α = 1 and risk loving behavior if α > 1.33
We use the ct-ratio=
c¯Ct
c¯NCt
as individual measure of behavioral trust.34 We also make
use of the beliefs subjects hold about the reception of the payment that are elicited
with the question “How certain are you that the payment in 28 days will reach you?”
The answer categories are “1–will surely not reach me”, “2–I have very strong doubts”,
“3–I have strong doubts”, “4–It might or might not happen, it is a coinflip”, “5–I have
slight doubts”, “6–I have only very slight doubts” and “7–Absolutely certain”.
Table 1.15 shows regressions of reported and behavioral general trust on risk and
social preferences to which we add demographic and socio-economic controls.35 Col-
umn (1) shows that risk aversion, betrayal avoidance and sociability significantly cor-
relate with reported trust. A one standard deviation in risk loving behavior leads to
a 0.17 standard deviation increase in trust towards people in general. Similarly, not
avoiding betrayal as well as being more sociable leads to more trusting behavior. In
column (2), we use the behavioral measure of risk preferences and find no significant
relation between risk and reported trust.
Columns (3) and (4) report results for the behavioral trust as measured by the
amount invested in the trust game. We find no effect of reported risk or social prefer-
ences (column 3), but we find that a one standard deviation increase in the subject’s
risk loving behavior leads to a 0.11 standard deviation increase in the amount invested
in the trust game (column 4). While consistent within themselves, elicited and re-
ported measures do not relate to each other in the expected way. This suggests that
self-reported attitudes and exhibited behavior differ.
Analogue results for institutional trust are presented in table 1.16. Columns (1)
and (2) show the result when survey institutional trust is the dependent variable
and columns (3) and (4) when the ct-ratio is the dependent variable. Similar as
in table 1.15, we find effects of survey measures of risk and social preferences on
survey measures of institutional trust. Risk aversion, betrayal aversion, reciprocity
32To estimate them, we follow the same procedure as for specifications 2 and 3, but only taking
into account the RPE task. That implies, that only the data of the RPE task is used to feed the
likelihood function, L = LEU . We use ω = 0 to estimate it.
33The median α is 0.60. In order to reduce effects due to outliers, we drop observations with α
below the 5th percentile and above the 95th percentile.
34In order to reduce effects due to outliers, we drop observations with a ct-ratio below the 1
th
percentile and above the 99th percentile.
35We control for age, household size and whether the household’s dwelling has electricity.
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and sociability significantly affect trust. We find that the more risk loving subjects are,
the more they trust in both NWTF and in the local money lender. Betrayal avoidance
plays no role in reported trust towards NWTF but it does in reported trust towards the
local money lender. Subjects that avoid less to be betrayed exhibit more trust towards
the local money lender. Reciprocity plays a role in trust towards NWTF. Subjects
that are less willing to offend back if offended exhibit higher trust towards NWTF.
For the local money lender, the effect is positive but insignificant. Finally, we find
that sociability has a positive effect in trust towards NWTF and a negative effect on
trust towards the local money lender. The more often people meet with friends, family
and neighbors the more they trust NWTF and the less they trust the money lender.
This might be the result of information transmission. More sociable subjects are
more likely to have access to information regarding the institutions, possibly receiving
positive information from NWTF and negative information from local money lenders,
given their bad reputation.
Columns (3) and (4) report the effect of risk and social preferences on behavioral
measures of institutional trust. For both institutions, we find a negative effect of
betrayal aversion, implying that the less participants avoid being betrayed the lower
the trust they exhibit towards the money lender. These results are contrary to what
we would expect. Beliefs regarding the institution’s trustworthiness have no effect.
We find an effect of sociability on trust towards the local money lender. Risk aversion
has a positive but insignificant effect, in the direction that subjects that are more
willing to take risks trust more in the local money lender.
Overall, the analysis supports the view that the elicited trust measure is less
related to individual preferences including social preferences than the reported trust
measures.
1.8 Effect of the Promise on Savings
Lack of trust in financial institutions has been identified as one of the possible causes
for low levels of savings with formal financial institutions in developing countries
(Karlan, Ratan, and Zinman, 2014; Dupas, Green, Keats, and Robinson, 2014). If a
realized future payment increases the trust in an institution, the higher trust might
lead to an increase in that amount of savings held at the institution.
We investigate this question by exploiting the random variation generated by the
choice of the round to be paid. Subjects make 54 decisions, of which 36 correspond
to the TE task and 18 to the RPE task. One of the 54 choices is selected at random
to be paid to the subject. All choices in the TE task might include a future payment
in t + d, where d = 7, 28. This depends on subjects’ choices.36 The future payment,
kept and delivered by the institution, constitutes a promise of delivery to the subject.
36If subjects choose ct = 150, then ct+d = 0, thus leading to no future payment although the subject
is paid for a TE task. Choices in which interest rates are low have a higher likelihood of ct = 150
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Table 1.15 Effect of risk and social preferences on general trust
Reported General Trust Invested in Trust Game
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk loving 0.17∗∗∗ 0.039
(reported) (0.000) (0.318)
Betrayal 0.088∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.043
non-avoidance (0.005) (0.005) (0.374) (0.302)
Reciprocity 0.036 0.033 0.0083 0.012
(0.214) (0.293) (0.818) (0.759)
Sociability 0.11∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ -0.047 -0.052
(0.000) (0.000) (0.251) (0.234)
Risk loving, α -0.0020 0.11∗∗∗
(estimated) (0.951) (0.009)
N 1247 1148 638 584
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS-regressions of trust on risk and social preferences measures with robust standard
errors. We shows standardized coefficients with p-values in parentheses. Reported general
trust, risk loving, betrayal non-avoidance are measured on a 7-point Likert scale. Sociability
takes values of 1-“never”, 2-“seldom”, 3-“monthly”, 4-“weekly”, or 5-“daily”. Risk loving,
α estimated using data from the RPE task, excluding bottom 5th and top 95th. α < 1,
implies risk aversion, α = 1 risk neutrality and α > 1 risk loving. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Fulfillment of that promise would constitute a positive effect on the subject’s trust
towards the institution.37
In contrast, choices in the RPE task are paid fully at the end of the experiment,
since RPE payoffs do not feature any time delay. Therefore, subjects paid for the RPE
task do not have the opportunity to see their trust in the delivery by the institution
paying off. 34% of all subjects were paid for the RPE task and 66% were paid for
a choice taken in the TE task. Figure 1.9 in Appendix B shows the distribution of
decisions paid in the experiment.
For this investigation, we focus on the sample in the NWTF treatment, since
we have detailed financial information from NWTF clients, including weekly data on
savings held at NWTF. Our aim is to test whether the possible positive effect on trust
experienced by subjects has a positive effect on their savings with NWTF. Table 1.20
in appendix B.2 show descriptive statistics for the sample of interest.38 Covariates are
balanced between subjects paid for a TE task and subjects paid for a RPE task.39
37Out of the 1,251 subjects, four did not receive the future payment, because they could not be
reached at their homes, after several trials. One of the subjects did not want to receive the future
payment (PHP20). Three of them were in the NWTF treatment and one in the ML treatment, and
two had a check as a payment securement.
38The sample is reduced, since not all the subjects that were in the NWTF treatment are NWTF
clients.
39Our sample was further reduced in the weeks following the experiment, since subjects might leave
the NWTF sample if there loan comes to an end. We check for the balancing of covariates for those
in the 8 weeks used for the analysis, and results are the same as presented in B.2. Electricity in the
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Table 1.16 Effect of risk and social preferences on institutional trust
Reported Inst. Trust ct-ratio:
c¯Ct
c¯NCt
NWTF ML NWTF ML
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk loving 0.049∗ 0.053∗
(reported) (0.079) (0.063)
Betrayal -0.019 0.074∗∗ -0.068∗ -0.084∗∗
non-avoidance (0.477) (0.023) (0.072) (0.026)
Reciprocity 0.090∗∗∗ 0.0063 0.0030 -0.027
(0.003) (0.824) (0.940) (0.407)
Sociability 0.082∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.12∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.740) (0.037)
Risk loving, α -0.019 0.080
(estimated) (0.694) (0.372)
Trustworthiness -0.054 -0.029
belief (0.286) (0.508)
N 1247 1247 495 458
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS-regressions of trust on risk and social preferences measures with robust standard
errors. We shows standardized coefficients with p-values in parentheses. Reported general
trust, risk loving, betrayal non-avoidance are measured on a 7-point Likert scale. Sociability
takes values of 1–“never”, 2–“seldom”, 3–“monthly”, 4–“weekly”, or 5–“daily”. ct-ratio data
excluded for the top 99th percentile and the bottom 1st to account for outliers. Risk loving,
α estimated using data from the risk task, excluding bottom 5th and top 95th. α < 1,
implies risk aversion, α = 1 risk neutrality and α > 1 risk loving. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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To examine our question we run the following regression
Savi,t+k = θ + φ1 · Ti + φ2Zi + φ3 ·Xi + εi,t+k,
where Savi,t+k corresponds to the weekly savings level of subjects in the NWTF
treatment. We look at the effects in the 8 weeks after the experiment took place,
k = {1, . . . , 8}. The treatment indicator is Ti = 1 if the subject was paid on a TE task
and thus eligible to receive the future payment from NWTF and Ti = 0 otherwise.
40
Since subjects’ earnings in the experiment could have an effect on their savings level
after the experiment, we control for the total amount earned in the experiment, Zi.
Finally, Xi is a vector of covariates which includes risk aversion estimates, covariates
used for balancing during the sampling (baseline savings, loan amount, distance to
municipality and urban indicator) and household characteristics (household size, age,
electricity in the household’s dwelling). Standard errors are clustered at the center
level.41
Table 1.17 shows a positive and significant effect on savings of being eligible for
receiving the later payment from NWTF. Savings increase by 65 PHP, representing
25% of baseline savings. In a second step, we investigate whether the effects are
driven by those that had a later payment in d = 7 or in d = 28 days. We would expect
that the longer the delay in the future payment delivery, the stronger the trust shock
subjects experience. We therefore split our treatment indicator Ti into a treatment
indicator for those that were to receive the future payments 7 days and 28 days after
the experiment, respectively. There is a positive and significant effect for those that
received the payment in 7 days, while for those receiving the future payment 28 days
after the experiment the effect is positive, smaller and not significant. A longer time
distance to the promised payment thus does not increase the saved amounts.
1.9 Discussion
From our structural estimations, we obtain levels of trust Pˆ between 0.10 and 0.60,
which result from differences clearly visible in the descriptive statistics, but which are
arguably lower than expected. The variation of Pˆ across estimations shows that the
measure depends considerably on estimates of utility curvature and discounting. In
this respect, the trust measure would benefit from a convergence in the literature on
the best way to identify time and risk preferences. For the moment we take away from
the results that the provision of a payment securement reduces uncertainty about the
dwelling and banking distance is different across groups, and we control for electricity in the dwelling
in our analysis. We do not control for bank distance, given that there was a local option for cashing
the check.
40Approximately 80% of subjects that were paid for TE decision chose a positive future payment.
41The subjects, all of which are clients of NWTF, borrow in the context of the group lending
method. Several groups meet once a week to make their loan installments, in lending centers. Several
subjects of a center may take part in the experiment. Given that they might have common traits
across centers, we cluster standard errors at the center level.
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Table 1.17 Effect of intervention on savings
Savi,t+k
(1) (2)
Future payment, Ti 64.82
∗∗
(29.92)
Future payment (d = 7), Ti,d=7 61.19
∗
(36.37)
Future payment (d = 28), Ti,d=28 46.89
(38.24)
Experiment earnings, Zi -0.127 -0.160
∗
(0.0868) (0.0860)
Constant -119.2 -96.62
(104.2) (102.1)
Covariates Yes Yes
R2 0.42 0.42
N 4,100 4,100
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the lending
center level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
future payment considerably across institutions.
We normalize the behavior when a payment securement is provided to P = 1.
Still, the choices under the payment securement are showing some dependence on the
responsible institution and might favor even more investment in the full absence of
such dependence. This implies that the level of Pˆ could be overestimated. At the
same time, depending on the influence of this dependence, the difference between
institutions might be underestimated because it would come out larger if the behavior
under payment securement did not differ.
We carefully design our experiment to pick up differences in trust in institutions
across the two financial institutions as well as across different modes of payment
securement. With the random allocation of treatments and the constant parameters
across the TE tasks we make sure that systematic differences in the valuation of later
payments can be related to the different institutions. It is possible, however, that
subjects have preferences over elements of the later payment, such as the delivery
mode, the information necessary to find them, the storage at the institution, and the
check transaction, that might limit this clean attribution.
For example, regarding the delivery, subjects might not want to have a representa-
tive of the institution come to their house, for example, possibly due to pending loans.
This could make subjects avoid contact by avoiding future payments at all (c¯t = 150),
depending on the institution. Howver, there is no difference across treatments on
the extensive margin of avoiding future payments. 17 out of 716 (2.4%) do this in
NWTF, 11 out of 533 (2.1%) in ML. Thus, such occurrences of extremely front-loaded
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allocations probably result from particular time preferences that are equally present
in both treatments.
The payment securement via a check is established on top of the organized delivery.
To the extent that the payment is expected not to be delivered, the equivalence of the
check payment to the immediate payment depends on beliefs with respect to the funds
of the check, the time necessary to cash it, the familiarity with cashing a check, etc.
We know that subjects are familiar with checks since loan payments are distributed
this way by NWTF. Furthermore, while the bank distance is substantial for some
subjects, we deliberately established a local option for cashing the check that made
the transaction easily feasible and informed subject prior of the decisions. We thus
believe that the check is not systematically viewed as unwieldy, after all, we see many
more future allocations under such a payment securement.
In a first application of our trust measure, we use it on two financial institutions.
The handling of money is a natural activity of the two institutions but the method is
not limited to financial institutions. One can think of any public or private institu-
tion to be responsible for a payment delivery, even if, for example, the institution is
normally providing other services, such as national education services. Of course, a
service closer to the institution at hand might be used if the substitute for the mon-
etary payment is an equally well quantifiable object of time preferences. The strong
drawback of such an approach would be the non-comparability with measures of trust
towards other institutions. We view our measure as a universal measure of trust in
generic institutions.
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1.10 Conclusion
We propose a novel way of experimentally measuring trust in institutions which draws
on the experimental method of eliciting time preferences. In particular, we are imple-
menting a time preference elicitation and vary the institutional setting as defined by
the terms of and responsibilities for the future payment. We employ the CTB method
as proposed by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) and add features of the DMPL method,
such as a separate risk preference elicitation task and binary choice sets, in order to
check the robustness of our measure (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m, 2008).
Our method allows us to elicit levels of trust towards institutions in an incentivized
way and at the same time is not identified by the participants as a measure of trust.
In contrast to any other measure of trust, it is provided directly in the the meaningful
metric of subjective probability of completion of a payment.
In a field study in the Philippines, we measure trust towards two institutions, a
Philippine microfinance institution and local money lenders. We show that our trust
measure is able to differentiate between these institutions in the expected way, namely
that the subjective probabilities of payment completion is higher throughout for the
more formal institution. We contrast this measure with other ways of measuring trust,
the trust game and non-incentivized survey questions. The survey responses indicate
a substantially larger differences in levels of trust than the incentivized measures,
suggesting the relevance of other factors such as preferences. Additionally, we find
that reported measures of trust might be different from the actual willingness to
transact with the institution.
We also exploit the random variation in the trust level in the formal institution
generated by our experiment. Subjects that were randomly selected to be paid in the
future exhibit a significant increase in savings held at the formal institution. We take
this as evidence of a positive effect on financial behavior due to the fulfillment of a
promised future payment.
Overall, the results show that time preference elicitation can be a useful method
to measure trust in institutions in a way that is incentivized, readily quantifiable, not
recognized as such and not confounded with other factors such as preferences. In that
sense, it is a useful measure to quantify trust in or the perceived reliability of particular
institutions. Additionally, on a methodological level, our results confirm that the
institutional setting is an important aspect of any time preference elicitation and
can substantially change estimates of utility parameters. Furthermore, the potential
of an exogenous variation of trust resulting from the measure opens new paths of
investigating the influence of trust in institutions on economic behavior.
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A.2 Further probabilistic specification results
Table 1.18 CRRA parameters estimates from probabilistic specification based only on
TE data.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NWTF ML NWTF ML
CRRA Curvature αˆ 3.093 3.213 4.077 4.233
0.025 0.029 0.032 0.038
Daily Discount Rate δˆ 0.959 0.947 0.955 0.944
0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Pˆ 0.213 0.179 0.196 0.163
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Background consumption ω -0.01 -0.01 -50.25 -50.25
Observations 25848 19188 25848 19188
LL -112190.97 -83068.402 -112065.72 -83030.178
A.3 Experiment materials
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Instructions 
§1. Thank you all for taking the time to join us here today. My name is XXX and this is Maria 
Isabel Santana/Frederik Weber. I am a research assistant and Maria Isabel/Frederik is a 
researcher at the University of Mannheim, in Germany. The complete session will last 
approximately 3 hours. In this study we want to play some games for the purpose of economic 
research. Some decisions will involve actual money, and whatever you earn today will be paid 
to you in private at the end of the session and is yours to take home.  
§2. The money you can earn today is not Maria Isabel’s/Frederik’s own money. The funds for 
this project are provided by the German Ministry of Science particularly for this research study. 
The study is carried out with similar games throughout Iloilo, Capiz and Guimaras.  
§4. It is very important that you understand the games… If there is something you do not 
understand, you may always ask the assistants to explain the rules.  
§5. Before the games you participated in the first part of a small survey. After the games, you 
will be asked to participate in the second part of the survey by answering some additional 
questions. Once the second part of the questionnaire is completed, you will receive your 
payment.  
§6. There will be four parts of games played in this session [refer to agenda]. The first two parts 
are a money valuation game, the third one is a lottery game, and the fourth one is an 
investment game. We will explain you the rules for each game before each of the games are to 
be played. The games are to be played by each player individually, therefore we kindly ask you 
to remain silent during the games and to take decisions individually.  
§7. After you have played the games and answered the questionnaire, Maria Isabel/Frederik 
will give you your payment and a receipt for you to sign. 
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Upcoming decisions 
§9. Within the three first parts, you will take 54 decisions [show bag with balls]. You will be paid 
for only one decision. At the end of all games, you will randomly select one of 54 balls that 
indicates the number of the decision paid for you. All decisions are equally likely to be selected 
by you; therefore you should make each decision seriously as the one that would be paid out. 
Money Valuation Game 
§10. In this game you are asked to make decisions about how to allocate money between two 
dates, one date would be today and the other date will be later in time. The later date in which 
you will possibly receive your payment is either in 1 week, that is in 7 days from today or in 4 
weeks, that is in 28 days from today. In parts 1 and 2, you will in each part make 18 decisions of 
the same kind. 
§11(NWTF). If the decision to be paid to you has a payment to be paid today, then you will 
receive this payment today together with any other additional payments from the game played 
in part 4. If the decision to be paid to you has a payment in a later date, then this payment will 
be kept for storage at Negros Women for Tomorrow foundation (NWTF), which is the 
organization that runs Project Dungganon and delivered to you to your house at the according 
date, either in 7 days or in 28 days. §11(ML). If the decision to be paid to you has a payment to 
be paid today, then you will receive this payment today together with any other additional 
payments from the game played in part 4. If the decision to be paid to you has a payment in a 
later date, then this payment will be kept for storage at ____, a local moneylender from the 
municipality of _____, and delivered to you to your house at the according date, either in 7 
days or in 28 days.  
Part 1 [refer to agenda] 
§14(No-Check/Check; NWTF). NWTF is responsible for payment at the later date and promises 
that the payment will be delivered to you, but we cannot provide you with any written legal 
note to secure this payment for the 18 questions in this part 1. Only for the later 18 questions 
in part 2 we will be able to – on top of the promise – offer to secure the payment with a signed 
check to your name which is dated for the due date of the payment and which you can take 
home with you.  
§14(Check/No-Check; NWTF). NWTF is responsible for payment at the later date and promises 
that the payment will be delivered to you. On top of that promise and only for the coming 18 
questions in this part 1, we will be able to offer to secure this payment with a signed check to 
your name which is dated for the due date of the payment and which you can take home with 
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you. [Show example check and pass around so participants can see it.] This is an example check 
made to be paid out in 7 days under the name of one of the participants.  
You do not need to cash the check. It is only a securement of payment. When the later payment 
is delivered to you at your house, you have to return the check and receive your later payment. 
Of course, if the delivery does not happen you can cash the check and this way receive the 
promised later payment. The check can be cashed in a BDO branch. Alternatively, we have 
arranged for cashing methods within your local area which will be specified at the payment. 
For the 18 questions coming later in part 2, we cannot provide you with any written legal note 
to secure the payment. 
§14(No-Check/Check; Moneylender). The Moneylender ____ is responsible for payment at the 
later date and promises that the payment will be delivered to you, but we cannot provide you 
with any written legal note to secure this payment for the 18 questions in this part 1. Only for 
the later 18 questions in part 2 we will be able to – on top of the promise – offer to secure the 
payment with a signed check to your name which is dated for the due date of the payment and 
which you can take home with you. 
§14(Check/No-Check; Moneylender). The Moneylender ____ is responsible for payment at the 
later date and promises that the payment will be delivered to you. On top of that promise and 
only for the coming 18 questions in this part 1, we will be able to offer to secure this payment 
with a signed check to your name which is dated for the due date of the payment and which 
you can take home with you. [Show example check and pass around so participants can see it.] 
This is an example check made to be paid out in 7 days under the name of one of the 
participants.  
You do not need to cash the check. It is only a securement of payment. When the later payment 
is delivered to you at your house, you have to return the check and receive your later payment. 
Of course, if the delivery does not happen you can cash the check and this way receive the 
promised later payment. The check can be cashed in a BDO branch. Alternatively, we have 
arranged for cashing methods within your local area which will be specified at the payment. 
For the 18 questions coming later in part 2, we cannot provide you with any written legal note 
to secure the payment. 
§15. In the money evaluation game, we will present you with options of receiving money today 
or receiving money with interest at a later date. Your decision is reached in a two- to three-
stage process. In a first stage[point to the first screenshot on the poster], you will decide 
between an option of getting 150 PHP today and 0 Pesos later and another option of receiving a 
higher amount in either 7 or 28 days and 0 or little today. You can view this as either using 
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money today or saving it for the future and earning interest. In a second stage [point to the 
second screenshot on the poster], you have these two options plus further options in which you 
get some of the 150 Pesos today and let only the remainder earn interest for later. Finally 
[point to the last screenshot on the poster], you get a confirmation of your choice and the 
option to define your choice to the Peso unit. Throughout the screens, amounts received today 
are shown in blue, amounts received in the later date are shown in orange. 
§16. Let us now consider one of the interest rates as an example. Here, you are first asked 
whether you prefer getting 150 Pesos today and 0 later [point again to the first screenshot, now 
on the blue bar, RA associates real money to column (150-0)] or 0 pesos today and 300 pesos in 
7 days. [point again to the first screenshot, now on the orange bar, associate money to (0-300)]. 
Take a moment to think which one you would prefer and click the bar when you are decided. 
You will then see the same two options and further options in between Note that towards the 
left columns the today payments gets higher, and towards the right the later payments get 
higher [point again to the second screenshot, RA associates real money to columns (150-0, 0-
300, 50-200, 20-260, 80-140)].  Again, take a moment to consider which combination of 
payments today and later you prefer. Click the bar of the combination that you prefer. On the 
last screen you get a confirmation of your choice. If you want, you can also specify your choice 
to the Peso level in a drop-down menu.  
Overall, you can allocate any amount between 0 and 150 today. The remaining amount will be 
multiplied and paid out later. You will see that the interest increases from low to very high, and 
it is shown at the top of the screen. That means that if you for example decide to keep 80 today 
in the first decision you get 70 in 7 days, but in subsequent decisions you get 93, 117, 140, 187 
and even higher amounts in 7 days. The same with any other amount that you choose to keep 
between 0 and 150 for today. Whatever you save for later will increase in value throughout the 
decisions.  
Please note that steps 2 and 3 are the ones that count. You can at any point go back to change 
your decision. 
Please note that in decisions 1-9 you receive the amount saved for later in 7 days and in 
decisions 10-18 you make the same decision but receive the amount saved for later in 28 days. 
Do you have any questions? It is important that you understand the options available to you. 
Before you take your decisions that count for your payment, we will go through a trial of the 9 
decisions. If you do not understand the options available to you or the way you can choose the 
option that you would like to have paid to you, you may always ask the assistants for an 
explanation.  Once everybody is finished and all questions are answered we will start the 
decisions that count. We now start the trial. 
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[SNACKS] 
Part 2 [refer to agenda] 
§24. Now, comes part 2. Here, you will again like in part 1 be asked to make 18 decisions about 
payment options on two dates, one date being today and the other date being in 7 or in 28 
days. Remember that the upcoming 18 decisions are also part of the 54 decisions of which one 
will be randomly chosen and paid out to you. 
§25(No-Check/Check; NWTF). Like before, NWTF is responsible for payment at the later date 
and promises that the payment will be delivered to you. On top of that promise and only for 
the coming 18 questions in this part 2, we will be able to offer to secure this payment with a 
signed check to your name which is dated for the due date of the payment and which you can 
take home with you. [Show example check and pass around so participants can see it.] This is 
an example check made to be paid out in 7 days under the name of one of the participants.  
You do not need to cash the check. It is only a securement of payment. When the later payment 
is delivered to you at your house, you have to return the check and receive your later payment. 
Of course, if the delivery does not happen you can cash the check and this way receive the 
promised later payment. The check can be cashed in a BDO branch. Alternatively, we have 
arranged for cashing methods within your local area which will be specified at the payment. 
§25(Check/No-Check; NWTF). Like before, NWTF is responsible for payment at the later date 
and promises that the payment will be delivered to you, but we cannot provide you with any 
written legal note to secure this payment for the 18 questions in this part 2. 
§25(No-Check/Check; Moneylender). Like before, the Moneylender ____ is responsible for 
payment at the later date and promises that the payment will be delivered to you. On top of 
that promise and only for the coming 18 questions in this part 2, we will be able to offer to 
secure this payment with a signed check to your name which is dated for the due date of the 
payment and which you can take home with you. [Show example check and pass around so 
participants can see it.] This is an example check made to be paid out in 7 days under the name 
of one of the participants.  
You do not need to cash the check. It is only a securement of payment. When the later payment 
is delivered to you at your house, you have to return the check and receive your later payment. 
Of course, if the delivery does not happen you can cash the check and this way receive the 
promised later payment. The check can be cashed in a BDO branch. Alternatively, we have 
arranged for cashing methods within your local area which will be specified at the payment. 
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§25(Check/No-Check; Moneylender). Like before, the Moneylender ____ is responsible for 
payment at the later date and promises that the payment will be delivered to you, but we 
cannot provide you with any written legal note to secure this payment for the 18 questions in 
this part 2.  
Do you have any questions? 
Lottery Game (Part 3) [refer to agenda] 
§18. In this game you are asked to allocate money between a certain payment and a risky 
lottery. All payments from this game will be paid out today after the session. The upcoming 18 
decisions are the last part of the 54 decisions of which one will be randomly chosen and paid 
out to you. 
§19. In the lottery game, we will present you with options of receiving a payment for sure or 
playing a risky lottery that might lead to a larger payment or no payment.  The result of the 
risky lottery depends on a random draw of yours of one of ten balls in this red bag.    
§19a. You will win when an orange ball is drawn and lose when a white ball is drawn. The 
chance of winning depends on the number of orange balls in this bag of ten balls. The number 
of orange balls in the coming decision will be between 1 and 9. There is no decision without an 
orange ball, since then it would be sure that you lose. With 1 orange ball, out of 10 people 
drawing a ball, on average only 1 will win the lottery. [Prepare such a bag, maybe a transparent 
bag] With 2 orange balls, 2 out of 10 people on average will win the lottery, and so on. [Prepare 
such a bag] With 9 orange balls it is very certain to win since 9 out of 10 draws on average win 
the lottery. [Prepare such a bag] There is no decision with 10 orange balls since it would be sure 
that you win. 
§20. In the first stage of the lottery game [point to the first screenshot on the poster], you will 
decide between an option of getting 150 PHP for sure and another option of receiving a higher 
amount when winning the lottery and 0 or little when losing. In a second stage[point to the 
second screenshot on the poster], you have these two options and further options in which you 
get some of the 150 Pesos for sure and put some money into the risky lottery. Finally [point to 
the last screenshot on the poster], you get a confirmation of your choice and the option to 
define your choice to the Peso level. Throughout the screens, amounts received for sure are 
shown in blue, amounts received when winning the lottery are shown in orange. The amount 
received from a lost lottery is always 0. 
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§21. Let us now consider an example. In this example, the chance that you win is 60%, that is, 
there are 6 orange balls and 4 white balls in the bag. [Prepare a bag with 6 orange balls and 4 
white balls in front of the participants.] The chance that you win is always indicated at the top 
of the screen [point to the screenshot]. You are first asked whether you prefer getting 150 
Pesos for sure [point again to the first screenshot, now on the blue bar, no money handling] or 
300 pesos when you win the lottery and 0 otherwise. [point again to the first screenshot, now 
on the orange bar].  Take a moment to think which one you would prefer and click the bar 
when you are decided. You will then see the same two options as well as further options in 
between. Again, take a moment to consider which combination of a sure payment and a risky 
lottery you prefer. Click the bar of the combination that you prefer. On the last screen you get a 
confirmation of your choice. If you want, you can also specify your choice to the peso level in a 
drop-down menu. Overall, you can decide to get any amount between 0 and 150 for sure. The 
remaining amount will be multiplied and paid out when you win the lottery. Please note that 
steps 2 and 3 are the ones that count. You can at any point go back to change your decision.  
Note that in each question, the number of orange balls will be different, that is, the chance that 
you win changes going from a low chance to a higher chance. Also, there are 9 decisions in 
which the lottery wins you up to 300 pesos and 9 decisions in which the lottery wins you up to 
400 pesos while you still get at least 50 pesos for sure. 
Do you have any questions? It is important that you understand the options available to you. 
Before you take your decisions that count for your payment, we will therefore go through all 9 
decisions that you will take for a possible lottery gain of 300 pesos. Further, we will go through 
2 decisions for a lottery gain of 400. If you do not understand the options available to you or 
the way you can choose the option that you would like to have paid to you, you may always ask 
the assistants for an explanation.  
Once everybody is finished and all questions are answered we will start the decisions that 
count. We now start the trial. 
Investment Game (Part 4) [refer to agenda] 
§26. This game is played by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of an Investor and a 
Recipient. Half of you will be Investors, the other half of you will be Recipients. You will be 
notified on the screen which role you have. You will be playing with someone from this session, 
but none of you will know exactly with whom you are playing. 
§27. If you are an Investor you will start with 50 PHP. You have to choose how much of the 50 
PHP you would like to send to the Recipient. Whatever amount you choose will be tripled and 
then go to the Recipient. 
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§28. If you are a Recipient you will be informed about the amount available to you. You then 
indicate how much of the tripled amount you want to send back to the Investor. You can freely 
choose to return a part, everything or nothing. You simply keep what you do not return. Then 
the game is over. 
§29. Whatever you hold as an Investor or Recipient, we will pay you in cash at the end of the 
meeting. 
In summary, first the investor indicates the amount to be sent to the Recipient. It could be 0, 
10, 23, 46. Any amount between 0 and 50 Pesos. Then, the amount sent is tripled and notified 
to the Recipient. 
Once the Recipient knows the amount available, he decides how much to send back to the 
Investor and indicates it in the screen. Could be 0, 10, 50, 150, that is any amount between 0 
and the full amount available to the Recipient.  
Finally, the investor and recipient will be informed of the total earnings. The Investor earns the 
amount kept and the amount returned by the Recipient. And the Recipient earns the amount 
that was not returned from the available tripled amount.  
The amounts earned will be paid out at the end of the session, after the games are played and 
the second part of the questionnaire is completed.  
Do you have any questions? If there are no further questions, let’s start the Investment Game.  
Choice of Round to be Paid 
Now, we will choose the round to be paid. To do this, we will insert 54 numbered balls in this 
big black bag, from where you will take one ball and the number in the ball will be the round 
paid out to you.  
[2 RAs place numbered white balls in the big black bag clearly so participants have no doubt of 
numbers of balls in the bag] 
Many thanks for your participation.  We are almost done.  
We will now ask you to please answer the second part of the questionnaire. Afterwards, you 
will collect your payment. One final comment regarding your payment. Your payment receipt 
will have a secret code enclosed in the envelope with the later payment. You will be given a 
copy of this code. Please keep this code with you. In order to get your payment, you need to 
present this code otherwise you will need to present an id. If you have received a check, you 
will need to hand in the check when you receive your payment in the later date. 
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Figure 1.6: Risk preference elicitation: sample decision, step 1
Figure 1.7: Risk preference elicitation: sample decision, step 2
Risk preference elicitation screen shots
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Figure 1.8: Risk preference elicitation: sample decision, step 3
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Table 1.19 Sample check.
Payment securement: check
B Effect of Promise on savings
B.1 Histogram of paid rounds
B Effect of Promise on savings 69
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Figure 1.9: Distribution of rounds to be paid
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B.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1.20 Descriptive statistics - Savings Analysis
No future payment Future payment Difference
mean sd mean sd b se
Age 42.5 (11.0) 41.6 (11.3) 0.94 (0.95)
Years of education 8.7 (3.1) 9.0 (2.8) -0.26 (0.25)
Married 0.8 (0.4) 0.8 (0.4) 0.00 (0.03)
Household size 5.6 (2.2) 5.4 (2.1) 0.15 (0.18)
Employed 0.5 (0.5) 0.5 (0.5) 0.04 (0.04)
Regular income 0.6 (0.5) 0.5 (0.5) 0.02 (0.04)
Monthly income (PHP) 1210.9 (2131.8) 1536.6 (3467.7) -325.73 (346.58)
Background consumption 329.7 (416.3) 331.4 (306.6) -1.70 (31.91)
Background consumption HH 1001.4 (725.0) 946.9 (643.2) 54.53 (61.17)
Official position in village 0.1 (0.2) 0.1 (0.3) -0.02 (0.02)
Rooms in HH for sleeping 1.7 (0.7) 1.8 (0.8) -0.04 (0.06)
Flush toilet at dwelling 0.9 (0.4) 0.9 (0.3) -0.03 (0.03)
Electricity at dwelling 0.8 (0.4) 0.9 (0.3) -0.06∗∗ (0.03)
Own dwelling 0.9 (0.3) 0.9 (0.3) -0.03 (0.03)
Am’t borrowed from MFI/Banks 5457.4 (2711.5) 5597.5 (2804.5) -140.16 (256.18)
Savings in MFI/rural bank 1201.1 (2033.5) 1464.4 (6326.9) -263.34 (632.21)
Trust level in NWTF 1 6.4 (1.1) 6.4 (1.0) 0.03 (0.09)
Trust in ML1 3.9 (2.0) 3.8 (2.1)(1-7) 0.07 (0.17)
Risk preference2 4.2 (2.6) 4.2 (2.5) 0.03 (0.22)
Betrayal aversion3 1.7 (1.6) 1.7 (1.5) 0.02 (0.13)
Avoid being taken advantage of3 1.9 (1.8) 1.9 (1.7) 0.02 (0.15)
Revenge if suffer serious wrong4 6.5 (1.4) 6.5 (1.4) 0.02 (0.12)
Reciprocity5 6.4 (1.4) 6.5 (1.4) -0.07 (0.12)
Sociability6 4.3 (1.2) 4.1 (1.3) 0.19 (0.11)
Bank distance (minutes) 27.7 (21.3) 32.4 (31.8) -4.71 (2.41)
Ever cashed a check 1.0 (0.2) 1.0 (0.2) -0.02 (0.02)
NWTF information (PHP)
Savings 261.6 (404.2) 244.1 (329.4) 17.53 (30.65)
Loan amount 5393.2 (2555.5) 5514.4 (2918.4) -121.12 (236.79)
Loan balance 3116.2 (2767.8) 2889.2 (2381.9) 227.04 (215.20)
Repayment 247.7 (206.8) 244.3 (163.6) 3.34 (15.37)
Emergency fund balance 783.6 (872.1) 814.0 (821.5) -30.36 (71.72)
Loan cycle 4.3 (2.2) 4.4 (2.2) -0.06 (0.19)
Principal amortization 221.1 (166.2) 221.2 (119.2) -0.06 (11.78)
Observations 222 369
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2 Financial Education, Social Net-
works and the Decision to Save:
Evidence from a Field Exper-
iment in the Philippines
2.1 Introduction
In recent years a wide variety of financial programs and interventions focused on mak-
ing savings more attractive and accessible for people in developing countries. Many
studies have found large impacts of access to subsidized or specialized savings prod-
ucts on downstream behavior (see Karlan, Ratan, and Zinman (2014) for a review).
The interventions analyzed in these studies try to overcome different barriers to saving
such as lack of knowledge (Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar, 2014; Cole, Gine, Tobacman,
Topalova, Townsend, and Vickery, 2013), behavioral barriers (Ashraf, Karlan, and
Yin, 2006; Brune, Gine´, Goldberg, and Yang, 2015; Dupas and Robinson, 2013a,b;
Prina, 2015), transaction costs (Dupas and Robinson, 2013b), and others.
Providing savings products has become easier with the improved access to credit
thanks to the spread of microfinance institutions (MFI). It is becoming more and more
common for MFIs to encourage their clients to save by providing savings accounts
along with borrowing products (Karlan, Ratan, and Zinman, 2014). When a savings
account – with usually no requirements on minimum balance – is a byproduct of
having a loan and considerably reduces transaction costs, it is puzzling that savings
levels are low.42
If individuals have easy access to savings products at a very low cost, could indi-
viduals have little knowledge about the savings technology? I investigate this research
question by evaluating whether a financial training program that focuses on savings
leads to an increase in participant’s savings.
Beyond the training effect on participants, it is also likely that saving decisions
affect their peers. Duflo and Saez (2003) analyze the role of information and social
interactions in employees’ decisions to enroll in a tax deferred account (TDA) retire-
ment plan and find a strong effect on TDA enrollment for the treated individuals but
also for the peers of the treated individuals. Thus, I also investigate the social network
effects of the training on other participants and their peers.
42It could be argued that instead of savings, clients should rather pay their loans quicker, since
their loans usually involve high interest rates. However, precautionary savings in these contexts and
particular easy access to funds in case of emergencies, justify why individuals might want to borrow
and save at the same time (Dupas and Robinson, 2013). Additionally, it might not be possible for
clients to repay their loans earlier, making it more profitable to put any excess funds into a savings
account earning interest.
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In particular, I analyze whether the effect of the intervention is stronger the more
treated subjects an individual is connected to. I further investigate spillover effects
on peers of the treated individuals in their financial network. Together with a MFI
in the Philippines, I implement a randomized evaluation that analyzes the effect of
participating in a financial training program as well as the effect of the program on
the participant’s peers. Clients of the MFI that are part of the MFIs group lending
scheme, are randomly assigned to the training program (injection points) or to a
control group (control subjects).
I define two levels of peers, the first level corresponds to the lending group members
of injection points and control subjects (group peers). The second level of peers
includes members of the lending center to which the injection points and control
subjects belong to (center peers). The two peer levels are interesting to analyze
separately. While the group peers are close to participants because their financial
decisions are connected via the group lending mechanism, center peers might also be
connected to the participants through primary kinship bonds.
I find that the savings training increases the injection points’ saving account bal-
ances with the MFI by 114 PHP, representing a 43% increase of baseline savings.
Having other friends receiving the training reinforces the effect of the program: sav-
ings increase by 28 PHP when an additional friend participates in the training, this is
equivalent to 24% of the main effect. There is no statistically significant differential
effect between injection points that are connected to other injection points and those
not connected to any other injection points.
The training effect spills over to members of the participant’s networks. Group
peers experience an increase of 71 PHP, representing 24% of baseline savings, while
center peers’ savings increase by 65 PHP, 25% of baseline savings. Group peers are less
affected by the program when they are connected to an injection point, with savings
increasing by 48 PHP while for group peers not connected to injection points savings
increase by 185 PHP, 63% of baseline savings.
For center peers however, kinship connections matter more since primary kinship
connections are not allowed within the group but within the center. I construct an
alternative network measure using the information in individuals’ last names and find
a stronger effect of the kinship connection compared to group peers. There is no effect
on group peers of kinship connections.
The design of the training is not fully equipped to distinguish across the different
mechanisms through which the program affects savings. It is possible however that
behavioral factors might play a role. I analyze the effects of the program for partici-
pants that report knowing what a saving plan is and compare it to the effect for those
that report not knowing. If the effect of the program is exclusively due to learning
how to use the savings technology, I should find a stronger effect on participants that
report not knowing. This is however not the case, I find a stronger effect in partici-
pants that know what a savings plan is, suggesting that behavioral factors might be
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one of the mechanisms through which the program is affecting savings. I also find
that participants with higher literacy experience a stronger effect of the program.
Finally, I am interested in investigating whether the observed effects are robust
through time. I find that the effects are short lived, with the main effects of the
program present for the three to four months after the intervention and then fading
out. This is not surprising. Changes in financial behavior have been shown to be
difficult to achieve and a more persistent program might be required in order to
generate long lasting effects.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides the background and
reviews the available literature. Section 2.3 presents the experimental design. Section
2.4 discusses the data and the empirical strategy. Section 2.5 presents the results
before section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background and Literature Review
2.2.1 Barriers to Savings
Savings allow households to smooth consumption and finance investments in human
and business capital. However, in developing countries, there are considerable barriers
to savings. On the supply side individuals might face transaction costs, regulation
barriers as well as low levels of trust in the financial organizations which might limit
the access to saving products. On the demand side, individuals might be confronted
with low levels of financial knowledge, behavioral biases as well as social restrictions.
Regardless of these obstacles, there is evidence that individuals in developing coun-
tries have a demand for savings products. Diaz, Ledesma, Ravi, Singh, and Tyler
(2011) report that people in the Philippines save for emergencies (42%), children’s ed-
ucation (34%), food and daily needs (6.6%), retirement, and the future (5.9%) among
others. The study also reports that low income individuals keep their savings mainly
at home (63.5%), followed by rural banks (9.7%), cooperatives (9.4%), and self-help
groups (6.7%). The authors cite convenience and accessability as important criteria
for storage location of savings, after all two thirds save for emergencies that might
require liquidity. Moreover, intimidation and unfamiliarity are cited as reasons for the
lack of formal savings. They also find a strong gap in saving levels across urban and
rural populations, with a high share of rural individuals saving at home due to lower
trust and unfamiliarity with formal savings products.
Many microfinance institutions are now providing to their clients financial services
on top of their main microcredit products. For example, our partner MFI, provides
savings accounts for all clients with microcredit loans free of charge. In spite of having
a savings account, a considerable share of the client sample report saving at home, a
technology that earns them no interest. This is puzzling, and leads to the question:
why are microfinance clients not using their savings account to which they have access
free of charge and instead decide to keep their savings at home?
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Several reasons might explain this puzzle. Clients i) have low levels of financial
literacy and education, or they ii) do not know how savings work or how they can get
themselves to save. Thus, financial education programs could affect financial outcomes
through different mechanisms: by i) providing information on how to make financial
decisions and how financial products work, ii) mediating behavioral biases such as
structuring financial goals, making financial plans more salient, providing reminders
of financial goals, among others. In the next subsection I discuss financial education
programs in more detail.
Although saving is important, it is not clear whether individuals should save while
having loans. A more reasonable approach might be to pay existing debt which often
comes with high interest rates. However, there are reasons why poor individuals might
want to save and borrow at the same time. In the very short term, it might not be
possible to repay a loan without incurring additional fees or it might not be possible
to repay early at all.43 More importantly, precautionary savings motives might lead
individuals to save and borrow at the save time.
Telyukova and Wright (2008) examine the credit card puzzle in the US consisting of
individuals owning significant credit card debt and at the same time, sizable amounts
of low-return liquid assets. They show precautionary savings – households needing
easily accessible money for possible contingencies – to be the reason for the puzzle.
This is a plausible reason in the Philippines, where evidence shows that households
save mainly for emergencies. In case of urgent need of liquidity the outside option for
low income individuals in the Philippines are ”5/6 money lenders”, that charge 20%
interest rate per month, a 240% annual interest rate. Thus one possible reason why
women in our sample save and borrow at the same time is to avoid the possibility of
relying on 5/6 money lenders in case of an emergency.
Financial Education This chapter relates to a vast literature that looks at the
effects of financial literacy on financial outcomes. Lack of financial knowledge might
lead to suboptimal financial choices. In developed countries, households with low
levels of financial education have been shown: to i) be less likely to plan for retire-
ment (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011), ii) borrow at higher interest rates (Lusardi and
Tufano, 2015), iii) purchase fewer assets (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007), and i) have
lower participation in the stock market (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2011).
In developing countries, although it has been established that financial knowledge
is low (Cole, Sampson, and Zia, 2011; Xu and Zia, 2012), a large body of evidence
illustrates that financial education programs have not been successful in unequivocally
leading to lasting knowledge or to a lasting change in people’s financial behavior
(Fernandes, Jr., and Netemeyer, 2014).
Cole, Sampson, and Zia (2011) implement a two-hour financial education program
to teach households about bank accounts. They find modest effects in that only
43Loans taken with the partner MFI cannot be repaid until the last 2 weeks before maturity.
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individuals with low levels of financial education increase demand for bank accounts.
Carpena, Cole, Shapiro, and Zia (2017) implement a randomized experiment in
India to measure the impact of a financial literacy intervention on numeracy skills,
financial awareness, and financial attitudes and perceptions with the aim of capturing
the effects of the program on financial knowledge and subsequently on financial behav-
ior. Their training program was a video-based training and they complemented the
financial education with a pay-for-performance knowledge test, personalized financial
counseling and financial goal setting. They find that financial education alone does not
lead to improved financial outcome. They find no impact of the pay for performance
test but they do find an effect of counseling and goal setting on financial outcomes,
such as on opening bank accounts.
Field, Jayachandran, and Pande (2010) together with a local partner institution
implement a 2-day training program for Indian women that covered basic financial
literacy, business skills, and aspirations. The program did not lead to an increase in
savings, although it increased borrowing and business income for women in the more
restrictive social stratum.
Seshan and Yang (2014) measure the influence of a saving-focused 3-hour financial
literacy training on financial decisions of Indian migrant workers. The workshop aimed
at improving financial habits and encouraging joint decision-making with spouses back
home. They find that wives of treated migrants became more likely to seek financial
education and the couples became more likely to make joint financial decisions. Similar
to previous studies they find a stronger effect for workers with lower initial levels of
savings.
From this glimpse look into the current literature it is evident that the different
programs implemented are very diverse, tackle different aspects of the financial ed-
ucation curriculum, and have a different focus on the outcomes intended to affect.
Several lessons have been drawn from the available literature on how to design finan-
cial education programs in order to improve their impact on financial behavior.
Karlan, Ratan, and Zinman (2014) suggest that programs should allow to disen-
tangle the effect of the program from low take-up of treatments, target the content
to match the recipients, make it timely so that the financial education received coin-
cides with financial decisions to be made, and be simple so that individuals can easily
implement the acquired content.
This study contributes to the literature by implementing the suggested improve-
ments and testing the effectiveness of such a program in the short and medium term.
Albeit the progress of the literature on identifying ways of improving the reach
of financial education programs, the knowledge gained is not long lasting (Fernandes,
Jr., and Netemeyer, 2014). Financial behavior is a conduct learned over a long period
of time that like many other habits is difficult to change. In developing countries indi-
viduals face stronger constraints that might hinder their capacity to work on changing
behaviors (Schilbach, Schofield, and Mullainathan, 2016). Moreover, designing pro-
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grams that manage to modify conduct and lead people in poverty to achieve healthier
financial decision making may have a strong positive impact on their livelihoods. I
revisit this topic in the conclusion after discussing the results of the study.
2.2.2 Social Networks
This work is further related to a strand of the literature that analyzes the role of
networks in the diffusion of information and social learning. Banerjee, Chandrasekhar,
Duflo, and Jackson (2013) evaluate how information of a new microfinance program
diffuses through social networks in India. They find that participation in the new
microfinance program is higher when the initially informed individuals are more central
in the network.
Bursztyn, Ederer, Ferman, and Yuchtman (2014) investigate whether social learn-
ing or social utility are the channels through which peers’ financial decision making is
affected. They find that both channels have an effect on asset investments and that
social learning effects are stronger when the learning peer is financially unsophisti-
cated.
Cai, De Janvry, and Sadoulet (2015) study how social networks affect the adoption
of weather insurance in rural China. Together with a local insurance provider they
introduce a new weather insurance for rice farmers and they randomize the intensity
of the product information in order to create variation in the understanding of the
product. The phased timing in the provision of the information allows them to identify
the social network effects on insurance take-up. They find a strong effect of having an
additional friend receiving the first set of product information on insurance take-up.
Looking at the mechanisms, they find that the effect does not operate through pass-
ing of information about peers’ purchases but rather through transfer of information
regarding the functioning and benefits of the product.
My work relates to this literature and contributes by extending the social network
analysis to the area of financial education and its effects on financial outcomes.
2.3 Experimental Design
2.3.1 The Institution: Negros Women For Tomorrow Foundation (NWTF)
The Negros Women for Tomorrow Foundation is a MFI that operates in the Visayas
Region of the Philippines, with 101 branches serving more than 180,000 clients.
NWTF provides credit and savings services to poor women from rural communities to
start or expand own small businesses. In its Project Dungganon program, it follows
the Grameen Bank credit methodology of group lending (Besley and Coate, 1995).44
The main credit service is a general loan between PHP 1,000 and 5,000 payable
in a 25-weeks loan cycle.45 Clients make weekly, equally-sized installment payments.
44Other financial services, such as micro-insurance, are also offered.
45The exchange rate at the time was 1 EUR = PHP 50 and 1 USD = PHP 44.
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Conditional on good behavior, clients get subsequent loans possibly with an increased
loan amount as well as a longer repayment period. Once the fourth loan cycle is
reached, loans can be increased up to PHP 30,000. Clients can take a break of at
most two months between loan cycles.46 The purpose of the loan is capital build-up
or initial capital for businesses.
Clients are offered the Alkansya Fund (AF), a voluntary savings account from
which clients can withdraw or deposit cash at anytime. In addition, an individual
compulsory fund (ICF) is obligatory and clients can only withdraw from it in case of
emergencies. Clients make weekly deposits to the ICF and 5% of the loan amount is
deducted from the loan and deposited in the ICF.47 Both funds earn interest at the
rate of 4% per annum, computed quarterly.
Individuals are encouraged to deposit excess earnings as well as excess amounts
from the ICF into the AF savings account. All deposits and withdrawals are recorded
in the individual’s passbook, which is a paper booklet used to record transactions.
Loan officers and branch staff are required to maintain confidentiality on the AF
savings of a member.
Clients form groups of 5 people, and 7-8 groups form a center. According to
NWTF regulations, group members must be friends, and their houses should be
close to each other (within 150 meters). Group members cannot be relatives (sisters,
mother/daughters or in-laws) and their age, educational attainment and economic
status should be similar. They should also have knowledge of the business proposed
for financing. Despite these requirements, it is possible for two group members not to
be linked. Loans are covered by a social contract that obliges the rest of the group
members to pay in case that a group member defaults. Loan size and disbursement
can differ across group members.
All center members meet weekly to make their loan installment payments. Center
meetings are held at a fixed place, time and day of the week in consultation with the
center members. The meetings are presided by a NWTF loan officer, who collects in-
stallment payments, deposits, and registers attendance of the center members. During
the meeting, a report of the status of members’ businesses is provided.
Loan usage monitoring is done jointly by the loan officer and group members. Soon
after the release of a loan, the loan officer together with a group member verify the
proper use of the funds. Random checks are also performed by the loan officer and
the branch manager.
As described, in the case that a group member cannot repay its weekly loan install-
ment, the group becomes responsible. If the group cannot cover the total amount, the
46In case that clients take a longer break, they are able to take a subsequent loan, but they are
treated as new clients. That implies that they start again from loan cycle one and have to start with
a small loan.
47Weekly contributions are PHP x per week per loan cycle number x. For example, clients in their
first loan cycle contribute PHP 1 weekly, clients in their second loan cycle contribute PHP 2 weekly,
and so on.
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defaulting member could ask to draw on a center fund, called the Paga-sa Fund, which
every member contributes to. Even in the case of such a default, the savings held in
the defaulting member’s AF savings account can only be accessed with the member’s
permission. NWTF would only resort to these funds in case the loan has not been
paid at the loan maturity date. In the same line, savings of group members in their
AF savings account cannot be used for repayment of other members’ installments in
case of default, without that member’s permission. Only the member can dispose of
the funds in the AF savings accounts.
2.3.2 The Intervention
The intervention consisted of a financial education program focused on savings. The
training taught participants how saving plans and budgets work, in a one time training
that lasted 45 minutes. The training first motivated the topic by explaining why it
is important to save. Participants were then introduced to the concept of a savings
plan and the steps necessary in order to make the plan. Subsequently, participants
were taught what a budget is and the steps to follow in order to create a budget.
Both parts of the seminar were supported by visual material in the form of posters,
in which participants could see step by step how a savings plan and a budget work
as well as how the two are related. A detailed description of the training content is
provided in table 2.1.
Additionally, each participant was provided with a toolkit containing all the in-
formation discussed during the training. The toolkit included a brochure with the
explanations of how to make a savings plan and a budget, and the example savings
and budget forms discussed in detail during the training. As a part of the toolkit,
blank savings and budget forms were provided so that participants could start their
own. Participants also received five additional copies of the toolkit to share with their
lending group members, family, and friends.
The aim was to provide the training in a simple way and to focus on topics and
behaviors related exclusively to savings. Karlan, Ratan, and Zinman (2014) suggest
that less is more when it comes to financial training programs, particularly for adults.
This is important as well since our sample of participants are women, and a long
duration of the program may have interfered with their work or family responsibilities,
making them prone to impatience and leading to a reduction of their attention towards
the training. Seshan and Yang (2014) present an example of a successful short-timed
savings-focused financial literacy training that focuses on particular topics.
Finally, it was also important that participants could identify with the topics cov-
ered in the training and that the message was delivered in a simple manner. Therefore,
we focused on providing the information in a very simple way that participants could
easily understand and implement on their own. Examples exist of successful training
programs that focus on providing the training in a simplified style. Drexler, Fischer,
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and Schoar (2014) find an effect on financial outcomes when a financial education
program is provided in a simple way as compared to a more standard accounting
training.
The financial education program was developed together with our Philippine re-
search team in order to provide a program adapted to local conditions. The training
follows international standards and is comparable to programs previously implemented
elsewhere, such as the two first modules of the training program implemented by
Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar (2014).
Table 2.1 Summary of training program
Training Content
Module 1 Savings
Importance of savings
Identify saving goals
Determine the costs
Set target date
Financial instruments for saving
Module 2 Budget
Definition/importance of budget
Set goals: incorporate saving goals
Know your income
Make your expenditure plan
Track your expending
Personalize your budget
Module 3 Connecting Savings and budget
Tips for improving savings and budgeting
Compare actual and planned expenditures
Stay on target: Update savings and budget plan periodically
2.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Randomization
The field experiment was conducted in the Philippine provinces of Guimaras, Capiz
and Iloilo during the month of April 2015 (see figures 2.1 and 2.2).
Subjects participating in the study are clients of NWTF and were randomly se-
lected from the pool of clients in the three provinces, belonging to three branches of
NWTF. The randomization procedure had two steps. In the first step, suitable cen-
ters were divided into bins according to minimum distance between centers, and the
bins where randomly allocated to the training treatment and to a control group. In a
second step individuals were randomly selected from the treatment and control pools.
All clients selected to be treated as well as clients selected as control, took part in a
series of experimental games before the savings training. See Penczynski and Santana
(2016) (chapter 1) for more details about the experimental games.
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Figure 2.1: Location of experimental sessions
The clients across the three NWTF branches were distributed across 175 centers,
located in 155 different villages (called barangays). It was not logistically possible to
hold sessions in each barangay, therefore several centers were grouped together in a
bin, based on their geographical location. In order to select the barangays (centers)
that would form a bin, the minimum geographical distance across barangays was
computed, and bins with the minimum distance and with approximately 90 clients
were selected.
Bins had on average three barangays, and the sessions were held in one of the
barangays of the bin. The selection of the barangay where the session was to be held
depended on the facilities, the proximity to the municipality and the accessibility.48
In order to have the information required for the randomization, recruiters sur-
veyed the barangays to collect data about the facilities and resources available. The
survey, implemented with tablets, enabled the collection of geographical reference
data of the barangays and municipalities as well as pictures of the facilities (see ap-
pendix A.2). Recruiters also gathered information about the barangay head and the
possibility to acquire permission to hold the sessions in the barangay.
The first step of the randomization process assigned the 60 client bins to one
of four treatment arms, a two-by-two design with two institutions and a treatment
48Four of the bins were composed of only one barangay. In these cases, the entire village was
mapped to get the complete network of those four villages.
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Figure 2.2: Location of experimental sessions in detail
and a control for the savings intervention. The institutions arm was related to the
experimental games and implied receiving a later payment from either NWTF or Local
Money Lenders (ML) (see Penczynski and Santana (2016) for more details). Given
that receiving a promised later payment from the microfinance institution, NWTF,
could have a positive effect on the trust level of the client towards NWTF and thus
have an effect on savings, I constrain the main analysis to those allocated to the ML
treatment.
In order to improve precision of our estimates, a rerandomization procedure based
on a set of covariates was implemented, following Morgan and Rubin (2012). The
procedure uses available data to check for covariate balance across treatment and
control groups. If a lack of balance is present, then rerandomization could help to
ensure balance. Figure 2.3, taken from Morgan and Rubin (2012), shows the steps of
the procedure.
Figure 2.3: Rerandomization procedure
Source: Morgan and Rubin (2012)
To establish the rerandomization criteria, the Mahalanobis distance M was uti-
lized:
M = (X¯T − X¯C)
[
cov(X¯T − X¯C)
]−1
(X¯T − X¯C), (2.1)
where X¯T−X¯C is the k-dimensional vector of the difference in covariate means between
the treatment and control groups and cov(x) is the sample covariate matrix of x. A
randomization is acceptable whenever M is below a certain threshold.
NWTF administrative data such as loan size, AF savings balance, ICF balance as
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well as an urban area indicator, the population of the bin, and the average distance
from the bin to the municipality were taken as covariates. In the rerandomization
procedure the distance across the covariates of the four different treatments arms was
compared, allowing for comparison of any two treatment arms against each other.
In order to recruit the participants permission from the municipality mayor was
requested and subsequently from the village head, locally known as barangay captain.
Barangay captains would additionally authorize the use of the village facilities, usually
the barangay hall, where the savings seminar was held. Subjects were invited to
participate in the experiment via an invitation letter delivered to their houses.
I define as “injection points” individuals that received the savings training and
participated in the experimental games. I denote the treatment status of the injection
points with Ti = 1. Individuals that also participated in the experimental games
but did not receive the savings training are the injection points’ control group, and I
identify them as control subjects. I denote the treatment status of control subjects as
Ti = 0.
I am also interested in the effects of the training on the peers of the injection
points. I define two groups: group peers denoted by g(i) and center peers denoted by
c(i). I denote the dummy variable Tg(i) as the group treatment indicator. Tg(i) = 1 if
and only if there is a group member that did not take part in the training but that
had an injection point in his lending group. I refer to them as “treated group peers”.
Consequently, Tg(i) takes a value of 0 for group members of clients that participated
in the experiment, but did not receive the training, which are the group members of
those that form the control group of the injection points. I refer to them as “control
group peers”.
Finally, Tc(i) indicates the treatment indicator at the center level, and takes a value
of 1 for members that are in centers with at least one injection point, excluding the
lending group to which the injection point belongs. I refer to them as “treated center
peers”. Tc(i) takes a value of 0 for members whose center has at least one member that
attended the experimental games but did not participate in the training, excluding
the group member of the control subjects. I refer to them as “control center peers”.
I have 205 injection points and 197 control subjects, a total of 402 individuals.49
They are distributed across 85 centers, out of which 42 have at least one injection
point (Tc(i) = 1), and 43 have at least one control subject (Tc(i) = 0).
I have 352 individuals as peers in treated groups and 360 individuals as peers in
control groups, a total of 712 peers at the group level. At the center level, I have 381
individuals as peers in treated centers and 394 individuals as peers in control centers,
49Initially, we had 256 injection points and 243 control subjects, a total of 499 individuals. I lose
97 individuals due to the fact that their loans end and that I only observe active clients. I focus the
analysis on clients that were active at the time of the savings training. Since I have data only on
active clients, it is possible that a client that was on a loan cycle break at the time of the training
and therefore not marked in April as an active client, appears in subsequent periods in my sample,
once she takes up the next loan. For now, I abstract from these clients.
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a total of 775 center peers.50
2.4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use three data sources, administrative data from NWTF on all active clients, survey
data collected before and after the intervention took place, and data from the exper-
imental games, the latter two only on the injection points and their control subjects.
The administrative data from NWTF is monthly data for the three branches with
information regarding AF savings balance, loan size, loan balance, principal amor-
tization, repayment start date, maturity date, loan cycle, and number of weeks in
which payments were missing. Repayment data is available only at baseline. In the
baseline survey, information was collected on household characteristics, financial prac-
tices, social preferences, risk attitudes, trust and – importantly – social networks. The
experimental games data provide estimates of behavioral measures of trust as well as
risk attitude parameter estimates (see Penczynski and Santana (2016) for more detail
on the estimation of these parameters).
Summary statistics are reported in table 2.2. Panel A presents household and
financial characteristics for the injection points and control subjects, and panels B
and C NWTF financial data for group and center peers. All individuals in the sample
are women. As shown in panel A, they are on average 43 years old, have a household
size of 5 people and hold a loan size of PHP 5,456. Their average AF savings in NWTF
is PHP 267 and their average ICF balance is PHP 812. 55% report to have some sort
of savings, and the average reported amount of savings is PHP 1,351. Their reported
savings is higher than the AF savings in NWTF, it may be that it includes their ICF
balance since 80% of those that mentioned having savings with an MFI or bank, said
that it was with NWTF. 22% of them have savings at home, averaging PHP 1,044.
Their businesses are mainly general stores (sari-sari stores), trading, and food
services. Their average start-up capital is PHP 3,990. The main reason for taking up
a loan is the sourcing of working capital for their business. They also take it for food
and daily needs, education, emergencies, and to buy assets (e.g., livestock, tricycle).
64% of the individuals know what a savings plan is, out of which 67% report having
ever made a savings plan. Out of those women that have made a savings plan, 85%
report that they are able to follow it. Therefore, 64% of all women either do not
know how to make a savings plan, have never made one or have not followed their
savings plan. It is also striking that 64% of women know what a savings plan is but
only 55% of them report having any type of savings. Savings at home are slightly
higher for women that report knowing how a savings plan works (on average PHP
700), compared to those that report not knowing (PHP 500), however the difference
is not statistically different from 0.
I also collected data on risk attitudes. Subjects self report to be slightly risk loving,
50Initially, I had 774 peers at the group level and 833 peers at the center level.
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with a reported risk avoidance of 4.3 on a Likert scale of 1 to 7. However, when using
risk aversion estimates from the experimental games, I find that 73% of the subjects
are risk averse.51 Subjects also report high levels of trust towards NWTF, with 6.2
out of a 1 to 7 Likert scale.
The social network questions in the survey asked participants about their social
links in twelve different dimensions: relatives in the village, non-relatives with whom
they socialize, from whom they would borrow money, from whom they would lend
money, to whom they would ask for help in case of emergency, from whom they hear
the news in the village from, whom do they think is a well connected person, whom
visits them on a regular basis, whom do they visit on a regular basis, with whom do
they go to church with, from whom they borrow or lend goods (i.e., sugar, eggs or rice),
and to whom do they lend goods. Questions were asked openly, so that participants
could mention all people in each category. Additionally, participants were asked to
name their lending group members, and answer the same questions (except whom
they would ask for help in emergency) as reported above.
The data collected is very rich, however, it was only collected for the participants
of the experiment. From this data, I compute several network measures: i) the degree,
Degreei, which is the number of connections in the network of a participant, ii) an
indicator measure Pi, which takes a value of 1 if another participant j in i’s center
mentioned participant i, and 0 otherwise; iii) an intensity measure Z, which takes a
value of 0, 1 or 2 if participant i was mentioned 0, 1 or 2 or more times by other
participants in her center and iv) the number of participants connected to divided by
the total number of friends, NetSharei.
Additionally, I compute an alternative definition of the network. I define a person
being connected to another person within the center if one of their two last names is
the same. Last names in the Philippines carry information about kinship. Names in
the Philippines are composed of a first name, a middle name and a last name. The
last name corresponds to the paternal last name and the middle name constitutes the
maternal last name.52 A member of a center is connected to another center member if
at least one of their two names is the same, otherwise they are not connected. Using
this information, I construct the measure family center degree, DegreeFami, which
corresponds to the number of links a member has within her center, according to this
alternative definition. The measure is of particular interest because it allows me to
estimate the center connections on the dimension of kinship, which I believe might be
of particular importance for center peers.
As presented in table 2.2 panel A4, injection points and control subjects have
51The risk avoidance question asked subjects ”Are you, generally speaking, a person who is fully
prepared to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks?” 1-avoid, 7-fully prepared. The risk
aversion parameters were estimated from a risk task elicited in the experimental games by having
subjects choose between risky and safe lotteries. For more details see Penczynski and Santana (2016).
52When a woman marries, the norm is that her maiden surname becomes her middle name, and
her husband’s surname becomes her new surname or last name.
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on average 9 friends in their network, 70% of them are connected to on average 2
other injection points or control subjects and on average they have 4.5 friends in the
center. According to the alternative degree measure, DegreeFami, they have 2.6
family connections within the center.
Table 2.3 reports summary statistics for injection points and control subjects from
the administrative and the survey baseline data, for clients that are active in the
month after the training was implemented, May 2015. Given the random assignment
of treatment, I expect injection points to be similar to the control subjects. As can
be seen in the table, these expectations hold across a wide range of characteristics.
Only two characteristics are statistically different from each other, whether the house-
hold has electricity and whether they have a flush toilet. I control for these in the
regressions. The treatment assignment variable, Ti, is not explained by the covariates
presented in table 2.3. The F -test for this regression is 0.98 with a p-value of 0.50.
The same holds for the originally intended sample before attrition.53
I expect that group peers of the injection points are similar to group peers of the
control subjects. Table 2.4 presents the balance of covariates for group peers. Given
that the baseline questionnaire was only implemented for the injection points and the
control subjects, covariates information is only available from the administrative data.
As shown in the table, group peers from the control subjects are on average similar to
the group peers of the injection points, except in their AF savings account balance.
They hold a loan of PHP 5,679, installment payment of PHP 253, and are on the third
loan cycle, on average. Their average AF savings account balance is PHP 293 and
their ICF balance is PHP 866. Compared to the injection points and control subjects,
the group peers have slightly higher AF savings account balance, ICF balance and
loan size.54
The AF savings account balance is higher for the group peers of the injection points
compared to the group peers of the control subjects. The difference is significant at
the 5% significance level. I control for this covariate in the analysis. The covariates
presented in table 2.4 do not jointly determine the treatment assignment indicator at
the peer group level, Tg(i). The F-test is 0.97 and the p-value is 0.43.
Lastly, I also expect that center peers of the injection points are similar to center
peers of the control subjects. Table 2.5 presents the balance of covariates for center
peers. As with group peers, I only have administrative data available. Center peers
53Table 2.10 presents the balance of covariates for the baseline, for all clients originally included in
the study. The results are practically the same as the ones reported in table 2.3, with the exception
that injection points are slightly more likely to know what a savings plan is, and the difference is
significant at the 10% level. I control for this covariate in the analysis. As in table 2.3 the treatment
assignment variable Ti is not explained by the covariates, the F -test is 1.04 and the p-value is 0.41.
54Table 2.11 presents the balance of covariates for the group peers at baseline of all injection points
and control subjects included in the study. Covariates are balanced across the group peers, including
the AF savings balance. Although the AF savings balance is higher for the group peers of the injection
points, the difference is not statistically significant from 0. I also look into balance of covariates for all
subsequent months in the analysis, and all the shown covariates are not statistically different across
group peers.
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have an AF savings account balance of PHP 264, loan size of PHP 5,454, and ICF
balance of PHP 882, similar to group peers. They repay weekly on average PHP
243 with a principal amortization of PHP 220. Variables are balanced, except for
the installment amount which is larger for center peers of the injection points. The
difference is significant at the 5% significance level. I control for this covariate in the
analysis. Similar to group peers, I analyze the balance of covariates for all subsequent
months and results are similar to the ones just described.
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics
mean sd
Panel A. Injection Points and Control Subjects
A1. Household Characteristics
Age 43.4 (12.1)
Household size 5.2 (1.9)
Has regular income 0.6 (0.5)
Daily consumption 332.8 (319.8)
HH daily consumption 994.7 (704.0)
Years of education 12.5 (4.8)
Trust level in NWTF1 6.2 (1.3)
Risk aversion2 .73 (0.44)
Avoid taking risks3 4.3 (2.6)
Sociability4 4.3 (1.2)
A2. Reported Financial Characteristics
Borrowed from MFI/Banks 5969.3 (3571.2)
Savings in MFI/Banks 1351.8 (3615.3)
Know what a savings plan is 0.6 (0.5)
Made a savings plan 0.7 (0.5)
Followed a savings plan 0.9 (0.4)
A3. NWTF Financial Characteristics
AF balance 267.6 (324.8)
Loan size 5456.2 (2481.7)
Loan balance 2899.2 (2241.3)
Installment amount 237.6 (138.1)
ICF balance 812.5 (923.4)
A4. Network Characteristics
Number of friends 9.1 (3.8)
Connected to other IP or control subjects 0.7 (0.5)
Number of IP or subjects connected to 2.1 (1.2)
Number of friends in center 4.5 (2.0)
Family center degree 2.6 (4.0)
Panel B. Group Peers
AF balance 293.5 (589.8)
Loan amount 5678.6 (3021.9)
Connected to an IP or control subjects 0.8 (0.4)
Number of IP or subjects connected to 1.6 (0.9)
Family center degree 2.2 (3.0)
Panel C. Center Peers
AF balance 263.6 (356.0)
Loan amount 5453.5 (2804.9)
Number of IP or subjects connected to 1.3 (0.6)
Connected to an IP or control subjects 0.2 (0.4)
Family center degree 2.0 (3.1)
1 1–no trust, 7–complete trust, 2 0-risk loving, 1-risk averse, 3
Avoid/prepared to take risks: 1–avoid, 7–fully prepared, 4 Meet friends,
relatives, neighbor: 1–never, 2–seldom, 3–monthly, 4–weekly, 5–daily.
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Table 2.3 Summary statistics of control subjects and injection points
Control Injection points Difference N
mean sd mean sd b p
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Client Characteristics
Age 44.1 (11.9) 42.6 (12.3) 1.55 (0.20) 401
HH water source 0.1 (0.3) 0.1 (0.3) 0.02 (0.44) 402
HH roof material 4.6 (1.3) 4.5 (1.3) 0.04 (0.73) 401
Electricity in HH 0.9 (0.2) 0.8 (0.4) 0.09 (0.00)∗∗∗ 401
Rooms used for sleeping 1.8 (0.8) 1.8 (0.8) -0.04 (0.58) 401
HH ownership 0.9 (0.3) 0.9 (0.3) 0.02 (0.63) 400
Household size 5.2 (2.0) 5.2 (1.9) -0.07 (0.72) 401
HH floor material 2.9 (6.9) 3.8 (11.7) -0.93 (0.34) 401
Flush toilet in HH 1.0 (0.2) 0.8 (0.4) 0.11 (0.00)∗∗∗ 402
Has regular income 0.6 (0.5) 0.6 (0.5) -0.03 (0.49) 401
Daily consumption 314.2 (283.7) 350.6 (350.6) -36.33 (0.26) 401
HH daily consumption 983.1 (715.8) 1005.9 (694.0) -22.76 (0.75) 402
Employment 4.1 (2.0) 4.0 (2.0) 0.11 (0.57) 396
Official position in village 0.1 (0.3) 0.1 (0.3) 0.01 (0.75) 401
Years of education 12.8 (4.8) 12.2 (4.7) 0.58 (0.23) 394
Panel B. Social Preferences
Trust in NWTF1 6.2 (1.2) 6.2 (1.3) -0.02 (0.90) 402
Trust in local money lender1 3.8 (1.9) 3.7 (2.1) 0.07 (0.74) 402
Avoids taking risks2 4.4 (2.5) 4.1 (2.6) 0.31 (0.22) 402
Avoids being betrayed3 1.7 (1.5) 1.7 (1.5) 0.02 (0.91) 402
Avoids being taken advantage of3 1.8 (1.6) 1.7 (1.5) 0.12 (0.44) 402
Revenges if suffers serious wrong4 6.4 (1.3) 6.6 (1.1) -0.14 (0.23) 402
Offends back if offended5 6.4 (1.3) 6.5 (1.3) -0.04 (0.75) 402
Sociability6 4.3 (1.2) 4.3 (1.2) 0.04 (0.73) 402
Panel C. Reported Financial Characteristics
Borrowed from MFI/Banks 6256.1 (3821.9) 5690.3 (3295.5) 565.84 (0.13) 365
Savings in MFI/Banks 1290.7 (1593.2) 1415.7 (4921.4) -124.97 (0.80) 217
Bank distance 35.0 (52.9) 40.1 (37.5) -5.09 (0.27) 402
Ever cashed a check 0.9 (0.2) 0.9 (0.3) 0.01 (0.78) 402
Know what savings plan is 0.6 (0.5) 0.7 (0.5) -0.07 (0.12) 402
Made a savings plan 0.7 (0.5) 0.7 (0.5) 0.03 (0.56) 260
Followed savings plan 0.8 (0.4) 0.9 (0.3) -0.08 (0.12) 175
Panel D. NWTF Financial Characteristics
AF Savings balance 251.4 (347.5) 283.2 (301.3) -31.74 (0.33) 402
Loan size 5445.7 (2616.6) 5466.3 (2351.2) -20.66 (0.93) 402
Loan balance 2967.6 (2570.2) 2833.5 (1875.8) 134.15 (0.55) 402
Installment amount 241.8 (145.0) 233.6 (131.4) 8.17 (0.55) 402
Tenure 482.9 (436.3) 469.7 (442.3) 13.19 (0.78) 344
ICF balance 783.1 (922.9) 840.7 (925.2) -57.58 (0.53) 402
Observations 197 205 402
Notes: ∗ (p < 0.10), ∗∗ (p < 0.05), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.01).
1 1-no trust, 7-complete trust,
2 1-avoid, 7-fully prepared,
3 1-completely avoid, 7-do not avoid,
4 1-revenge, 7-no revenge,
5 1-offend, 7-not offend,
6 Meets friends, family, neighbors: 1-never, 2-seldom, 3-monthly, 4-weekly, 5-daily.
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Table 2.4 Descriptive Statistics, group peers
Control Savings training Difference N
mean sd mean sd b p
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AF savings balance 249.1 (421.0) 336.9 (715.1) -87.83 (0.05)∗∗ 711
Loan amount 5675.2 (3322.2) 5681.9 (2701.9) -6.73 (0.98) 711
Installment amount 254.4 (208.4) 252.3 (149.4) 2.13 (0.88) 712
ICF balance 862.2 (1108.5) 869.4 (949.0) -7.20 (0.93) 711
Loan cycle 3.1 (2.1) 3.1 (2.1) -0.03 (0.84) 711
Principal amortization 230.8 (166.1) 229.3 (111.3) 1.51 (0.89) 711
Observations 352 360 712
Notes: ∗ (p < 0.10), ∗∗ (p < 0.05), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.01).
Table 2.5 Descriptive Statistics, center peers
Control Savings training Difference N
mean sd mean sd b p
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AF savings balance 245.9 (357.5) 280.6 (354.2) -34.70 (0.18) 774
Loan size 5324.1 (2925.0) 5578.7 (2681.4) -254.53 (0.21) 775
Installment amount 231.2 (171.6) 256.2 (148.2) -25.03 (0.03)∗∗ 775
ICF balance 847.9 (1225.0) 914.9 (1123.2) -66.95 (0.43) 774
Loan cycle 3.0 (2.1) 3.1 (2.3) -0.18 (0.27) 775
Principal amortization 214.5 (122.3) 226.2 (108.2) -11.69 (0.16) 775
Observations 381 394 775
Notes: ∗ (p < 0.10), ∗∗ (p < 0.05), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.01).
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2.4.3 Empirical Strategy
The random assignment of the savings training allows me to get unbiased estimates
of the effect of receiving the training by estimating the following equation:
Yd = α+ β1Td + γ
′Xd + εd, (2.2)
where d = i, g(i), c(i). Yd is the AF savings balance of individual belonging to group
d for the months following the training – the outcome of interest. Td is an indicator
of the savings training and Xd is a vector of baseline characteristics.
I run this regression on the three groups of interest. I first look at d = i, which
corresponds to the injection points and their control subjects. As mentioned above,
Ti is an indicator of the savings training. A value of 1 indicates that the individuals
received the savings training, and we refer to them as injection points. A value of
0 indicates that they are the control subjects, that is individuals in other centers
randomly selected to be the control subjects which also participated in experimental
games but did not get the savings training. Xi is a vector of baseline characteristics
including age, electricity in the HH, household size, average background consumption,
knowledge of a savings plan, trust in NWTF, amount earned in the experimental
games, risk aversion parameter, trust level in money lenders and the number of links
within the network. Additionally, we also include the covariates on which we balanced
the randomization: AF savings balance, ICF balance, loan amount, population, and
the average distance to the municipality.55
In a second step, I am interested in analyzing whether there is a differential effect
across group peers and center peers. The second group of interest, is therefore group
peers, for which d = g(i). For this group, Tg(i) = 1 if and only if there is a group
member that did not take part in the training but that had an injection point in
his lending group. Tg(i) = 0 for group members of clients that participated in the
experiment, but did not receive the training, which are the group members of those
that form the control group of the injection points.
The third group of interest is center peers. For this group, Tc(i) takes a value of 1
for members that are in centers with at least one injection point, excluding the lending
group to which the injection point belongs to. Tc(i) takes a value of 0 for members
whose center has at least one member that attended the experimental games but did
not participate in the training, excluding the group member of the control subjects.
For sets g(i), and c(i), the vector of baseline characteristics corresponds to the AF
savings balance, ICF balance, loan amount, loan balance, loan cycle, average distance
to municipality, population and number of clients in the center.
To test the effect of the social network on savings, I run the following regression
on the three groups of interest:
55The urban indicator is not included due to multicolinearity.
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Yd = α+ φ1Td + φ2Pd + φ3Td × Pd + ψ · degreed + γ′Xd + εd, (2.3)
where d = i, g(i), c(i). Pd takes a value of 1 if an injection point (or a control subject)
reported individual belonging to group d as a connection and 0 otherwise. The set of
baseline covariates are as before. For set i, degreei corresponds to the total number
of links.
To test whether intensity of the connection matters, I run the following regressions
on the three groups of interest:
Yd = α+β1Td+β2Z1d+β3Z2d+β4(Z1d×Ti)+β5(Z2d×Td)+ψ·degreed+γ′Xd+εd, (2.4)
where d = i, g(i), c(i). Z1d takes a value of 1 if and only if individual belonging to
group d is connected to 1 injection point for treated centers, or to 1 control subject
in control centers, and 0 otherwise. Z2i takes a value of 1 if and only if individual in
group d is connected to two or more injection points in the case of treated centers or
2 or more control subjects in the case of control centers, and 0 otherwise.56
The effect of the training, conditional on not being connected to an injection point,
is β1. The effect of the training conditional on being connected to another injection
point is β1 + β4. The effect of the training conditional on being connected to two or
more injection points, is β1 + β5.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Injection Points
I first look at the effect of the training on the AF savings balance of the injection
points by estimating equation (2.2) for the injection points (d = i). Yi is the AF
savings balance of injection point i for the first three months after the intervention.57
Results in table 2.6, column 1, show that the AF savings balance of the injection
points increases by PHP 114.6, a 43% increase of baseline average AF savings.
To test the effect of the social network on savings for the injection points, I esti-
mate:
Yi = α+ φ1Ti + φ2NetSharei + ψ ·Degreei + γ′Xi + εi, (2.5)
where NetSharei is the share of participants to whom i is connected over i’s total
number of friends and Degreei is a set of dummy variables that indicate i’s number
of friends.
56I do not include Degreed, d = g(i), c(i) in specifications (2.3) and (2.4), since the data on number
of friends is not available for group and center peers.
57I run a pooled regression for the three months after the intervention took place. The main reason
for looking at the effects for this short period of time is the dynamic nature of the network. Once a
client’s loan cycle ends, clients can be inactive until they start their next loan or leave. That implies
that members of the network could come and go depending on their cycle maturity and when their
next loan starts. Therefore I look at the short term effects in order to abstract of the dynamics of the
network. In the next section I analyze the medium term effects of the program.
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Results for this specification are reported in column 2. I find a positive effect of the
social networks on the AF savings balance, of PHP 252.9. This implies that having an
additional friend receiving the training, which raises NetSharei by 11 percent, leads
to an increase of the AF savings by PHP 28 (252.9 × 0.11). This represents 24% of
the main effect presented in column 1.
Equation (2.6) is an alternative specification, to test whether there is an effect on
savings of having a friend also participating in the experiment:
Yi = α+ φ1Ti + φ2Pi + ψ ·Degreei + γ′Xi + εi, (2.6)
where Pi takes a value of 1 if individual i is connected to an injection point or control
subject, and 0 otherwise. Results are presented in column 3. I find a positive effect
of PHP 48 on savings of being connected to someone that also received the training,
but the effect is not significant.
Next, I examine whether having other injection points as friends leads to a stronger
effect of the training program. To this end, I estimate equation (2.3) and instead
of Degreei I include a set of dummy variables indicating the number of friends in
the network. Results, presented in column 4, show that injection points with other
friends as injection points do not experience a stronger effect of the training, the
effect size is PHP 92.5 (φ1 +φ3=139.9-47.4), however the effect is not significant. For
injection points not connected to another injection point, the effect is much stronger
and significant. They experience an increase of PHP 139.9 on savings, representing
52% of baseline savings. This implies that injection points are less influenced by their
friends when they have direct information about the training.
I further investigate this by estimating equation (2.4) and as before include a set of
dummy variables indicating the number of friends. Results are presented in column 5
indeed showing that the effect does not intensify when an injection point is connected
to 1 or 2 or more other injection points.
2.5.2 Spillover effects: group peers
In this section, I analyze the effect of the training on the AF savings balance of group
peers. I first assess the basic effect of the training by estimating equation (2.2) for
the group peers (d = g(i)). Results are shown in table 2.7, column 1. I find a positive
effect of the savings training on group peers of PHP 71, representing 24% of baseline
savings of group peers.
To assess the social network effect on savings of the group peers, I estimate equation
(2.3) where Pg(i) takes a value of 1 if the group peer is connected to an injection point
or a control subject, and 0 otherwise. Results are shown in columns 2 and 3, the
former not including the interaction term φ3Tg(i) × Pg(i).
Column 2 shows that being connected to an injection point or control subject leads
to a positive but insignificant effect of PHP 40 on group peer savings. More interesting
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Table 2.6 Effect of training on savings, injection points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Savings training, Ti 114.6
∗∗ 96.83∗ 106.0∗ 139.9∗∗ 143.2∗∗
(55.43) (50.16) (53.63) (60.20) (60.07)
Share of friends as IP, NetSharei 252.9
∗∗∗
(91.60)
Connected to IP, Pi 47.96 66.63
∗
(37.03) (36.81)
Savings training × -47.39
Connected to IP, Ti × Pi (87.29)
Connected to 1 IP, Z1i 22.86
(41.27)
Connected to 2 or more IP, Z2i 101.9
∗∗
(48.92)
Savings training× -103.2
Connected to 1 IP, Ti × Z1i (84.10)
Savings training× -30.24
Connected to 2 IP, Ti × Z2i (101.2)
Constant 79.94 18.12 57.42 43.66 115.2
(138.1) (144.7) (138.8) (137.8) (136.7)
Observations 1030 1030 1023 1023 1024
Village Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.256 0.268 0.258 0.258 0.272
p-value joint significance:
φ1, φ3 0.0405
∗∗
H0 : φ1 + φ3 = 0 0.1835
H0 : β1 + β4 = 0 0.5736
H0 : β1 + β5 = 0 0.1879
Notes: Clustered standard errors at the center level. NetSharei is the ratio of participants i is
connected to over total number of friends. Village characteristics: average distance to municipality
and population. Financial characteristics: Baseline levels of savings, loan, amount, ICF balance and
loan cycle. Household characteristics: Age, electricity, background, consumption, trust in NWTF,
experiment earnings and estimated risk aversion parameter. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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are the results in column 3. The effect of the saving training on those not connected
to an injection point is PHP 185.4, representing 63% of baseline savings. Group peers
are less influenced by the program when they have a direct contact to the injection
points. The effect of the training for those connected to an injection point is PHP 48
(φ1 + φ3=185.4-137.2), which corresponds to a 16% of group peers’ baseline savings.
I further investigate this by estimating equation (2.4) where Zjg(i) takes a value
of 1 if an individual in group peer g(i) is connected to 1 or 2 or more injection
points or control subjects j = 1, 2, and 0 otherwise. This specification allows me to
analyze in more detail the smaller effect of the training for group peers connected
to an injection point. Results are presented in column 4. As before, we have that
for subjects not connected to an injection point the effect of the training is strong,
increasing savings by PHP 185. As can be seen, the negative effect for those connected
to one injection point is driven by those with 2 or more connections. Treated group
peers connected to one injection point experience an increase in savings of PHP 78.8
(β1 + β4 = 185.1 − 106.3), however the effect is not significant. Treated group peers
with 2 or more connections to injection points experience an increase in savings of
only PHP 12 (β1 + β5 = 185.1 − 172.9). The effect is considerably smaller than for
those not connected to an injection point and is not statistically different from zero.
Incorporating further dummy variables for those with 3, 4, 5, and 6 connections,
it can be seen in column 6 that results are mainly driven by those with more than 3
connections to the injection points, representing a very small number of group peers
(corresponding to 10 percent).
Results in this section suggest that there is a stronger effect of the training on
those not directly connected to the injection points. This also supports the presence
of spillover effects through nonfriends.
Finally, I investigate whether kinship matters by estimating the following specifi-
cation:
Yg(i) = α+τ1Tg(i)+τ2DegreeFamg(i)+τ3Tg(i)×DegreeFamg(i)+γ′Xg(i)+εg(i). (2.7)
By adding the kinship network measure I assess whether family connections have
an effect on the savings level of group peers, and moreover whether this effect is
stronger for those group peers with at least one injection point as a group member.
Results are presented in column 5. As expected, there is a small and insignificant
effect of the kinship network. Kinship connections should be stronger at the center
peer level and not at the group peer level, since close family members cannot be part
of a same lending group.
2.5.3 Spillover effects: center peers
In this section I investigate the effects of the training on the AF savings balance of
the center peers. In particular, I expect a larger importance of the kinship network,
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Table 2.7 Effect of training on savings, group peers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Savings training, Tg(i) 71.06
∗ 68.64∗ 185.4∗∗∗ 185.1∗∗∗ 57.36 185.1∗∗∗
(40.60) (40.34) (61.38) (60.82) (39.87) (60.72)
Connected to IP, Pg(i) 40.63 95.55
∗∗∗
(30.96) (26.57)
Savings training × -137.2∗∗
Connected to IP, Tg(i) × Pg(i) (63.58)
Connected to 1 IP, Z1g(i) 94.69
∗∗∗ 95.29∗∗∗
(27.45) (27.96)
Connected to 2 or more IP, Z2g(i) 94.98
∗∗
(39.90)
Savings training ×Connected -106.3
to 1 IP, Tg(i) × Z1g(i) (71.36)
Savings training ×Connected -172.9∗∗
to 2 IP, Tg(i) × Z2g(i) (70.29)
DegreeFamg(i) 2.212
(10.70)
Savings training × 4.397
DegreeFamg(i) (10.81)
Connected to 2 IP 80.54∗∗
(36.55)
Connected to 3 IP 59.39
(70.82)
Connected to 4 IP 495.2
(333.6)
Connected to 5 IP -24.81
(43.52)
Connected to 6 IP -82.97
(58.26)
Training×Connected to 1 IP -106.4
(71.53)
Training×Connected to 2 IP -144.5∗∗
(68.45)
Training×Connected to 3 IP -160.8
(102.4)
Training×Connected to 4 IP -565.7
(343.6)
Training×Connected to 5 IP -133.7∗
(77.54)
Constant 169.6∗ 141.5 102.8 98.73 176.8∗ 95.82
(94.33) (91.89) (88.40) (86.57) (94.31) (85.73)
Observations 2085 2085 2085 2085 2043 2085
Village & Financial Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.239 0.240 0.243 0.246 0.241 0.254
H0 : φ1 + φ3 = 0 0.2633
H0 : β1 + β4 = 0 0.1410
H0 : β1 + β5 = 0 0.8170
H0 : τ1 + τ3 = 0 0.1166
Notes: Clustered standard errors at the center level. Connected to IP, Pg(i), takes a value of 1 if the
group peer is connected to an injection point or control subject, DegreeFamg(i) is the alternative network
measure based on kinship. Village characteristics: average distance to municipality, population, number of
clients. Financial characteristics: Baseline levels of savings, loan amount, loan balance, ICF balance and
loan cycle. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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given that family members are not allowed to be in the same group, but they can be
in the same center. First, I assess the overall effect of the training on the center peers
by estimating equation (2.2) for the center peers (d = c(i)). Results are presented in
table 2.8, column 1. The training has a positive effect on center peers’ savings of PHP
65.6, which represents a 25% of baseline center peer savings.
To investigate the effect of social networks on the center peers, I run the same set
of regressions as for the group peers. I start by estimating equation (2.3). Columns 2
and 3 show the results. In column 2, I incorporate only Pc(i), which takes a value of 1
if an injection point or a control subject indicates a peer in c(i) as a connection. I find
a positive and insignificant effect of the connection indicator of PHP 18, as shown in
column 2.
Results in column 3 suggest that for center peers not connected to the injection
points, the effect of the training is PHP 87.4, representing 33% of baseline center
peers’ savings. For those that are connected to an injection point, the effect is PHP
-8.1 (φ1 + φ3=87.4-95.5) but insignificant. These results go in the same direction as
for the group peers, but at a lower intensity.
Although the effect for center peers connected to an injection point is not sig-
nificant, I investigate the source of the negative effect, by estimating equation (2.4).
Results are presented in columns 4 and 5, where column 4 does not include the in-
teraction terms. Similar as for group peers, I find that the negative effect for center
peers connected to an injection point is driven by those with 2 or more connections.
Only 4% of center peers have 2 or more connections to an injection point or control
subject.
Finally, in columns 6 and 7, I assess the effect of the kinship network measure and
its interaction with the training. In a first step, I estimate equation (2.2) and control
for the family connectivity, DegreeFamc(i). Column 6 presents an effect of 17 PHP
in center peers’ savings, although insignificant (p = 0.12).
In a second step, I estimate equation (2.7) to assess whether the effect of the
training is stronger for kinship connections at the center peer level. As shown in
column 7, for center peers without family connections within the center, I find a
positive and significant effect of PHP 90.3 corresponding to 34% of baseline center
peers’ savings. On the other hand, the effect for center peers with at least one family
member within the center, PHP 65 (τ1 + τ3 = 90.35 − 25.24), is lower but still
statistically different from zero.
Comparing results for the two peer levels, I find a stronger effect of being connected
to an injection point for peers at the group level compared to peers at the center level.
On the other hand, kinship networks plays a stronger roll for peers at the center level
and no role for peers at the group level.
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Table 2.8 Effect of training on savings, center peers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Savings training, Tc(i) 65.58
∗ 65.93∗ 87.40∗∗ 66.56∗∗ 87.04∗∗ 44.84 90.35∗∗
(33.65) (33.58) (34.04) (33.21) (34.23) (32.38) (38.61)
Connected to IP, Pc(i) 17.94 67.00
∗
(33.50) (34.67)
Savings training × -95.50
Connected to IP, Tc(i) × Pc(i) (62.71)
No. of IP connected to 43.17
(34.74)
Connected to 1 IP, Z1c(i) -21.15
(31.65)
Connected to 2 IP, Z2c(i) 340.8
∗∗
(132.3)
Savings training ×Connected -33.44
to 1 IP, Tc(i) × Z1c(i) (51.99)
Savings training ×Connected -289.9
to 2 IP, Tc(i) × Z2c(i) (201.6)
DegreeFamc(i) 17.16 34.60
∗∗∗
(10.90) (11.88)
Savings training × -25.24
DegreeFamc(i) (20.63)
Constant 88.12 86.25 71.52 82.87 75.00 72.08 59.10
(79.96) (79.38) (80.05) (79.53) (79.02) (82.38) (79.75)
Observations 2249 2249 2249 2249 2249 2156 2156
Village Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.347 0.347 0.349 0.350 0.362 0.368 0.373
p-value:
H0 : φ1 + φ3 = 0 0.8986
H0 : β1 + β4 = 0 0.2246
H0 : β1 + β5 = 0 0.3328
H0 : τ1 + τ3 = 0 0.0270
Notes: Clustered standard errors at the center level. Connected to IP, Pc(i), takes a value of 1 if the group
peer is connected to an injection point or control subject, DegreeFamc(i) is the alternative network measure
based on kinship. Village characteristics: average distance to municipality, population, number of clients.
Financial characteristics: Baseline levels of savings, loan amount, loan balance, ICF balance and loan cycle.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.9 Heterogenous effect of training on savings, injection points
Knows what a Savings Plan is Financial Literacy
No Yes Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Savings training, Ti 85.02 111.2
∗ 70.64 119.1∗
(50.97) (55.97) (47.72) (60.98)
Constant -81.26 180.4 78.16 227.8
(168.6) (164.3) (126.4) (216.4)
Observations 394 701 363 732
R2 0.445 0.157 0.368 0.203
Notes: Clustered standard errors at the center level. Village characteristics: average distance to
municipality and population. Financial characteristics: Baseline levels of savings, loan amount, ICF
balance and loan cycle. Household characteristics: Age, electricity, background consumption, trust
in NWTF, experiment earnings and estimated risk aversion parameter. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
2.5.4 Heterogeneity Analysis
In this section I analyze the heterogeneity of effects of the savings training on the
injection points. I am particularly interested in whether subjects that report knowing
what a savings plan is experience a stronger effect of the program. This might help
shed some light on the possible mechanisms of how the savings training works. There
are several reasons why the savings training might lead to a change in individuals’
saving behavior. i) Individuals learn how to save or put differently they learn how
to use the product, or ii) Individuals know how the product works and the savings
training serves to mitigate behavioral reasons that hinder savings. In the case that
the savings training is working through the first mechanism, I expect that individuals
that report not knowing what a savings plan is experience a stronger effect of the
program.
Table 2.9 reports the results of estimating equation (2.2) in columns 1 and 2. The
effect of the savings training is stronger for individuals that report knowing what a
savings plan is, although the difference is not statistically significant. This implies
that the main mechanism through which the program is having an impact is not only
through learning how the product works. Although this cannot be ruled out, there
might be other mechanisms such as behavioral reasons.
In a second step I analyze whether more financial literate individuals experience
a stronger effect of the program. Subjects are defined to have high financial literacy
if they have three out of six financial literacy questions asked in the survey correctly.
Otherwise, they are classified as low literacy subjects.58 Results are presented in
58Financial literacy questions: 1) What is 5+3?, 2) What is 3*7?, 3) What is 1/10 of 300?, 4) What
is 5% of 200?, 5) Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 100 times. Out of 100 rolls, how many times
do you think the die would come up as an even number (2,4, or 6)?, 6) In another lottery, the chance
of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What percent of lottery tickets win a car?. No participant answered
all six questions correctly.
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columns 3 and 4, and they show that indeed subjects with a high financial literacy
level experience a stronger effect of the program.
2.5.5 Medium Term effects
The main effects of the program presented in section 2.5 are short term effects, namely
the effects of the programs for the three months after the intervention took place.
What about the effects of the program in the medium term, are they stable? I answer
this questions by examining the effects of the savings training on savings up to 9
months after the intervention, for the different groups of interest.59
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Figure 2.4: Weekly effect of the training on savings, Ti, injection points
Injection Points To answer this question for the injection points, I use weekly data
from NWTF to estimate equation (2.2) for the 35 weeks after the intervention took
place. For the analysis I take as week 0 the week in which the experiment took place.
Results presented in figure 2.4 show that the effect of the training is short lived. In
week 2 the effects start to increase reaching a positive and significant effect at week 7
until week 16. Thereafter the effect of the training decreases and is not significant.
The results are not surprising. If the savings training is impacting individuals’
savings through behavioral aspects rather than information about how the product
59Figures 2.4 to 2.9 present results of the estimations. The central dots are the monthly estimates
and the lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
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works, a more persistent training program designed to change the individuals’ saving
behavior might be more desirable.
Figure 2.5 presents the results of estimating equation (2.5) for the 35 weeks follow-
ing the experiment. The social network effect is more persistent. It steadily increases
in the first weeks after the experiment, reaching an average effect of 268.5 PHP from
weeks 5 to 12, leading to an increase in savings of PHP 29 (268.5 × 0.11). This rep-
resents 26% of the main effect presented in table 2.6, column 1. The social network
effect starts to decrease 13 weeks after the experiment reaching a level of almost 0 in
week 16. It then starts an upward tendency, with a significant average effect of PHP
27.6 (251× 0.11) between weeks 19 and 30.
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(b) Share of friends as IP, NetSharei.
Figure 2.5: Weekly social network effects for injection points
Figure 2.6 shows the results of estimating equation (2.3) with the weekly data.
As in the main effect presented in table 2.6, column 4, I find no differential effects
for injection points that have other injection points as friends. The interaction effect
presented in figure 2.6c is insignificant throughout the 35 weeks after the training took
place.
Group and center peers I examine the medium term effect for group and center
peers using monthly data up to nine months after the training took place, from May
2015 until January 2016. Figure 2.7 shows the results of estimating equation (2.2)
for group and center peers. As for the injection points, the effect of the training
is short lived. For group peers, the effect is positive and significant until the third
month after the experiment took place. Beyond the third month effects are lower and
insignificant.60
In the case of the center peers, effects are even weaker. The effects are positive
and significant for the two months after the intervention, afterwards they are close to
zero (and even negative) and insignificant.
60Results for July 2015 are significant at the 10% significance level.
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(c) Savings training×Connected to IP, Ti × Pi.
Figure 2.6: Weekly social network effects for injection points
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The results are to be expected, given the short term effect of the program on the
injection points. The weaker medium term effect on center peers compared to group
peers is also to be anticipated since a larger share of group peers might have a stronger
connection to the injection points than those in center peers connected by kinship to
the injection points.
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(b) Center peers, Tc(i).
Figure 2.7: Monthly basic effects of the savings training, group and center peers
Figure 2.8 presents the medium term effects of estimating equation (2.3) for group
peers, 2.8a, 2.8b, and 2.8c, and for center peers, 2.8d, 2.8e, and 2.8f. Group peers
experience a lower but positive and significant effect of the training program when
they are connected to other injection points, consistent with the short term effect
presented in table 2.7, column 3. Group peers that are not connected to an injection
point experience an average effect of 191 PHP for the four months after the training,
corresponding to a 65% of baseline savings. Group peers that are connected to an
injection point have a smaller effect of 44 PHP, representing 15% of baseline savings.
A similar but much weaker effect is reported for center peers for the first month
after the intervention. Center peers that are not connected to injection points have a
positive and significant effect of the training of 103 PHP, corresponding to a 39% of
baseline savings. However, center peers that are connected to an injection point have
a negative effect of the training of 25 PHP, a 9% of baseline savings. In the second
month after the training the effect of the training is positive and significant and not
statistically different for peers connected or not connected to an injection point (the
interaction, term Tc(i) × Pc(i), is not significant). Afterwards the effects are weak and
insignificant throughout.
Finally, in figure 2.9, I examine the social network medium term effects of kinship
connections, both at the group and at the center level. The estimation corresponds to
equation (2.2) and controls for the kinship measure DegreeFamd, where d = g(i), c(i).
Figures 2.9b and 2.9d show that the effects are stronger for center peers. For group
peers, the effects are smaller and insignificant throughout. For center peers, the
effects are stronger and significant for the first three months after the intervention,
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(d) Savings training, Tc(i)|Pc(i) = 0.
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(e) Connected to IP, Pc(i).
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(c) Savings training ×Connected to IP, Tg(i)×Pg(i).
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(f) Savings training ×Connected to IP, Tc(i)×Pc(i).
Figure 2.8: Monthly social network effects for group and center peers
104 2 SOCIAL NETWORKS AND SAVINGS
afterwards they are insignificant. Results are consistent with those presented above
where we show that kinship connections matter at the center peer level but not at the
group peer level. Results are however short lived.
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Figure 2.9: Monthly social network effects for group and center peers
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper uses a randomized field experiment implemented in the Philippines to
examine the impact of a training program focused on savings on participants’ savings
balance and the role of social networks in enhancing the effects.
I find a strong short term effect of the program on participants’ savings balance and
the effect is stronger for participants not connected to other subjects that participated
in the training.
I also examine the effects of the program on the participants’ social networks,
distinguishing across two type of peers, peers belonging to the participants’ lending
group that did not participate in the training and peers from the same center as the
participants.
I construct network measures to account for the connection between peers and
participants and find that group peers experience a positive effect of the training but
the effect is not enhanced when they are connected to a participant. This might
suggest that effects are channeled through second order connections. Center peers
further experience a positive effect of the training through kinship connections within
the center.
I examine the possible mechanisms of the training and find that not only knowledge
about the financial product plays a role, but possibly also behavioral factors. Finally,
I find that results are short lived, lasting until about three to four months after the
intervention.
The results of the study have important policy implications. First, as it has been
found in other applications, social networks are a powerful mechanism to enhance the
spread of information and allow for social learning, allowing to reduce the costs of
introducing new tools that can improve financial literacy.
Results support the findings in the financial literacy literature that less is often
better in terms of designing financial education programs, however more has to be
done to ensure lasting effects. The programs’ design should move in a direction that
fosters a change in habits bearing in mind the particular constraints faced by people
in developing countries (Schilbach, Schofield, and Mullainathan, 2016). Additionally,
programs that rely on generating changes in financial behavior through intrinsic moti-
vation rather than through the use of extrinsic intensives might be preferable to avoid
crowding out intrinsic motivation in the long run (Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel, 2011).
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Figure 2.10: Toolkit materials: Brochure, part 1
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(1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2) (4) (5) = (3) / (4)
Total 
Needed
Already 
Saved
Left to 
Save
Months to 
Save
Monthly 
Savings
Emergency Fund -  PHP                -  PHP                
Retirement -  PHP                -  PHP                
Children's Education -  PHP                -  PHP                
Debt Repayment -  PHP                -  PHP                
Computer -  PHP                -  PHP                
Television / Electronics -  PHP                -  PHP                
Furniture -  PHP                -  PHP                
Home Appliance(s) -  PHP                -  PHP                
Wedding / Special Event -  PHP                -  PHP                
Capital to start/expand business 5,000.00 PHP        -  PHP               5,000.00 PHP        12 	
Buy Land -  PHP                -  PHP                
House Repair -  PHP                -  PHP                
House Construction -  PHP                -  PHP                
Vacation -  PHP                -  PHP                
Other -  PHP                -  PHP                
Other -  PHP                -  PHP                
I. TOTAL SHORT TERM GOALS 5,000.00 PHP        -  PHP               5,000.00 PHP        	
(1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2) (4) (5) = (3) / [(4)*12]
Total 
Needed
Already 
Saved
Left to 
save
Years to 
Save
Montly 
Savings
Emergency Fund 20,000.00 PHP      2,000.00 PHP       18,000.00 PHP      4 
	
Retirement 50,000.00 PHP      -  PHP               50,000.00 PHP      20 


Children's Education 20,000.00 PHP      -  PHP               20,000.00 PHP      5 





Debt Repayment -  PHP                -  PHP               -  PHP                  
Computer -  PHP                -  PHP               -  PHP                  
Television / Electronics -  PHP                -  PHP               -  PHP                  
Furniture -  PHP                -  PHP               -  PHP                  
Home Appliance(s) -  PHP               -  PHP                 5  
Wedding / Special Event 20,000.00 PHP      3,000.00 PHP       17,000.00 PHP      10 	
Capital to start/expand business -  PHP                -  PHP               -  PHP                  
Buy Land -  PHP                -  PHP               -  PHP                  
House Repair -  PHP                -  PHP               -  PHP                  
House Construction -  PHP                -  PHP               -  PHP                  
Vacation -  PHP                -  PHP               -  PHP                  
Other -  PHP                -  PHP               -  PHP                  
Other -  PHP                -  PHP               -  PHP                  
II. TOTAL LONG TERM GOALS 110,000.00 PHP    5,000.00 PHP       105,000.00 PHP    


III. TOTALS ( I + II ) 1,475.00 PHP            
I kumparar ang kantidad sang imo nasupot sa kada bulan. Kung ang kabilogan parehas lang ukon mas manaba sa imo sinuptan subong, ara kana sa target nga malab-
ot mo ang imo savings goals. Kung mas damo, mangita ka sang pamaagi para mapataas ang imo sinuptan ukon bag-ohon ang imo nga goals.
Savings Plan
Para sa kada savings target ikaw maga desisyon kung pala ini short-term ukon long term goal. Para sa short-term goals ibutang kung pila ka bulan 
imo plano nga magsupot para malab-ot ina. Para sa long-term goals, ibutang kung pila katuig mo ini malab-ot. Ibutang man ang kabilogan nga 
kantidad nga imo kinahang lan para malab-ot ang imo goals kagang kantidad nga imo na nasupot. note:  Ibutang ang kada savings goal sang kaisa 
lang. 
SHORT-TERM GOALS
LONG-TERM GOALS
PART 1: MONTHLY INCOME Estimated Actual
Person 1: Monthly income (full and part time job) 3,000.00 PHP          3,000.00 PHP               
Person 2: Monthly income (full and part time job) 2,000.00 PHP          2,000.00 PHP               
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program 500.00 PHP             500.00 PHP                  
Remittances 1,000.00 PHP          1,000.00 PHP               
Other -  PHP                   -  PHP                        
Other -  PHP                   -  PHP                        
Other -  PHP                   -  PHP                        
Other -  PHP                   -  PHP                        
TOTAL 6,500.00 PHP      6,500.00 PHP           
PART 2: MONTHLY EXPENSE Estimated Actual
Mortgage / Rent 700.00 PHP             700.00 PHP                  
Loan Payment 300.00 PHP             300.00 PHP                  
Health Insurance 25.00 PHP               25.00 PHP                    
Education Fees 100.00 PHP             100.00 PHP                  
Electric Bill 75.00 PHP               75.00 PHP                    
Water Bill 45.00 PHP               45.00 PHP                    
Groceries 1,500.00 PHP          1,500.00 PHP               
Phone Bill 200.00 PHP             200.00 PHP                  
Transportation 300.00 PHP             300.00 PHP                  
Gasoline 50.00 PHP               50.00 PHP                    
House Repairs 500.00 PHP             1,000.00 PHP               
SAVINGS 1,475.00 PHP          1,475.00 PHP               
Clothing/footwear 80.00 PHP               80.00 PHP                    
Recreation 200.00 PHP             200.00 PHP                  
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Unplanned: Trycicle repair 500.00 PHP                  
Unplanned: trip to Iloilo City 500.00 PHP                  
Unplanned: 
Unplanned: 
TOTALS 5,550.00 PHP      7,050.00 PHP           
PART 3: RESULTS Estimated Actual
1. TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME 6,500.00 PHP      6,500.00 PHP           
2. TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSE 5,550.00 PHP      7,050.00 PHP           
3. VARIANCE  ( 1 - 2 )
(This is how much over, or under, your budget you are.) 950.00 PHP      -550.00 PHP
Household Budget
If this number is positive, good work! Ikaw naga gasto sang mas manubo kay sa imo ginabatun. If it is a negative number, imo 
dapat ikonsiderar ang mag pamaagi para maka supot ukon ireprioritze ang imo nga galastuhan. 
Ibutang ang imo estimated nga kita kada bulan kag ang mag galastuhan para ma intidihan kung ano ang 
dapat lainun nga imo pagahimuon para mangabuhi para lang sa budget nga maayo para sa imo. 
























	
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	
Figure 2.11: Toolkit materials: Brochure, part 2
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(1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2) (4) (5) = (3) / (4)
Total 
Needed
Already 
Saved
Left to 
Save
Months to 
Save
Monthly 
Savings
Emergency Fund -  PHP                         
Retirement -  PHP                         
Children's Education -  PHP                         
Debt Repayment -  PHP                         
Computer -  PHP                         
Television / Electronics -  PHP                         
Furniture -  PHP                         
Home Appliance(s) -  PHP                         
Wedding / Special Event -  PHP                         
Capital to start/expand business -  PHP                         
Buy Land -  PHP                         
House Repair -  PHP                         
House Construction -  PHP                         
Vacation -  PHP                         
Other -  PHP                         
Other -  PHP                         
I. TOTAL SHORT TERM GOALS -  PHP                -  PHP               -  PHP                 -  PHP                         
(1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2) (4) (5) = (3) / [(4)*12]
Total 
Needed
Already 
Saved
Left to 
save
Years to 
Save
Montly 
Savings
Emergency Fund -  PHP                         
Retirement -  PHP                         
Children's Education -  PHP                         
Debt Repayment -  PHP                         
Computer -  PHP                         
Television / Electronics -  PHP                         
Furniture -  PHP                         
Home Appliance(s) -  PHP                         
Wedding / Special Event -  PHP                         
Capital to start/expand business -  PHP                         
Buy Land -  PHP                         
House Repair -  PHP                         
House Construction -  PHP                         
Vacation -  PHP                         
Other -  PHP                         
Other -  PHP                         
II. TOTAL LONG TERM GOALS -  PHP                -  PHP               -  PHP                 -  PHP                         
III. TOTALS ( I + II ) -  PHP                     
SHORT-TERM GOALS
LONG-TERM GOALS
I kumparar ang kantidad sang imo nasupot sa kada bulan. Kung ang kabilogan parehas lang ukon mas manaba sa imo sinuptan subong, ara kana sa target nga malab-
ot mo ang imo savings goals. Kung mas damo, mangita ka sang pamaagi para mapataas ang imo sinuptan ukon bag-ohon ang imo nga goals.
Savings Plan
Para sa kada savings target ikaw maga desisyon kung pala ini short-term ukon long term goal. Para sa short-term goals ibutang kung pila ka bulan 
imo plano nga magsupot para malab-ot ina. Para sa long-term goals, ibutang kung pila katuig mo ini malab-ot. Ibutang man ang kabilogan nga 
kantidad nga imo kinahang lan para malab-ot ang imo goals kagang kantidad nga imo na nasupot. note:  Ibutang ang kada savings goal sang kaisa 
lang. 
Figure 2.12: Toolkit materials: Savings form
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PART 1: MONTHLY INCOME Estimated Actual
Person 1: Monthly income (full and part time job)
Person 2: Monthly income (full and part time job)
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program
Remittances
Other
Other
Other
Other
TOTAL -  PHP               -  PHP                   
PART 2: MONTHLY EXPENSE Estimated Actual
Mortgage / Rent
Loan Payment
Health Insurance
Education Fees
Electric Bill
Water Bill
Groceries
Phone Bill
Transportation
Gasoline
House Repairs
SAVINGS
Clothing/footwear
Recreation 
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Unplanned: Trycicle repair
Unplanned: trip to Iloilo City
Unplanned: 
Unplanned: 
TOTALS -  PHP               -  PHP                   
PART 3: RESULTS Estimated Actual
1. TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME -  PHP               -  PHP                   
2. TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSE -  PHP               -  PHP                   
3. VARIANCE  ( 1 - 2 )
(This is how much over, or under, your budget you are.) -  PHP            0.00 PHP
Household Budget
Ibutang ang imo estimated nga kita kada bulan kag ang mag galastuhan para ma intidihan kung ano ang 
dapat lainun nga imo pagahimuon para mangabuhi para lang sa budget nga maayo para sa imo. 
If this number is positive, good work! Ikaw naga gasto sang mas manubo kay sa imo ginabatun. If it is a negative number, imo 
dapat ikonsiderar ang mag pamaagi para maka supot ukon ireprioritze ang imo nga galastuhan. 
Figure 2.13: Toolkit materials: Budget form
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A.2 Randomization
Figure 2.14: Example barangay data collected by recruiters
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Figure 2.15: Example barangay data collected by recruiters
Figure 2.16: Example facilities sketch drawn using tablets by recruiters
DCC=day care center, BH=Barangay hall
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A.3 Descriptive Statistics
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Table 2.10 Summary statistics of control and injection points, original sample
Control Savings Training Difference N
mean sd mean sd b p
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Client Characteristics
Age 43.8 (11.7) 42.2 (12.2) 1.62 (0.13) 498
HH water source 0.1 (0.3) 0.1 (0.3) 0.01 (0.62) 499
HH roof material 4.6 (1.2) 4.5 (1.3) 0.11 (0.32) 498
Electricity in HH 0.9 (0.3) 0.8 (0.4) 0.09 (0.00)∗∗∗ 498
Rooms used for sleeping 1.8 (0.8) 1.8 (0.8) -0.04 (0.59) 498
HH ownership 0.9 (0.3) 0.9 (0.3) 0.01 (0.84) 497
Household size 5.2 (2.0) 5.4 (1.9) -0.19 (0.27) 498
HH floor material 2.8 (6.3) 3.5 (10.5) -0.70 (0.37) 498
Flush toilet in HH 1.0 (0.2) 0.8 (0.4) 0.13 (0.00)∗∗∗ 499
Regular income 0.6 (0.5) 0.6 (0.5) -0.03 (0.47) 498
Daily consumption 345.6 (383.0) 336.7 (323.1) 8.92 (0.78) 498
HH daily consumption 1037.1 (769.9) 1004.2 (674.1) 32.94 (0.61) 499
Employment 4.1 (2.0) 4.0 (2.0) 0.06 (0.74) 492
Official position in village 0.1 (0.3) 0.1 (0.3) 0.01 (0.73) 498
Years of education 12.9 (4.9) 12.4 (4.7) 0.48 (0.27) 489
Group degree 2.4 (1.6) 2.4 (1.5) -0.06 (0.67) 499
Center degree 0.33 (0.8) 0.36 (0.8) -0.04 (0.60) 499
Panel B. Social Preferences
Trust level in NWTF 6.1 (1.3) 6.2 (1.3) -0.07 (0.54) 499
Trust in local money lender 3.8 (1.9) 3.8 (2.0) 0.09 (0.63) 499
Avoid taking risks 4.4 (2.6) 4.2 (2.6) 0.21 (0.37) 499
Avoid being betrayed 1.7 (1.5) 1.7 (1.5) 0.01 (0.93) 499
Avoid being taken advantage of 1.8 (1.7) 1.7 (1.5) 0.12 (0.40) 499
Revenge if suffers serious wrong 6.4 (1.3) 6.6 (1.1) -0.13 (0.22) 499
Offends back if offended 6.4 (1.4) 6.4 (1.4) -0.05 (0.71) 499
Sociability 4.3 (1.2) 4.2 (1.2) 0.04 (0.71) 499
Panel C. Reported Financial Characteristics
Borrowed from MFI/Banks 6129.8 (3757.3) 5649.3 (3134.7) 480.42 (0.14) 444
Savings in MFI/Banks 1332.4 (1683.2) 1476.3 (4696.4) -143.90 (0.75) 251
Bank distance 34.0 (49.0) 38.5 (35.6) -4.45 (0.24) 499
Ever cashed a check 0.9 (0.3) 0.9 (0.3) -0.00 (1.00) 499
Know what savings plan is 0.6 (0.5) 0.7 (0.5) -0.08 (0.07)∗ 499
Made a savings plan 0.6 (0.5) 0.6 (0.5) -0.00 (0.99) 326
Followed savings plan 0.8 (0.4) 0.9 (0.3) -0.06 (0.19) 208
Panel D. NWTF Financial Characteristics
AF savings balance 239.9 (329.0) 255.1 (290.4) -15.17 (0.58) 499
Loan size 5301.6 (2486.1) 5443.8 (2313.2) -142.10 (0.51) 499
Loan balance 2681.9 (2430.7) 2591.2 (1855.4) 90.69 (0.64) 499
Installment amount 237.6 (137.0) 235.1 (127.8) 2.48 (0.83) 499
Tenure 491.1 (442.9) 461.7 (434.0) 29.39 (0.52) 370
ICF balance 754.4 (917.7) 815.0 (903.4) -60.63 (0.46) 499
Observations 243 256 499
Notes: ∗ (p < 0.10), ∗∗ (p < 0.05), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.01).
1 1-no trust, 7-complete trust,
2 1-avoid, 7-fully prepared,
3 1-completely avoid, 7-do not avoid,
4 1-revenge, 7-no revenge,
5 1-offend, 7-not offend,
6 Meets friends, family, neighbors: 1-never, 2-seldom, 3-monthly, 4-weekly, 5-daily.
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Table 2.11 Descriptive Statistics, group peers (original sample)
Control Savings Training Difference N
mean sd mean sd b p
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AF savings balance 272.2 (431.2) 330.0 (698.8) -57.72 (0.17) 774
Loan size 5678.3 (3214.4) 5674.4 (2733.6) 3.88 (0.99) 774
Installment amount 255.3 (201.8) 253.8 (149.8) 1.45 (0.91) 774
ICF balance 870.3 (1082.4) 872.3 (958.9) -2.02 (0.98) 774
Loan cycle 3.1 (2.1) 3.1 (2.2) -0.01 (0.95) 774
Principal amortization 230.6 (159.8) 228.8 (112.3) 1.72 (0.86) 774
Observations 387 387 774
Notes: ∗ (p < 0.10), ∗∗ (p < 0.05), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.01).
Table 2.12 Descriptive Statistics, center peers (original sample)
Control Savings Training Difference N
mean sd mean sd b p
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AF savings balance 248.8 (363.3) 272.0 (345.7) -23.19 (0.35) 833
Loan size 5385.3 (3003.0) 5546.3 (2649.1) -161.01 (0.41) 833
Installment amount 231.6 (175.1) 257.8 (150.6) -26.21 (0.02)∗∗ 833
ICF balance 862.6 (1212.5) 903.3 (1103.2) -40.64 (0.61) 833
Loan cycle 3.0 (2.1) 3.1 (2.2) -0.08 (0.60) 833
Principal amortization 217.9 (125.6) 226.7 (109.4) -8.79 (0.28) 833
Observations 401 432 833
Notes: ∗ (p < 0.10), ∗∗ (p < 0.05), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.01).
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3 Contract Nonperformance Risk
and Ambiguity in Insurance Mar-
kets
3.1 Introduction
The concept of probabilistic insurance was first introduced by Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1979) as an insurance policy that, in the event of a loss, reimburses policyholders
only with some probability, strictly less than one. Various circumstances, such as
insolvency, discord about the losses covered, and payment delays, can cause total or
partial contract nonperformance. Hence, from an insurance demand perspective, con-
tract nonperformance risk is not restricted to situations where legally valid claims
are not settled, but more generally applicable to all rejected claims that are per-
ceived as valid by the policyholders (Doherty and Schlesinger, 1990). In this paper,
we extend the probabilistic insurance model to allow for ambiguity in contract non-
performance probabilities. Furthermore, we test theoretical predictions derived from
the extended model through a behavioral experiment conducted with rural villagers
from the Philippines, focusing on the role of contract nonperformance risk and its
ambiguity for insurance demand.
Even in the absence of ambiguity, contract nonperformance risk has significant
implications for classic results of insurance demand theory. Doherty and Schlesinger
(1990) show that risk-averse individuals do not fully insure at actuarially fair prices,
that increasing risk aversion and decreasing loadings do not generally induce higher
optimal insurance demand, and that optimal insurance demand is not necessarily a
monotonic function of contract nonperformance risk. Hau (1999) reconsiders this prob-
lem for co-insurance policies in a multiple-state model, providing further explanation
for the results of Doherty and Schlesinger (1990). Then, Mahul and Wright (2007,
2004) generalize their results to the case of partial indemnification under contract
nonperformance. Subsequent empirical works by Zimmer, Gru¨ndl, Schade, and Glen-
zer (2016), Zimmer, Schade, and Gru¨ndl (2009), Herrero, Toma´s, and Villar (2006),
Albrecht and Maurer (2000), and Wakker, Thaler, and Tversky (1997) support the
hypothesis of strong detrimental effects of contract nonperformance risk on insurance
demand.
As opposed to contract nonperformance risk, where probabilities can be assigned
to all possible outcomes, ambiguity relates to situations where the probabilities of
outcomes are unknown (Epstein, 1999).61 Ambiguity is of general relevance to eco-
61The literature uses different terms to refer to situations where probabilities are known or unknown.
The word “risk,” as opposed to “uncertainty,” has been used in Knight (1921). The terms “unam-
biguous” and “ambiguous” were introduced by Ellsberg (1961). While Savage (1954) uses the terms
“precise” and “vague,” Ga¨rdenfors and Sahlin (1982) differentiate between the levels of “epistemic
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nomic decision making and resembles real world scenarios in that probabilities can be
assigned to all possible outcomes only in very few cases. The presence of an aversion
to ambiguity could be identified in the laboratory under different conditions (Einhorn
and Hogarth, 1986; Sarin and Weber, 1993; Epstein, 1999; Chow and Sarin, 2001).
While some studies have examined the effect of ambiguous loss probabilities on
insurance demand (Bajtelsmit, Coats, and Thistle, 2015; Gollier, 2014; Alary, Gollier,
and Treich, 2013; Huang, Huang, and Tzeng, 2013; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1989) as
well as on the demand for self-insurance and self-protection (Snow, 2011), the ambi-
guity in contract nonperformance risk has so far been neglected in the theoretical and
empirical literature. One exception is Bryan (2013), who studies the role of ambiguity
aversion in the context of a new index insurance contract. While the setting differs
from our paper along some important dimensions, his findings suggest that ambiguous
probabilities of insurance payouts are relevant for insurance demand.62 Our discussion
of ambiguous probabilities is also distinct from approaches capturing divergent beliefs
about the probability distribution of contract nonperformance risk between insurers
and their customers (Cummins and Mahul, 2003). In such a setting contracting par-
ties might hold different beliefs, but each of them perceives no ambiguity and hence
ambiguity aversion plays no role.
In line with the preceding literature, our model predicts a decrease in insurance
demand when introducing contract nonperformance risk, in particular for highly risk-
averse individuals. Making the contract nonperformance probability ambiguous fur-
ther decreases demand for ambiguity-averse individuals. This is because ambiguity
aversion essentially makes people more pessimistic about contract nonperformance
probabilities. We test these theoretical predictions through a behavioral experiment
conducted with rural villagers from the Philippines. In this field lab experiment, we
vary the presence of contract nonperformance risk, the existence of ambiguity, and
the causes for nonperformance of insurance contracts and evaluate the effects on in-
surance demand. We find that introducing contract nonperformance risk (i.e., the
insurer does not always pay a claim) and making contract nonperformance ambiguous
decreases insurance demand. In the former case, we observe a significant 17.1 per-
centage points decrease in uptake resulting from increasing contract nonperformance
risk from 0 to 10 percentage points. Then, relative to a known 10 percent chance of
contract nonperformance, ambiguity about contract nonperformance risk leads to a
further significant decrease in uptake of 14.5 percentage points. The effects of ambigu-
reliability” of a probability estimate to infer the amount of information available on all possible states
and outcomes. We rely on the term “ambiguity” because it is common in the literature (Camerer and
Weber, 1992).
62Bryan (2013) provides a theoretical framework and empirical evidence from Kenya and Malawi,
showing that ambiguity-averse clients have a lower propensity to take up a new index insurance
product. The setup relates to our case, because basis risk in index insurance (i.e., the probability that
the index does not trigger a payout even when the insured faces a loss) might play a role similar to
contract nonperformance risk. However, the setting differs from ours in important aspects. Besides
the presence of both upside and downside risk, insurance decisions are combined with the adoption
of a new production technology. Thus, theoretical predictions of insurance demand differ from ours.
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ity appear little affected by experience and remain stable over time. We also consider
the effect of different causes of contract nonperformance on insurance demand. This
is because Kunreuther, Meyer, Zeckhauser, Slovic, Schwartz, Schade, Luce, Lippman,
Krantz, Kahn, and Hogarth (2002) and Zimmer, Schade, and Gru¨ndl (2009) suggest
that emotions play a role in insurance decisions and we suspect that varying the causes
of contract nonperformance risk might in particular evoke different emotions. Low-
numeracy and ambiguity-averse sub-samples show substantial and significant effects
of framing the cause of contract nonperformance as the insurer’s unwillingness as op-
posed to the insurer’s inability to pay claims, but overall the effects are insignificant.
In addition, framing does not significantly magnify the treatment effects of contract
nonperformance and its ambiguity.
Aside from the experimental implementation in the Philippines, the pertinence
of our setup extends to insurance markets in developed economies, where significant
efforts are undertaken to disseminate information on insurers’ reputations for servicing
claims (Mahul and Wright, 2004), and consumer complaint statistics suggest that there
is good reason to do so.63 The negative effects of contract nonperformance risk on
insurance demand are from a developed country perspective. Zimmer, Schade, and
Gru¨ndl (2009), Herrero, Toma´s, and Villar (2006), Albrecht and Maurer (2000), and
Wakker, Thaler, and Tversky (1997) examine the effects on hypothetical willingness
to pay, and Zimmer, Gru¨ndl, Schade, and Glenzer (2016) implement an incentive-
compatible experiment with real monetary payoffs; these studies further testify to
the strong detrimental effects of contract nonperformance risk on insurance demand.
Thus, even in an environment with high levels of regulation, customer protection,
and access to reliable information, perceived contract nonperformance risk is highly
relevant to insurance demand.
Several factors magnify contract nonperformance risk and ambiguity in low-income
insurance markets. Individuals face a broad variety of perils that are not easily quan-
tifiable arising from geographic settings (e.g., natural disasters), lack of public infras-
tructure (e.g., risk of diseases due to lack of water provision), and economic (e.g.,
unemployment), political (e.g., lack of education), and legal (e.g., lack of contract en-
forcement) environments. Furthermore, perceptions of high contract nonperformance
risk are fueled by limited trust in regulators and legal institutions to enforce contracts
and supervise markets. This might explain why, despite significant efforts, insurance
demand of low-income consumers remains low, even though the widespread use of
risk transfer through insurance solutions holds potentially significant social welfare
benefits. Claims considered eligible by the insured but not paid by the insurer emerge
as a potential piece of the puzzle explaining the low insurance demand in developing
countries. Recently, Liu and Myers (2016) provided theoretical evidence for significant
63Roughly 50 percent of all complaints reported to the U.S. state regulators in 2014 related to
denials and delays of claims and unsatisfactory settlements, amounting to over 30,000 cases (National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2016).
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w
no insurance
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w − Lp
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w − I(ε)1− p
lose L
w − I(ε)− L+ ε1− r
w − I(ε)− Lr
p
Figure 3.1: Decision Tree
reductions in insurance demand due to perceived insurer default in low-income insur-
ance contexts, and Cole, Gine, Tobacman, Topalova, Townsend, and Vickery (2013)
empirically reveal trust as an important market friction constraining demand.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we present our
theoretical framework and derive the hypotheses. The experimental design and field
implementation, including sample characteristics, are explained in Section III. In Sec-
tion IV, we discuss our empirical results, and Section V concludes the paper.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Preliminaries
Below we formalize the characteristics of contract nonperformance risk and ambiguity
and relate them to optimal insurance demand. To this end, we rely on the theoretical
foundations of Doherty and Schlesinger (1990) for contract nonperformance risk and
Alary, Gollier, and Treich (2013) and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) for
ambiguity and attitudes toward ambiguity. Figure 1 describes the process we consider
here. We assume that a decision maker with initial wealth w has a positive probability
p of suffering a loss L > 0, against which she can purchase insurance that pays ε, for
some premium I(ε).64 In the case that the decision maker buys insurance and the loss
does not occur (with probability 1− p), she is left with w − I(ε).
In the case that the decision maker buys insurance and incurs a loss of L, there
is a positive probability r that her claim is not reimbursed. In this case, she is left
with w − I(ε)− L; otherwise, the insurer pays the claim and the decision maker gets
w− I(ε)−L+ε. Thus, any decision maker evaluates the expected utility of the upper
branch of the tree (i.e., insurance) against the lower branch (i.e., no insurance) shown
in Figure 1.
64Note that we remain general in our definition of a premium and do not presume that the insurance
is priced as being actuarially fair.
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3.2.2 Demand for Probabilistic Insurance
Our benchmark probabilistic insurance setting is one with a known probability of
contract nonperformance r. We use von Neumann–Morgenstern preferences with util-
ity functions u(.) that are continuous, monotonously increasing (u′(.) > 0) and three
times continuously differentiable. We furthermore restrict our attention to risk-averse
agents (u′′(.) < 0) with positive prudence (u′′′(.) > 0). The decision maker’s expected
utility under the insurance policy (EUr) is defined as:
EUr =(1− p)u(w − I(ε)) (3.1)
+ p[(1− r)u(w − I(ε)− L+ ε)
+ ru(w − I(ε)− L)].
Our first area of interest is how insurance decisions change when we introduce a
positive probability that the insurance fails to perform. Therefore, we compare the
benchmark setup, with r > 0, to a situation with r = 0. Let I0(ε) be the premium for
non-probabilistic insurance with r = 0. Note that when changing r and not adapting
the premium accordingly (i.e., I(ε) = I0(ε)) we change the expected payout and,
hence, the loading factor (1+α) = I(ε)p(1−r)ε of the insurance policy.
65 It is obvious that
under these circumstances non-probabilistic insurance is always preferred because it
features lower risk and a lower loading, ceteris paribus (the proof is presented in
Appendix A).
The case becomes less trivial when the premium is discounted by the contract
nonperformance probability, thus, keeping the loading factor constant. Let I(ε) be
the insurance premium for r > 0, while, again, I0(ε) denotes the premium for r = 0.
Specifying I(ε) = (1− r)I0(ε) leads to a constant loading factor. The expected utility
derived from probabilistic insurance becomes:
EUr =(1− p)u(w − I0(1− r))
+ p[(1− r)u(w − I0(1− r)− L+ ε)
+ ru(w − I0(1− r)− L)],
whereas the expected utility derived from non-probabilistic insurance is:
EU0 = (1− p)u(w − I0) + pu(w − I0 − L+ ε).
65The loading of the insurance policy is the difference between the premium and the expected
payout; the loading factor is the ratio between the two. Thus, if the premium is higher than the
expected payout, this implies a positive loading and a loading factor greater than one. When there
is a positive probability of contract nonperformance, the expected payout decreases, which, ceteris
paribus, influences the loading.
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With a constant loading factor, introducing contract nonperformance risk de-
creases both, premium and expected payout. Whether the decrease in premium or
the decrease in expected payout is larger, depends on the loading of the insurance. If
it is actuarially unfair (i.e., a positive loading), clients might even profit from contract
nonperformance risk in terms of expected wealth. On the other hand, this entails the
risk of a default on insurance claims. These advantages and drawbacks are weighted
differently by different types of agents and it is not possible to derive a monotonous
relationship between optimal coverage and contract nonperformance risk in general
(Doherty and Schlesinger, 1990). To provide more detailed results suited to our em-
pirical setup, we focus on the case of a binary insurance decision with a given coverage
level ε. We also define two measures of risk aversion for our formal discussion. One
is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion: ARA(x0) = −u
′′(x0)
u′(x0) . The other
is a more general measure based on normalized concavity (see Liu and Meyer, 2013):
C(x;x0) = − u
′′(x)
u′(x0) . The latter is defined more broadly than absolute risk aversion.
This measure is important in particular for Lemma 2, where the proof depends on
risk aversion at multiple points. Lemma 1, in contrast, only depends on absolute
risk aversion at a single point. For notational convenience, we furthermore define
x? = w − I0 − L + ε. The following lemmas can be shown to hold (see proof in Ap-
pendix A):
Lemma 1. For each loading factor (1 + α) ∈ [1, 1p ] there exist agents with suffi-
ciently high absolute risk aversion ARA(x?) such that EU0 > EUr. In particular:
ARA(x?) > 2αε
(ε−rI0)2 ⇒ EU0 > EUr.
Lemma 2. For each loading factor (1 +α) > 1 there exist agents with sufficiently
low risk aversion C(x, x?) such that EUr > EU0. In particular:
prεα > a4C(c4, x
?) + a1C(c1, x
?) + a2C(c2, x
?) + a′3C(c′3, x?)⇒ EU0 < EUr,
where a4, a1, a2, a
′
3 are bounded constants > 0
and c4, c1, c2, c
′
3 ∈ (w − L− (1− r)I0, w).
In binary uptake decisions, decreasing the utility derived by a product implies
(weakly) lower demand and vice versa. The above lemmas hence shed light on the
circumstances under which demand reductions can be expected when introducing
contract nonperformance risk. For actuarially fair insurance (i.e., α = 0), our set-
ting simplifies to a similar case in Doherty and Schlesinger (1990). Here, Lemma 2
is rendered irrelevant, and the condition for Lemma 1 always holds, in the sense that
all risk-averse agents prefer non-probabilistic insurance over probabilistic insurance.
Therefore, similarly to Doherty and Schlesinger (1990), we expect lower insurance
demand for probabilistic insurance. Given actuarially unfair premiums, Lemma 2
presumes a weak demand-increasing effect of contract nonperformance risk for agents
with low risk aversion. However, agents with low risk aversion are more sensitive to
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loadings, exhibiting a decreasing insurance-demand pattern with increasing loadings
(Mossin, 1968; Smith, 1968), and are hence less likely to purchase insurance irrespec-
tive of the presence of contract nonperformance risk. Overall effects ultimately hinge
on the shape of the utility function. We therefore run simulations over a range of
loading and risk aversion parameters. These simulations clearly predict a decrease in
demand when contract nonperformance risk is introduced.66 Thus, we expect that
the share of the population actually switching to buying probabilistic insurance is
relatively small and formulate the first hypothesis accordingly:
Hypothesis 1. Contract nonperformance risk reduces insurance demand (H1).
3.2.3 Demand for Ambiguous Probabilistic Insurance
Next, we focus on the effect of ambiguity of contract nonperformance risk on insur-
ance demand (i.e., r is unknown). We redefine contract nonperformance risk as the
ambiguous probability r(γ), depending on the unknown parameter γ. The ambiguity
is defined as a probability distribution for γ with discrete support {1, . . . , n}. Let
q(γ) denote the subjective probability that the true value of the parameter is γ, with∑n
γ=1 q(γ) = 1. We assume that ambiguity is mean preserving (i.e.,
∑n
γ=1 q(γ)r(γ) =
r). In the case that γ is known to be γ? (i.e., q(γ?) = 1), we define the expected utility
derived from probabilistic insurance as follows:
EUr(γ?) =(1− p)u(w − I(ε))
+ p[(1− r(γ?))u(w − I(ε)− L+ ε)
+ r(γ?)u(w − I(ε)− L)].
Following the smooth ambiguity approach of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji
(2005), we model ambiguity aversion using an increasing and concave valuation func-
tion Φ for the expected utility derived from each state of γ. Thus, the decision maker’s
expected utility derived from ambiguous probabilistic insurance corresponds to:
Φ−1
(
IEγΦ(EUr(γ))
)
= Φ−1
 n∑
γ=1
q(γ)Φ(EUr(γ))
 .
An ambiguity-neutral agent uses a linear valuation function, essentially using EUr
from Equation (3.1) and replacing r with IEγr(γ). Concavity of Φ expresses ambiguity
aversion, that is, an aversion to mean-preserving spreads in the random probability
66We simulate decision makers exhibiting constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)-type utility func-
tions over a range of loading and risk aversion parameters (see Appendix B for details). The results
are clear-cut in that the set of parameter combinations predicted to take up probabilistic insurance
is a subset of the parameter combinations predicted to take up non-probabilistic insurance.
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of contract nonperformance r(γ). Ambiguity-averse agents assign higher weights to
states of γ that are associated with low utility. In our case, this would lead to an
overweighting of contract nonperformance probabilities. For ambiguity-loving agents,
Φ is convex, and higher weights are assigned to favorable (i.e., high utility) probabili-
ties, leading to an underweighting of contract nonperformance probabilities. Using the
above general formula for ambiguity preferences and plugging in the expected utility
definition from Equation (3.1), we can see that individuals maximize the following
expression when deciding about insurance uptake:
IEγΦ(EUr(γ)) =IEγΦ[(1− p)u(w − I(ε)) (3.2)
+ p[(1− r(γ))u(w − I(ε)− L+ ε)
+ r(γ)u(w − I(ε)− L)]].
Under this setting, the following Lemma holds (see proof in Appendix A):
Lemma 3. For ambiguity-averse (-loving) agents, the marginal willingness to pay
for additional insurance is strictly lower (higher) at every coverage point after intro-
ducing mean-preserving ambiguity over contract nonperformance risk.
This result on the marginal willingness to pay applies to both continuous and
binary insurance decisions. It implies that the optimal coverage level decreases (in-
creases) for ambiguity-averse (-loving) individuals once ambiguity with respect to con-
tract nonperformance risk is introduced. It also implies that for binary insurance
decisions, insurance with known contract nonperformance risk is always preferred by
ambiguity-averse agents, as opposed to insurance with ambiguous contract nonper-
formance risk. This, in turn, implies that demand for non-ambiguous probabilistic
insurance should be higher for ambiguity-averse agents. The result is in line with
Mukerji and Tallon (2001) who show that risk sharing opportunities on financial mar-
kets that involve ambiguity can be less attractive to ambiguity-averse agents.
There are arguments as to why the effect of ambiguity-averse, as opposed to
ambiguity-neutral or -loving preferences, should dominate. Based on a sample of 30
countries, Vieider, Lefebvre, Bouchouicha, Chmura, Hakimov, Krawczyk, and Mar-
tinsson (2015) show that individuals seem to be, on average, averse to ambiguity. In
addition, risk aversion seems to be positively correlated with ambiguity aversion, and
only risk-averse individuals are potential clients, which could be affected by ambigu-
ous contract nonperformance risk. Thus, we state the second hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 2. Ambiguity about contract nonperformance probabilities reduces
insurance demand (H2).
126 3 CONTRACT NON-PERFORMANCE
It is possible to conduct further comparative statics beyond the introduction of
ambiguity. For example, it might be interesting to show the effect of changing the
extent of ambiguity or changing ambiguity preferences. In Appendix A, we derive
the central condition for the development of marginal willingness to pay when such
changes happen. This condition generally holds in our setting of mean-preserving
ambiguity and smooth ambiguity aversion as proposed by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and
Mukerji (2005). In particular, we derive that any change in ambiguity aversion or
the extend of ambiguity leading to an increase in the correlation between r(γ) and
Φ′(EUr(γ)) will decrease the marginal willingness to pay and vice versa. The effect on
the marginal willingness to pay directly translates into changes of optimal coverage in
both continuous and binary insurance decisions.
3.3 Experimental Design
3.3.1 Insurance Experiment
We implement a field lab experiment where subjects decide whether to purchase prob-
abilistic insurance in a risky environment. Participants received an initial endowment
W , and could opt to buy insurance at cost I. Once the insurance decision was made,
participants experienced a loss with probability pLoss. Participants who bought insur-
ance could claim a payment from the insurer, contingent on having experienced a loss.
Whether the insurer paid the claim was determined by another random draw, with
probability pDef for the contract not performing. All random draws are implemented
using opaque bags, each containing 10 balls, some of which were orange and the rest
white. In the first draw, orange balls represented a loss of L, while in the second draw
(i.e., only in the case of an insurance claim), orange balls indicated nonperformance of
the insurance contract. Hence, the mixtures of orange and white balls determine the
loss probability pLoss and the contract nonperformance probability pDef . Participants
were grouped in sessions of six participants. They were not allowed to exchange in-
formation or talk amongst themselves during the first round of the experiment. This
procedure aims to avoid peer effects on a participant’s initial belief about probabilities.
Participants were then allowed to communicate with other members for the remaining
rounds, such that they could learn from their peers’ experiences.
An additional lottery choice task was played prior to the insurance experiment in
order to classify each participant in terms of risk and ambiguity preferences. Here,
participants were presented with pairs of monetary lotteries, with one to four out-
comes, of which they had to choose one (Glo¨ckner, 2009). The outcome values varied
between -250 and 250 Philippine pesos (PHP), and participants played up to 122 lot-
teries, depending on their response time.67 Here, we use lotteries following Ellsberg
67Lotteries were divided into four blocks, and each block had a maximum amount of time the
participant could spend on it. Once the time limit was reached, the next block was presented. The
lotteries were assigned randomly within each block.
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Table 3.1 Experimental Treatments
Treatments
C TNoDef TAmb TFr TAmb−Fr
Panel A: Universal parameters
Initial endowment (in PHP) 210 210 210 210 210
Loss (in PHP) 150 150 150 150 150
pLoss 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Panel B: Treatment characteristics
Ambiguous contract No No Y es No Y es
nonperformance probability
pDef 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Framing Neutral Neutral Neutral Negative Negative
Insurance premium (in PHP) 50 60 50 50 50
Panel C: Participants and sessions
Number of subjects 144 162 168 174 168
Number of sessions 24 27 28 29 28
(1961), from which we classify individuals as ambiguity-averse, ambiguity-neutral, or
ambiguity-loving (details in Section 3.4.3). Participants earned the average of four
randomly drawn gambles, two from the gain domain and two from the loss domain.
3.3.2 Treatments
A complete overview of all treatments is presented in Table 3.1. Every participant
was provided with an initial endowment of PHP 210. Under the benchmark control
treatment C, both the 30 percent probability of losing PHP 150 and the 10 percent
probability of experiencing contract nonperformance were known to participants. The
variation in contract nonperformance probability introduced in treatment TNoDef (i.e.,
the elimination of the 10 percent contract nonperformance risk) allows for an inference
about hypothesis H1. The elimination of contract nonperformance risk is accounted
for in terms of a higher premium of PHP 60 for treatment TNoDef , as opposed to PHP
50 for all other treatments.68
Comparing treatment TAmb with control treatment C allows us to identify the
effect of ambiguity on insurance demand and, thus, to test hypothesis H2. Here,
the contract nonperformance probability was ambiguous to the participants. In order
68Because the actual price of an insurance policy is its loading, we added a 30 percent markup
to all insurance treatments. To make the resulting premium values manageable in our experimental
setting using artificial PHP bills, we rounded premium values to even amounts, resulting in actual
loadings of 25 percent and 33 percent for the TNoDef treatment. Given that rounding necessarily leads
to different loadings, we made sure that the loading for insurance without contract nonperformance
risk was at least as high as that with contract nonperformance risk. This implies that our results are
lower bounds of the effect of contract nonperformance risk on insurance demand. In general, insurance
premiums commonly include risk and cost loadings, which are often particularly high in low-income
insurance markets (Biener, 2013).
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to provide the participants with an initial signal of probabilities, to form their prior
beliefs, the balls in the bags of the ambiguous treatments (TAmb and TAmb−Fr) were
selected blindly from a big bag containing 100 balls, during the instructions by one
research assistant. Of the 100 balls in the big bag, 10 were orange and 90 were white.
One of the participants was invited to count the balls in the bag blindly to make
sure that 10 balls were placed in the ambiguous bags. Our setting with multiple
rounds allows us to analyze the effects over time, which is especially interesting under
ambiguity when experience about losses and contract nonperformance can be shared
within the peer network. In particular, one might expect ambiguity to decrease over
time, once sufficient learning has taken place.
We employ treatments TFr and TAmb−Fr to make inferences about potential fram-
ing effects. The standard framing of contract nonperformance is that the insurer
cannot pay the claim. This framing is neutral, and was implemented in the control
treatment C, as well as in TNoDef and TAmb. The negative framing in treatments
TFr and TAmb−Fr presents the source of potential contract nonperformance as the
insurer’s unwillingness to pay (e.g., owing to policy exclusions). Thus, not paying
claims is at the discretion of the insurer in the negative framing, whereas the insurer
has no discretion under the neutral framing.
3.3.3 Procedures and Sample Characteristics
We conducted a field lab experiment in the Philippine provinces of Iloilo and Guimaras
in October and November 2013. Four treatments and one control setting of this
experiment were randomized across four sessions, played in each of a total of 42
villages.69 This random assignment was implemented such that distinct treatments
were played in each village in order to reduce the likelihood of correlations between
village-level covariates and treatment assignment or order. Furthermore, we applied
a two-stage randomization procedure. In the first stage, rural villages were selected
randomly.70 In the second stage, individuals aged between 18 and 65 years were
selected randomly from complete household lists, as provided by village officials. The
recruitment procedure resulted in 24 participants per village, forming four groups (or
sessions) of six participants.
The structure of an experimental session was as follows. First, a pre-experimental
survey was conducted to gather individual and household characteristics, followed by
the lottery choice task to measure risk and ambiguity attitudes. Next, the insurance
experiment began with an instructional part. Detailed explanations were provided by
one instructor, with the help of visual aids. We ensured participants’ understanding
69One additional treatment, unrelated to ambiguous contract nonperformance risk, was conducted.
Thus, six variants were randomized altogether. The omitted treatment is irrelevant to the research
questions analyzed in this paper, but more details are available upon request.
70Villages from municipalities with high income (top two income classes out of five) were excluded
from the study; income classes are defined by the Department of Finance Republic of the Philippines
(2008).
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by conducting a test questionnaire. Only when all questions of the test questionnaire
could be answered correctly was a participant allowed to continue. Each participant
played six rounds of the insurance experiment, and the initial endowment was restored
at the start of each round. In order to gather participants’ beliefs about contract
nonperformance probabilities, a brief survey was implemented at the beginning of
rounds 1, 2, 4, and 6 (i.e., before the insurance decisions). Here, participants provided
their beliefs about the number of orange balls in the respective bag, and stated the
minimum and maximum numbers of orange balls they believed were in the bag. The
first survey at the beginning of round 1 provides participants’ beliefs of the contract
nonperformance probabilities in the absence of any peer or network effects.
A post-experimental survey was conducted to gather data on mathematical and
numerical capabilities, past real-life loss experiences, insurance ownership, and other
beliefs. Finally, participants were paid one of the six rounds played in the insurance
experiment, plus the proceeds from the lottery choice task and a show-up fee, in real
PHP. The round of the insurance experiment that was paid out was selected randomly
by the participant from another opaque bag, with six numbered balls representing
the six rounds of the experiment. The average earnings from the experiment were
PHP 156.5 in the insurance experiment, and PHP 13.5 in the lottery choice task.
Additionally, participants received a show-up fee of PHP 100,71 amounting to PHP
270, or approximately USD 6.2—a substantial amount for the average participant.72
In total, we conducted 136 sessions with 816 participants in 42 villages. Table
3.2 presents the mean values of individual characteristics and equality of means tests
by treatment group. The results show that individual characteristics are balanced
throughout the treatments (i.e., versus the control treatment C) and that few vari-
ables exhibit significant differences. Treatments TNoDef and TFr have slightly higher
proportions of female participants. The proportion of employed participants in the
TFr treatment is a bit lower than in the control treatment C. The mean risk aversion
score is larger under treatment TAmb−Fr than it is in the control treatment C. How-
ever, overall, it is apparent that the sample is balanced across treatment groups, with
only one variable not balanced in treatment TAmb−Fr versus the control treatment
C, and two variables not balanced in treatments TNoDef and TFr. All variables were
balanced in treatment TAmb.
As a further balancing check, we implement a multivariate analysis of variance to
test for differences between means across treatment groups on each of the variables
presented in the summary statistics. The last column of Table 3.2 shows the p-values
associated with the F-statistic based on Wilks’ lambda. We do not reject the null
71The show-up fee was increased by PHP 20 if the participant was the head of the household.
72The official exchange rate was PHP 43.3 to USD 1 in early October 2013. Note that the stakes of
PHP 210 in the experiment are close to the minimum daily wage of PHP 250 in the agricultural sector
in the Iloilo province, as of October 2013 (Republic of the Philippines, 2008), which few participants
are able to earn. The median daily earnings of those participants receiving a daily wage (12 percent
of total sample) is only PHP 180.
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Equality
C TNoDef TAmb TFr TAmb−Fr of Means
(p-value)d
Panel A: Socio-demographic characteristics
Age 39.86 38.80 38.96 38.76 39.86 0.745
(in years) (10.50) (10.08) (9.966) (10.94) (9.755)
Gender 0.741 0.840* 0.810 0.833* 0.786 0.185
(1 = female) (0.439) (0.368) (0.394) (0.374) (0.412)
Financial responsibilitya 0.958 0.994** 0.964 0.977 0.970 0.34
(1 = yes) (0.201) (0.0786) (0.186) (0.150) (0.170)
Married or in partnership 0.903 0.889 0.869 0.902 0.899 0.848
(1 = yes) (0.297) (0.315) (0.338) (0.298) (0.302)
Education 9.573 9.580 9.911 9.552 9.381 0.402
(in years) (2.642) (2.472) (2.476) (2.210) (2.619)
Employment status 0.465 0.358 0.387 0.351* 0.429 0.187
(1 = employed) (0.501) (0.481) (0.488) (0.479) (0.496)
Regular income 0.270 0.295 0.282 0.250 0.275 0.985
(1 = yes) (0.447) (0.460) (0.453) (0.436) (0.449)
Seasonal income 0.716 0.787 0.732 0.653 0.637 0.3
(1 = yes) (0.454) (0.413) (0.446) (0.479) (0.484)
Owns land 0.133 0.142 0.113 0.167 0.161 0.635
(1 = yes) (0.341) (0.350) (0.318) (0.374) (0.368)
Owned dwelling 0.799 0.895* 0.845 0.839 0.851 0.232
(1 = yes) (0.402) (0.307) (0.363) (0.369) (0.357)
Reduced meals in last month 0.273 0.210 0.214 0.218 0.244 0.666
(1 = yes) (0.447) (0.408) (0.412) (0.414) (0.431)
Panel B: Mental capabilities, risk and ambiguity aversion
Mathematical ability score 6.660 6.654 6.661 6.655 6.494 0.873
(0 min 8 max) (1.698) (1.815) (1.630) (1.612) (1.754)
Numerical ability score 9.236 9.142 9.119 9.040 8.994 0.961
(0 min 16 max) (3.084) (2.988) (2.999) (2.930) (2.958)
Risk aversionb 5.493 5.354 5.583 5.434 5.820* 0.197
(1 min 7 max) (1.840) (1.935) (1.859) (1.989) (1.744)
Ambiguity aversionc 1.763 1.734 1.774 1.756 1.776 0.989
(1 min 3 max) (0.711) (0.767) (0.786) (0.768) (0.799)
Panel C: Loss and insurance experience
Insurance ownership 0.528 0.580 0.577 0.557 0.542 0.863
(1 = yes) (0.501) (0.495) (0.495) (0.498) (0.500)
Illness or accident shocks 0.625 0.627 0.631 0.590 0.563 0.654
(1 = yes) (0.486) (0.485) (0.484) (0.493) (0.498)
Weather or livestock shocks 0.451 0.391 0.423 0.439 0.425 0.861
(1 = yes) (0.499) (0.490) (0.495) (0.498) (0.496)
Observations 144 162 168 174 168
Notes: Mean coefficients reported; standard errors in parentheses. aIndicator variable in which 1 indicates respon-
sibility for financial decision-making in the household. bScores based on survey measure, “I avoid risky things,”
on a seven-point Likert scale: 1-strongly disagree, 7-strongly agree. cAmbiguity classification: 1-ambiguity averse,
2-ambiguity neutral, 3-ambiguity loving. dp-values for multivariate equality of means test based on Wilks’ lambda
test statistics. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 indicate significance levels for equality of means t-tests of all
treatments versus the control treatment C.
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hypothesis that the means across the groups are all equal. Thus, we conclude that
the participants’ characteristics shown in Table 3.2 are balanced across treatments.
3.4 Experimental Results
3.4.1 Main Results
We show the average uptake across treatments in Figure 3.2. Appendix Table 3.7
mirrors the figure using estimates from linear probability and probit models, and
shows that the results are robust to the inclusion of control variables.73 In all our
analyses, we account for potential correlation within our unit of randomization (i.e.,
the experimental session) via clustered standard errors.
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Figure 3.2: Average Insurance Uptake by Treatment
Notes: The bars represent the mean proportion of individuals taking up insurance for the different
treatment groups. Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals, based on clustered standard
errors at the session level.
The discussion of results is structured along the hypotheses defined in Section
3.2. Eliminating contract nonperformance risk in treatment TNoDef , that is, setting
pDef = 0 instead of pDef = 0.1, results in a significant increase in insurance uptake
of 17.1 (p=0.007) percentage points. For all specifications, the treatment dummy is
significant at the 1 percent level. Hence, the risk that the insurance contract might
73The added covariates are age, gender, financial responsibility, marital status, education, employ-
ment, owning a dwelling, owning land, reduced meals in last month, score in mathematical and nu-
merical capabilities, insurance ownership, health or accident shocks, and weather or livestock shocks.
We also include round controls and the additional variable Typhoon, which takes a value of one if the
subject was exposed to typhoon Haiyan, and zero otherwise. Typhoon Haiyan passed by the Iloilo
Province halfway through our experiment, in November 2013. Our main effects are consistent before
and after the typhoon.
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not perform is clearly unattractive to participants, on average, even if they are com-
pensated by lower premiums. This is in line with H1 as well as the findings of prior
studies (Zimmer, Gru¨ndl, Schade, and Glenzer, 2016; Zimmer, Schade, and Gru¨ndl,
2009; Herrero, Toma´s, and Villar, 2006; Albrecht and Maurer, 2000; Wakker, Thaler,
and Tversky, 1997).
Result 1. The presence of contract nonperformance risk in an insurance contract
considerably decreases uptake, even when premiums are adjusted for the potential
default on valid claims on an actuarially fair basis.
When introducing ambiguity in the probability of contract nonperformance in
treatment TAmb, insurance uptake is reduced by 14.5 percentage points (p=0.062).
For all specifications, the treatment dummy is significant at least at the 10 percent
level. The results suggest that the presence of ambiguity in contract nonperformance
risk decreases insurance uptake compared to when the nonperformance risk is known.
In particular, the magnitude of the effects indicate that the reduction of insurance
uptake induced by contract nonperformance risk is almost twice as strong in the pres-
ence of ambiguity, thus providing evidence for hypothesis H2.
Result 2. The reduction in insurance uptake induced by the presence of contract
nonperformance risk is amplified significantly if the nonperformance probability of the
insurance contract is ambiguous.
Framing the insurer’s contract nonperformance risk negatively rather than neu-
trally, as represented by treatments TFr, leads to a 12.1 percentage point reduction
(p=0.134) in insurance uptake. This is almost equal to the effect of ambiguity. Thus,
ambiguity about contract nonperformance risk and our negative frame seem to have
similar negative effects on insurance uptake. However, the effects are not additive
in that introducing ambiguity about contract nonperformance risk to the negatively
framed setting in TAmb−Fr does not reduce uptake further with a treatment effect
of 10.4 percentage points (p=0.193). However, because the treatment effects for TFr
and TAmb−Fr are not statistically significant, we are careful about deriving strong
implications from the observed results.
3.4.2 Numeracy
Here, we analyze treatment effects, conditional on subjects’ numeracy levels, because
a minimum level of numeracy skills might be useful to adequately understanding the
experiment and, thus, to reacting to the treatment manipulations. In order to assess
subjects’ levels of numeracy, we use a survey on mathematical ability and numeracy
(Weller, Dieckmann, Tusler, Mertz, Burns, and Peters, 2013). We construct a total
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numeracy score by joining the results from the mathematical ability and numeracy
scales. The total score ranges from 0 (i.e., no correct answer) to 16 (i.e., all answers
correct). High-numeracy subjects are those with a total score of 10 or higher, and
low-numeracy subjects are those with a score of 9 or less. Table 3.3 shows average
treatment effects by numeracy level. Columns 1 and 2 show the high-numeracy sub-
sample, and Columns 3 and 4 show the low-numeracy subsample. High numeracy
subjects seem to exhibit stronger treatment effects. Eliminating contract nonperfor-
mance risk in treatment TNoDef increases insurance demand by 20.8 percentage points
(p=0.003) for the high-numeracy sample, but only 13.8 percentage points (p=0.063)
in the low-numeracy sample.
Ambiguity about the probability of contract nonperformance, as implemented in
TAmb, leads to a reduction of 18.5 percentage points (p=0.035) in insurance uptake
for the high-numeracy sample, which is 7 percentage points more than that of the
low-numeracy sample (p=0.361). The significance of the average ambiguity treatment
effect disappears in the low-numeracy sample (p=0.187). This could suggest that
some level of sophistication is needed in order to recognize and avoid ambiguity in our
setting (see discussion in Chew and Sagi (2008)).
Result 4. Participants with higher numeracy skills exhibit stronger treatment
effects and react more to contract nonperformance ambiguity.
Table 3.3 Average Treatment Effects by Numeracy
High numeracy Low numeracy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TNoDef 0.208*** 0.227*** 0.138* 0.145*
(0.0699) (0.0696) (0.0734) (0.0735)
TAmb -0.185** -0.166* -0.113 -0.0982
(0.0868) (0.0858) (0.0851) (0.0865)
TFr -0.0978 -0.0889 -0.141 -0.122
(0.0917) (0.0872) (0.0877) (0.0847)
TAmb−Fr -0.180* -0.177* -0.0421 -0.0364
(0.0958) (0.0901) (0.0788) (0.0788)
Constant 0.691*** 0.658* 0.721*** 0.558**
(0.0670) (0.394) (0.0627) (0.218)
Observations 2,238 2,232 2,658 2,640
R-squared 0.096 0.128 0.044 0.070
F test 21.23 6.892 5.730 2.633
Covariates No Yes No Yes
Notes: Linear probability models are used with the dependent variable set to 1
if the subject takes up insurance. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are
corrected for clustering at the session level. Covariates are age, gender, financial
responsibility, marital status, education, employment, owning a dwelling, owning
land, reduced meals in last month, score in mathematical and numerical capa-
bilities, insurance ownership, health or accident shocks, and weather or livestock
shocks. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 indicate significance levels of 10, 5,
and 1 percent, respectively.
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Ambiguity towards the negatively framed probability of contract nonperformance,
as implemented in TAmb−Fr, reduces insurance uptake by 18 percentage points for the
high-numeracy sample (p=0.062). However, in the low-numeracy sample, the reduc-
tion is statistically insignificant with an effect size of 4.2 percentage points (p=0.594).
Our estimates also suggest that framing plays no role in insurance demand for indi-
viduals with high numeracy skills. As shown in Table 3.3, the effects of TAmb and
TAmb−Fr on subjects with high numeracy are similar, leading to the conclusion that
the reduction of insurance uptake for the high-numeracy subgroup is driven by the
ambiguity towards the probability of contract nonperformance, and not by framing.
These results make intuitive sense, because framing of the treatment provides no addi-
tional information on the probability of contract nonperformance, which is the element
we expect rational subjects to use when assessing their insurance choices.
3.4.3 Ambiguity and Risk Aversion
Following our theoretical model, individual ambiguity aversion should be the major
factor explaining the sign and strength of the ambiguity effect. Therefore, we ex-
ploit the fact that we can classify participants with respect to ambiguity aversion,
given their behavior in the lottery choice task prior to the insurance experiment.
In particular, we use two Ellsberg (1961) lottery choices to classify individuals as
ambiguity-averse, ambiguity-neutral, or ambiguity-loving.74 Table 3.4 presents av-
erage treatment effects for ambiguity-averse (Columns 1 and 2), ambiguity-neutral
(Columns 3 and 4), and ambiguity-loving subjects (Columns 5 and 6).
The results for ambiguity-averse subjects are in line with our theoretical predic-
tions. There is a strong reduction in insurance demand when the probability of con-
tract nonperformance is ambiguous, in both the TAmb and the TAmb−Fr treatments.
When ambiguity-averse subjects are confronted with the TAmb treatment, insurance
demand is reduced by 18.2 percentage points (p=0.048), and when the negative fram-
ing condition is added to the ambiguous contract nonperformance risk, insurance
demand falls by 22 percentage points (p=0.02). For ambiguity-neutral and -loving
subjects, all effects of contract nonperformance ambiguity are smaller and statisti-
cally insignificant. However, even for ambiguity-loving subjects, the effects of ambi-
guity have a negative sign, even though we would expect a positive effect on demand
in this subsample. Such patterns could be explained by an imprecise classification of
participants. In addition, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effects are, in fact,
positive, given the limited precision in the ambiguity-loving subsample. Overall, the
pattern of stronger reductions in demand for participants who are more ambiguity-
averse is in line with our theoretical predictions.
74Those choices are between lotteries with known and unknown content. Participants who chose
the known content twice were classified as ambiguity-averse, those with one choice for known content
were classified as ambiguity-neutral, and those choosing unknown content twice were classified as
ambiguity-loving.
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Table 3.4 Average Treatment Effects by Ambiguity Aversion
Ambiguity averse Ambiguity neutral Ambiguity loving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TNoDef 0.166** 0.135* 0.200** 0.217** 0.162 0.106
(0.0677) (0.0694) (0.0921) (0.0960) (0.131) (0.123)
TAmb -0.182** -0.184** -0.155 -0.136 -0.0861 -0.0907
(0.0909) (0.0872) (0.103) (0.100) (0.151) (0.132)
TFr -0.192** -0.191** -0.0460 -0.0281 -0.127 -0.164
(0.0897) (0.0851) (0.110) (0.104) (0.156) (0.143)
TAmb−Fr -0.220** -0.229** -0.0296 -0.0237 -0.0762 -0.104
(0.0934) (0.0891) (0.0987) (0.0986) (0.156) (0.133)
Constant 0.747*** 0.822*** 0.658*** 0.506** 0.738*** 0.931**
(0.0638) (0.233) (0.0791) (0.253) (0.127) (0.381)
Observations 2,004 1,986 1,614 1,608 918 918
R-squared 0.101 0.158 0.058 0.078 0.051 0.158
F test 17.48 8.812 5.742 1.803 4.908 2.226
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Linear probability models are used with the dependent variable set to 1 if the subject takes up
insurance. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the session level.
Covariates are age, gender, financial responsibility, marital status, education, employment, owning a
dwelling, owning land, reduced meals in last month, score in mathematical and numerical capabili-
ties, insurance ownership, health or accident shocks, and weather or livestock shocks. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
Result 5. The effect of ambiguity in contract nonperformance probabilities on
demand tends to be more pronounced among ambiguity-averse individuals than it is
among non-ambiguity-averse individuals.
Interestingly, negatively framing known contract nonperformance risk in TFr also
reduces insurance uptake of ambiguity-averse subjects (-19.2 percentage points, p=0.034),
while it has no significant effect on ambiguity-neutral and ambiguity-loving subjects
(all p-values > 0.4). One potential explanation is that aversion to framing is correlated
with ambiguity aversion, but that they are independent concepts. Another possibility
is that mentioning negative motives of the insurer creates a feeling of uncertainty,
similarly to making the contract nonperformance probability unknown, particularly
for ambiguity-averse participants.
So far, we have focused on the role of ambiguity aversion, because the predictions
of its influence on the treatment effect are the most straightforward. However, to-
gether with ambiguity aversion, risk aversion also determines decisions in ambiguous
(i.e., inherently also risky) environments. Deriving exact predictions on the interplay
of risk and ambiguity aversion without further assumptions is difficult. Therefore,
we simulate insurance demand under parametric specifications of the utility function
(see Appendix B for details). Specifically, we assume constant relative risk aver-
sion (CRRA) and constant relative ambiguity aversion (CRAA); otherwise, we use
all parameters as given in our experimental setup. The simulations predict that with
contract nonperformance risk, (1) insurance should be taken up primarily by indi-
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viduals within a range of “moderate” risk aversion parameters (see Appendix Figure
3.5(b)), and that (2) the effects for ambiguity-averse subjects should be observed pri-
marily at the boundaries of this “moderate” range (see Appendix Figure 3.6). The
first prediction is in line with Doherty and Schlesinger (1990), who show a violation
of the standard monotonic relationship between risk aversion and optimal insurance
demand when contract nonperformance is present. Similarly, Clarke (2016) makes
the case for a hump-shaped relationship between risk aversion and optimal insurance
demand for index insurance with basis risk, which is similar to the notion of contract
nonperformance risk considered here, except that it has both upside and downside
risk.75
Therefore, we start by analyzing whether insurance uptake is indeed higher in a
certain “moderate” range of risk aversion. The behavior in the lottery choice task
prior to the insurance experiment again serves as a basis to classify participants. In
particular, we use the percentage of risk-seeking choices made in a set of Holt and
Laury (2002) lotteries as a measure of risk aversion, where risk aversion increases with
a decreasing share of risk-seeking choices. Figure 3.3 (a) shows the expected effect of
higher insurance uptake by “moderately” risk-averse individuals.
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Figure 3.3: Average Insurance Uptake and Treatment Effect by Risk Aversion
Notes: In this figure we focus on the subsample of participants in Treatments C and TAmb. The
dots in (a) represent the mean proportion of individuals taking up insurance under C and TAmb,
conditional on the percentage of risky choices in the Holt and Laury (2002) lotteries; (b) shows
average treatment effects of TAmb. All estimates are based on third-degree polynomials interacting
with TAmb for the subsample of ambiguity-averse participants used in Table 3.4. Error bars indicate
95 percent confidence intervals, based on clustered standard errors at the session level.
Testing the second simulation result (highest ambiguity effect at boundaries of
“moderate” risk aversion range) is more complicated. Our measure of risk aversion
is noisy and difficult to translate into the parameters used in our simulation. In
addition, the “location” of effects is sensitive to the model specifications. However,
75However, note that the decrease in optimal index insurance demand with basis risk in risk aversion
is driven by the downside risk, not by the upside potential. This is equivalent to what we observe
here.
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it is clear that the effects of introducing ambiguity on ambiguity-averse individuals
should be driven by those who are risk-averse. The reason is that risk-loving subjects
should not take up insurance, irrespective of the presence of ambiguity and ambiguity
aversion. Thus, we expect that the effects of the TAmb treatment should materialize
primarily among the risk-averse. Figure 3.3 (b) shows average treatment effects of
TAmb, conditional on our measure of risk aversion. We find that average treatment
effects become stronger with risk aversion (i.e., with a lower percentage of risky choices
treatment effects are more pronounced). These results show that predictions from
utility theory are, to some extent, supported by our empirical results. This lends
further credibility to our interpretation of the effects.
3.4.4 Ambiguity over Rounds
Ambiguity is essentially due to a lack of information. In our setting, participants lack
information about the exact contract nonperformance probability, which is governed
by the mixture of orange and white balls in an opaque bag. An interesting question is
whether individuals can accumulate information via experience and, hence, decrease
the ambiguity over time. Rational individuals should update their beliefs about the
unknown stochastic process based on newly available information. As the number
of observations increases, the true probability can be estimated more precisely.76 In
terms of our model in Section II, the subjective probability distribution q(.) over the
possible probabilities should converge towards a degenerate distribution, with value
one, at the true probability. Thus, decreasing ambiguity with experience should be
reflected in the participants’ insurance decisions. In particular, the effect of ambiguity
in the contract nonperformance probability on insurance demand should converge to
zero. Studying dynamic ambiguity is important, because, in reality, individuals col-
lect and share experiences of the outcomes of ex-ante uncertain situations. Whether
repeated exposure to such situations (directly or indirectly, via peers) decreases am-
biguity effectively has clear implications for the relevance of the results of a static
analysis. Therefore, we analyze the trend in ambiguity effects over the six rounds in
the experiment.
Figure 3.4 shows pooled treatment effects for ambiguity treatments TAmb and
TAmb−Fr, separately, by round for the total sample and for a subsample of ambiguity-
averse subjects. If anything, we expect to find a convergence of treatment effects
to zero in the ambiguity-averse subsample. However, contrary to the updating hy-
pothesis, the effect of ambiguity exhibits no clear trend, and remains consistent in
both the overall sample and the ambiguity-averse subsample. All treatment effects
remain negative, irrespective of the experience accumulated, while the effects are more
pronounced and more significant in the ambiguity-averse subsample.
76For example, ambiguity measured by the standard error of a simple probability estimate, based
on averages, should decrease with the square root of observed realizations.
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Figure 3.4: Average Treatment Effects by Round
Notes: The bars represent the average treatment effects for the pooled treatment groups TAmb and
TAmb−Fr, by round, for the total sample and for a subsample of ambiguity-averse subjects. The error
bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals, based on clustered standard errors at the session level.
We compare these findings to participants’ beliefs about the contract nonperfor-
mance probability. Recall that we elicited beliefs by having participants guess (1)
the number of orange balls contained in the bag from which contract nonperformance
was drawn, and (2) the minimum and maximum number of orange balls they deemed
possible. In addition to observing the “best guess” of participants, we use the spread
between the minimum and maximum number of orange balls as a proxy for subjective
ambiguity. Finally, the absolute deviation between the best guess and the real number
of orange balls serves as an objective measure of uncertainty.77 Table 3.5 shows how
the best guesses, spread between the minimum and maximum guesses, and error of
guesses evolve over rounds for different treatments. For each of these three measures,
the averages are presented separately for treatments TAmb and TAmb−Fr.
Participants appear to be very pessimistic in treatments TAmb and TAmb−Fr, be-
cause the average guess is substantially above one. If anything, these guesses show
a subtle upward tendency away from the real number of orange balls contained in
the bags. The spread between the maximum and minimum guesses (Columns 3 and
4) seems to decrease over rounds, suggesting a decrease in the extent of ambiguity.
On the other hand, the decrease is very small, and a substantial spread remains. In
addition, the difference between the number of orange balls that participants believe
are in the bag and the actual number of orange balls (Columns 5 and 6) shows no such
downward tendency. Overall, participants do not improve their guesses significantly
over the rounds. In summary, there is no clear evidence of a reduction in ambiguity
over rounds. This holds for both the TAmb and TAmb−Fr treatments, and is consistent
77Because the actual number of orange and white balls was drawn randomly, it varies between
sessions for the ambiguous treatments. Thus, we recorded the actual number of orange and white
balls at the end of each session.
3.4 Experimental Results 139
Table 3.5 Individuals’ Probability Beliefs
Mean best guess Mean subjective spread Mean absolute error of guess
TAmb TAmb−Fr TAmb TAmb−Fr TAmb TAmb−Fr
Round 1 2.589 2.613 1.81 2.071 2.027 1.687
Round 2 2.673 2.601 1.934 1.909 2.166 1.636
Round 4 2.542 2.78 1.632 1.788 2.042 1.728
Round 6 2.655 2.696 1.554 1.83 2.161 1.632
N 168 168 155 154 155 154
Notes: Guesses were elicited via a short survey in rounds 1, 2, 4, and 6 on the average, minimum,
and maximum number of orange balls, from a total of 10 balls (see Section III). The mean subjective
spread is computed as the difference between the minimum and maximum number of orange balls
stated. The mean absolute error of guesses measures the difference between the guesses and the ac-
tual number of orange balls. We restrict the sample for the mean subjective spread and the mean
absolute error of guesses to those participants with meaningful statements about the minimum and
maximum numbers of orange balls (i.e., minimum ≤ maximum).
with their persistent negative treatment effects on insurance uptake.
Result 6. The negative impact of contract nonperformance ambiguity on insur-
ance uptake is not eliminated over time by updating beliefs about probabilities.
There might be reasons for the absence of learning that are particular to our exper-
iment. For example, it is possible that participants did not have all the information
from other players, in which case they could not properly update on their signals.
Second, participants might have needed more experience in order to reduce ambigu-
ity; that is, updating processes might take longer than the duration of the experiment
permits. In order to obtain an intuitive understanding of the potential improvement
in agents’ assessments of probabilities, we simulate Bayesian updating under perfect
information transmission for all participants. That is, we assume that all partici-
pants in one session shared their experiences, and then followed a Bayesian updating
rule.78 The result suggests that for ambiguous contract nonperformance probabilities,
agents have access to limited information, because insurance performance can only
be observed if there is a loss and insurance had been purchased previously. Hence,
ambiguity decreases slowly (see Appendix D).
Even with a longer time horizon, there are good reasons why ambiguity might
persist. First, information transmission might be imperfect, thus further increasing the
time needed to accumulate the necessary information. Second, consistently updating
beliefs is a difficult task, particularly if information is arriving sporadically. Under such
circumstances, it is possible that subjective ambiguity remains high, even if sufficient
information has eventually been accumulated.
78Appendix D provides more detail on the updating process and the assumptions involved.
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3.5 Conclusion
We show the detrimental impact of contract nonperformance risk and ambiguity on
insurance demand, both theoretically and empirically. Typically, the probability of an
insurance contract failing to perform is considered to be known. We extend the theory
by allowing contract nonperformance risk to be ambiguous, and show that demand
for probabilistic insurance decreases with increasing mean-preserving ambiguity about
contract nonperformance risk if agents are ambiguity-averse.
Our results from a field lab experiment in the Philippines are consistent with this
logic. In particular, we establish empirically that the effects of contract nonperfor-
mance risk (a decrease in insurance uptake by 17.1 percentage points) and its ambi-
guity (a further decrease in insurance uptake by 14.5 percentage points) are similar
in magnitude. These results suggest that the reduction in insurance demand induced
by contract nonperformance risk is reinforced by ambiguity. This pattern is strongest
among participants classified as ambiguity-averse in a separate lottery choice task.
The causes for the failure of insurance contracts also seem to be important, under
some circumstances. While they play a smaller role for participants with high numer-
acy, negatively depicting the insurer as unwilling to pay claims significantly reduces
insurance demand for ambiguity-averse subjects. Interestingly, in this subsample, the
negative framing seems to have a similar effect to that of introducing ambiguity.
We present additional evidence that the effects of ambiguity are not easily elimi-
nated over time by updating beliefs about probabilities. In reality, learning might be
more effective than it is in the lab. However, it seems intuitive that villagers from
a low-income setting cannot update their beliefs effectively or compute confidence
bounds around their probability guesses, in either the experiment or in reality.
According to our results, ambiguity about contract nonperformance risk clearly
influences insurance demand, and has a similar economic relevance to that of contract
nonperformance risk. Our results imply that in addition to ensuring low contract
nonperformance risk, regulators should have an interest to reduce its ambiguity, for
example, by making the repayment practices of insurers transparent. Similar to the
case of contract nonperformance risk, such measures might not be in the best interests
of individual insurance providers. Here, many potential reasons for contract nonper-
formance are endogenous to management decisions (e.g., more risky investments, less
solvency capital, delaying payments) that benefit the owners of an insurance com-
pany. Thus, there is a particular trade-off between the costs and benefits that can
be exploited by insurers, which the regulator may want to restrict. Furthermore,
in the case of ambiguity, reasons not to create transparency may be endogenous to
management decisions. For example, an insurance provider publishing data about
claims payment practices might, at the same time, send an unintended negative signal
about claims payment probabilities, or lose the possibility of denying contract non-
performance risk towards clients. These and other strategic reasons might limit the
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incentives for transparency, even though the insurance market as a whole might profit
from reduced ambiguity.
For emerging low-income insurance markets, with limited insurance demand, the
effects of contract nonperformance risk and ambiguity are particularly relevant in
terms of market development. In line with our results is a call for sound regulatory
frameworks. Such frameworks should focus on ensuring low levels of contract non-
performance risk and ambiguity through solvency regulation, contract validation, and
market transparency. In particular, there is room for such improvements in low-income
insurance markets, because of currently low regulatory oversight, limited customer
protection, and low levels of trust. For the management of an insurance company,
a strategic focus on sound policies and practices may prove beneficial to gaining a
competitive advantage and building trust in an emerging market.
Our conclusions are based on the empirical results presented in this paper, but
their interpretation inevitably rests on certain assumptions, because randomizing all
potential factors influencing insurance demand under ambiguity is impossible. For
example, in our experiment, groups consist of six individuals, and it is not clear how
the results would change with larger groups and, thus, more information potentially
being available under the ambiguous settings. In addition, varying the contract non-
performance probability is potentially interesting, enabling us to judge the sensitivity
of demand with regard to this factor in greater detail. However, prior work suggests
that the largest part of the demand-reducing effect of contract nonperformance risk
can be attributed to whether this risk is present, and that sensitivity of demand is
highest when moving from non-probabilistic insurance to insurance with a non-zero
contract nonperformance probability (Zimmer, Gru¨ndl, Schade, and Glenzer, 2016).
In a similar vein, further research may investigate the role of the degree of ambiguity
and the way it is introduced, which we did not vary in our experiments. Therefore,
in the absence of additional experimental findings across a range of parameters, it
is crucial to think about the interpretation of results theoretically in order to judge
their plausibility and generalizability. Our main empirical findings are in line with the
hypotheses derived from the theoretical model and the corollary findings appear to be
sensible: the demand effects of ambiguity are strongest for ambiguity- and risk-averse
subjects, and demand seems to follow an inverted U-shape with respect to risk aver-
sion (Doherty and Schlesinger, 1990; Clarke, 2016). These properties suggest that the
findings are meaningful, and might hold when moving beyond the restricted parameter
set tested here.
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A Proofs
A.1 Probabilistic Insurance
In this appendix, we prove that introducing contract nonperformance risk, without
adjusting premiums, decreases the willingness to pay. This is intuitive, because there
is no reason why a contract nonperformance feature should be valued by clients. In
the following, we compare the marginal willingness to pay under both scenarios. The
marginal willingness to pay when r > 0 can be obtained from the first-order condition
when optimizing Equation (3.1) with respect to coverage ε:
∂EUr
∂ε
=(1− p)u′(w − I(ε))(−I ′(ε)) (3.3)
+ p[(1− r)u′(w − I(ε)− L+ ε)(−I ′(ε) + 1)
+ ru′(w − I(ε)− L)(−I ′(ε))] = 0.
We solve Equation (3.3) for I ′(ε) and get the following marginal willingness to pay
for probabilistic insurance:
p(1− r)u′(w − I(ε)− L+ ε)
(1− p)u′(w − I(ε)) + p[(1− r)u′(w − I(ε)− L+ ε) + ru′(w − I(ε)− L)] ,
which can be rewritten as:
pu′(w − I(ε)− L+ ε)
(1− p)u′(w − I(ε)) · 1(1−r) + p[u′(w − I(ε)− L+ ε) + r(1−r)u′(w − I(ε)− L)]
(3.4)
Then, we set r = 0 in Equation (3.3), and solve for I ′(ε) to get the following
marginal willingness to pay for non-probabilistic insurance:
pu′(w − I(ε)− L+ ε)
(1− p)u′(w − I(ε)) + pu′(w − I(ε)− L+ ε) (3.5)
When comparing Equation (3.4) and (3.5), it follows that the marginal willingness
to pay for probabilistic insurance is lower than it is for the same insurance that
settles claims with certainty, irrespective of the coverage point ε (i.e., the numerator
is the same, but the denominator is larger). This implies a lower overall willingness
to pay at all coverage points and, hence, lower demand for insurance with contract
nonperformance risk, irrespective of individual risk aversion. This result holds for
both binary and continuous insurance decisions.
A.2 Lemma 1 and Lemma 2: Premium-Adjusted Probabilistic Insurance
The setting is less trivial once we account for contract nonperformance risk by reducing
premiums proportionally (i.e., I(ε) 6= I0(ε)). In this case, agents face a trade-off be-
tween effective coverage and lower premiums. Doherty and Schlesinger (1990) already
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show that optimal coverage is not necessarily monotonic in contract nonperformance
risk in such a situation. Given this more general result, we focus on the case of a
binary insurance decision with a given coverage level ε here. This is in line with our
empirical setup and should help us to shed further light on reasons for potential non-
monotonicities and the direction of the effect which is likely to dominate. We hence
compare EUr and EU0, holding coverage ε constant. In binary insurance decisions,
a lower (higher) utility for policies with contract nonperformance risk implies weakly
lower (higher) insurance demand.79 The following equation denotes the difference
between EUr and EU0 at a given level of ε:
EUr − EU0 =(1− p)[u(w − I0(1− r))− u(w − I0)]
+ p(1− r)[u(w − I0(1− r)− L+ ε)− u(w − I0 − L+ ε)]
− pr[u(w − I0 − L+ ε)− u(w − I0(1− r)− L)].
If the difference is positive, individuals prefer insurance with contract nonperformance
risk, and vice versa. The expression can be transformed using the Taylor theorem for
approximating the difference.80 In the following, we use x? = w − I0 − L + ε for
notational convenience:
EUr − EU0 =(1− p)[ u(w − I0 + rI0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=u(w−I0)+u′(w−I0)rI0+τ1
−u(w − I0)]
+ p(1− r)[u(w − I0(1− r)− L+ ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=u(x?)+u′(x?)rI0+τ2
−u(x?)]
− pr[u(x?)− u(w − I0 − L+ rI0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=u(x?)−(ε−rI0)u′(x?)+τ3
]
=(1− p)[u′(w − I0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=u′(x?)+τ4
rI0 + τ1] + p(1− r)[u′(x?)rI0 + τ2]− pr[u′(x?)(ε− rI0)− τ3],
(3.6)
79In non-binary insurance decisions, a lower (higher) utility for policies with contract nonperfor-
mance risk implies that less (more) utility can be derived, even if optimal coverage changes. To see
this, let ε? denote the optimal coverage of agents when r = 0, and ε?? when r > 0. Then:
EUr(ε) < EU0(ε) =⇒ EUr(ε??) < EU0(ε?), and
EUr(ε) > EU0(ε) =⇒ EUr(ε??) > EU0(ε?).
This follows from the fact that EU0(ε
??) < EU0(ε
?) and EUr(ε
??) > EUr(ε
?) under the optimal cov-
erage decision. However, the implications for demand are less straightforward, and require additional
assumptions.
80We exploit that—under assumptions about continuity and differentiability—f(x) can be approx-
imated by a n-th order Taylor expansion from x0 in the following way:
f(x) = f(x0) + f
′(x0)(x− x0) + ...+ f
n(x0)
n!
(x− x0)n + f
n+1(c)
(n+1)!
(x− x0)n+1
with c between x0 and x.
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where
τ1 =
(rI0)
2
2
u′′(c1),
τ2 =
(rI0)
2
2
u′′(c2),
τ3 =
(ε− rI0)2
2
u′′(c3), or
=
(ε− rI0)2
2
u′′(x?)− (ε− rI0)
3
6
u′′′(c′3), and
τ4 =(L− ε)u′′(c4),
with
c1 ∈ (w − I0, w − I0 + rI0),
c2 ∈ (w − I0 − L+ ε, w − I0 − L+ ε+ rI0),
c3, c
′
3 ∈ (w − I0 − L+ rI0, w − I0 − L+ ε),
c4 ∈ (w − I0 − L+ ε, w − I0).
Given the concavity of the utility function all approximation errors (τ i) are nega-
tive. Equation (3.6) can be rewritten as follows:
EUr − EU0 =u′(x?)prεα− (1− p)rI0τ4 + (1− p)τ1 + p(1− r)τ2 + prτ3.
Now plugging in the definitions of τ i and defining the the positive constants
a4 = (1 − p)rI0(L − ε), a1 = (1 − p) (rI0)
2
2 , a2 = p(1 − r) (rI0)
2
2 , a3 = pr
(ε−rI0)3
6 , and
a′3 = pr
(ε−rI0)2
2 yields:
EUr − EU0
u′(x?)
=prεα+ a4
u′′(c4)
u′(x?)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−C(c4,x?)
+a1
u′′(c1)
u′(x?)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−C(c1,x?)
+a2
u′′(c2)
u′(x?)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−C(c2,x?)
+a′3
u′′(c3)
u′(x?)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−C(c3,x?)
or
=prεα+ a4
u′′(c4)
u′(x?)
+ a1
u′′(c1)
u′(x?)
+ a2
u′′(c2)
u′(x?)
− a3 u
′′′(c′3)
u′(x?)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+pr
(ε− rI0)2
2
u′′(x?)
u′(x?)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−ARA(x?)
,
where C(x, x?) is the risk aversion / concavity measure (Liu and Meyer, 2013) dis-
cussed in the main text, normalized at u′(x?), and ARA(x) is the Arrow-Pratt measure
of absolute risk aversion.
The above term might be positive or negative, depending on the loading factor
and risk aversion. For actuarially fair insurance (i.e., α = 0) and with risk-averse
agents the expression is strictly negative, while for insurance with a positive loading
(i.e., α > 0) and risk neutral agents, the term is strictly positive.
It is easy to see from the above equation that if
ARA(x?) > 2αε
(ε−rI0)2 ⇔ pr
(ε−rI0)2
2 ARA(x
?) > prεα⇒ EUr − EU0 < 0
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which constitutes Lemma 1. The lower α, the lower the risk aversion level required
such that insurance without contract nonperformance risk is preferred. In binary
insurance decisions, this implies that for these agents, the average insurance demand
must be weakly lower for insurance with contract nonperformance risk.
On the other hand, ∀α > 0, ∃u(x) s.t. C(x, x?) > 0 at x = c4, c1, c2, c3 and
prεα > a4C(c4, x
?) + a1C(c1, x
?) + a2C(c2, x
?) + a′3C(c3, x?)⇒ EUr − EU0 > 0.
To see this, we can define a sequence of utility functions uλ(x) with
Cλ(c1, x
?), Cλ(c2, x
?), Cλ(c3, x
?), Cλ(c4, x
?)
λ→∞→ 0.81
This ensures that the weighted sum of risk aversion measures will become small enouh
to satify the condition, which constitutes Lemma 2. The higher α, the higher the risk
aversion level allowed such that insurance with contract nonperformance is preferred.
Preferring insurance with contract nonperformance risk implies weakly higher demand
for such an insurance contract for these agents. However, agents with low risk aver-
sion are also more sensitive to loadings and tend not to buy insurance that is too
expensive (Mossin, 1968; Smith, 1968). So even though they prefer the contract with
nonperformance risk they might not buy any insurance voluntarily.
Ultimately, the results hinge on the shape of the utility function. Therefore, we
implement simulations over a range of parameters to obtain more precise predictions.
The simulation results can be found in Appendix B. They strongly suggest that con-
tract nonperformance risk decreases demand.
A.3 Lemma 3: Ambiguous Probabilistic Insurance
Lemma 3 can be shown by comparing the marginal willingness to pay when r is known
to that when r is ambiguous. The marginal willingness to pay can be obtained from
the first-order condition when optimizing Equation (3.2) with respect to coverage ε:
IEγΦ
′(EUr(γ))[(1− p)u′(w − I(ε))(−I ′(ε)) + p[(1− r(γ))u′(w − I(ε)
− L+ ε)(−I ′(ε) + 1) + r(γ)u′(w − I(ε)− L)(−I ′(ε))]] = 0.
The marginal willingness to pay I ′(ε) for a reduction ε in loss is:
pu′(w − I(ε)− L+ ε)
(1− p)u′(w − I(ε))rˆ + p[u′(w − I(ε)− L+ ε) + r¯u′(w − I(ε)− L)] , (3.7)
where rˆ =
IEγΦ′(EUr(γ))
IEγ(1−r(γ))Φ′(EUr(γ)) and r¯ =
IEγr(γ)Φ′(EUr(γ))
IEγ(1−r(γ))Φ′(EUr(γ)) .
We are interested in comparing the above marginal willingness to pay to the
81Such sequences exist. For example, let u0(x) denote a utility function satisfying all conditions set
in this paper and define the sequence uλ(x) =
λ−1
λ
u′0(x
?)x+ u0(x)
λ
.
This ensures that Cλ(x, x
?) = − u′′0 (x)
λu′0(x?)
λ→∞→ 0. In this sequence, c4, c1, c2, c3 even remain constant
across λ. This can be shown via inserting the transformation in the Taylor expansion formula and
showing equivalence across different values of λ.
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marginal willingness to pay for probabilistic insurance with known contract nonper-
formance risk derived in Equation (3.4):
pu′(w − I(ε)− L+ ε)
(1− p)u′(w − I(ε)) · 1(1−r) + p[u′(w − I(ε)− L+ ε) + r(1−r)u′(w − I(ε)− L)]
.
In order to compare the two equations, it will suffice to compare 11−r to rˆ and
r
1−r
to r¯. If rˆ > 11−r and r¯ >
r
1−r , it follows that the marginal willingness to pay decreases,
and vice versa. We begin by showing that both conditions are equivalent:
rˆ >
1
1− r (3.8)
⇔ IEγΦ
′(EUr(γ))
IEγ(1− r(γ))Φ′(EUr(γ))
>
1
1− r
⇔ IEγr(γ)Φ′(EUr(γ)) > r · IEγΦ′(EUr(γ))
⇔ IEγr(γ)Φ
′(EUr(γ))
IEγ(1− r(γ))Φ′(EUr(γ))
>
r
1− r
⇔ r¯ > r
1− r .
The desired result can now be obtained from Equation (3.8) by exploiting the
shape of Φ(.). For ambiguity-averse agents, Φ(.) is concave. This means that as
r(γ) increases (and EUr(γ) decreases), Φ
′(EUr(γ)) increases as well. That is, r(γ)
and Φ′(EUr(γ)) are positively correlated, such that the expectation of their product is
greater than the product of their expectation, and Equation (3.8) holds. The reverse
is true for ambiguity-loving agents. Hence, we have established that for ambiguity-
averse (-loving) agents, the willingness to pay for insurance with ambiguous contract
nonperformance risk is lower (higher) than it is in the case where it is known.
A.4 Generalizing Lemma 3
Lemma 3 refers to the introduction of ambiguity regarding contract nonperformance
risk. Other comparative statics such as increasing ambiguity aversion or increasing
the extend of ambiguity are interesting as well. In the following we show that the
development of the marginal willingness to pay boils down to one central property:
corr
(
r(γ),Φ′(EUr(γ))
)
.
If this correlation increases, the marginal willingness to pay decreases and vice
versa. To see this, consider Equation (3.7) for two alternative situations with distinct
ambiguity in contract nonperformance risk (r(γ1) versus r(γ2)) and distinct ambiguity
preferences (Φ1 versus Φ2). Comparing the marginal willingness to pay between both
settings leads to comparing rˆ1 with rˆ2 and r¯1 with r¯2. If rˆ2 > rˆ1 and r¯2 > r¯1, it follows
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that the marginal willingness to pay decreases from situation 1 to 2, and vice versa.
We again begin by showing that both conditions are equivalent:
rˆ2 > rˆ1
⇔ IEγ2Φ
′
2(EUr(γ2))
IEγ2(1− r(γ2))Φ′2(EUr(γ2))
>
IEγ1Φ
′
1(EUr(γ1))
IEγ1(1− r(γ1))Φ′1(EUr(γ1))
⇔ 1− IEγ1r(γ1)Φ
′
1(EUr(γ1))
IEγ1Φ
′
1(EUr(γ1))
> 1− IEγ2r(γ2)Φ
′
2(EUr(γ2))
IEγ2Φ
′
2(EUr(γ2))
⇔ IEγ2r(γ2)Φ
′
2(EUr(γ2))
IEγ2Φ
′
2(EUr(γ2))
>
IEγ1r(γ1)Φ
′
1(EUr(γ1))
IEγ1Φ
′
1(EUr(γ1))
(3.9)
⇔ IEγ2r(γ2)Φ′2(EUr(γ2)) · IEγ1Φ′1(EUr(γ1)) > IEγ1r(γ1)Φ′1(EUr(γ1)) · IEγ2Φ′2(EUr(γ2))
⇔ IEγ2r(γ2)Φ
′
2(EUr(γ2))
IEγ2(1− r(γ2))Φ′2(EUr(γ2))
>
IEγ1r(γ1)Φ
′
1(EUr(γ1))
IEγ1(1− r(γ1))Φ′1(EUr(γ1))
⇔ r¯2 > r¯1.
Note that the expected contract nonperformance probability is assumed to lie in
the interval (0, 1) and that Φ′1(.),Φ′2(.) > 0 such that the direction of inequality holds
through all divisions and multiplications. Dividing Equation (3.9) by r (= IEγ1r(γ1) =
IEγ2r(γ2)) and subsequently subtracting one yields the condition:
corr
(
r(γ2),Φ
′
2(EUr(γ2))
)
> corr
(
r(γ1),Φ
′
1(EUr(γ1))
)
. (3.10)
The evolution of this correlation uniquely determines whether the marginal willing-
ness to pay uniformly decreases (if the inequality holds), remains the same (if equality
holds), or increases (if the reverse inequality holds). From here, different kinds of
comparative statics can be derived. Note, for example, that our derivation of Lemma
3 is a special case of the above general statement. Without ambiguity in the initial
situation (r(γ1) being a constant), the right hand side of Equation (3.10) is necessarily
zero. Ambiguity aversion implies that on the left hand side r(γ2) and Φ
′
2(EUr(γ2)) are
positively correlated (negatively for ambiguity loving subjects), which proves Lemma
3.
Beyond the result of Lemma 3, it is intuitive that the willingness to pay will
decrease when increasing the extend of ambiguity or increasing ambiguity aversion.
For this proposition to hold, however, these changes must lead to an increase in the
correlation. The above derivation hence delivers a useful criterion which facilitates
proving further comparative statics.
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B Simulations
We have shown that under some circumstances (i.e., high premium loadings and low
risk aversion), insurance with contract nonperformance risk might be preferred. Intu-
itively, some types might value the gain in the expected payoff as being greater than
the risk of the contract failing to perform. To assess the extent of this phenomenon,
we specify a CRRA utility function of the form u(A) = A
1−ρ
1−ρ , where ρ = 0 indicates
risk neutrality, and risk aversion increases in ρ. In order to estimate the expected
utilities of the different options, we fix the parameters as defined in Table 3.6 (i.e.,
following treatments C and TNoDef in our experimental setup).
Table 3.6 Parameters
C TNoDef TAmb
Initial endowment 210 210 210
Loss probability 0.3 0.3 0.3
Loss 150 150 150
Insurance coverage 150 150 150
Contract nonperformance probability 0.1 0 0.1
Contract nonperformance probability ambiguous No No Yes
Insurance premium I0(1− r) I0 I0(1− r)
Loading factor α α α
The insurance premium depends on the loading factor because I = (1 + α)εp =
(1 + α)45. Using the specifications shown in Table 3.6, we can calculate the expected
utility difference EUr − EU0 for any combination of α and γ. Figure 3.5 (a) shows
the result of this simulation. As derived theoretically, low risk-aversion types facing
insurance policies with high premium loadings might prefer the policy with inherent
contract nonperformance risk. However, for high premium loadings, the types prefer-
ring insurance with inherent contract nonperformance risk might not opt for insurance
anyway. To illustrate this, Figure 3.5 (b) shows the simulation results for the trade-off
between insurance with inherent contract nonperformance risk and no insurance.
Indeed, only those who would not take up insurance anyway prefer insurance with
contract nonperformance risk. This implies that demand for insurance not prone to
contract nonperformance risk must be larger, because it is always preferred by those
who are sufficiently risk-averse. Figure 3.5 (c) shows the results of our simulations
for the trade-off between insurance without contract nonperformance risk and no
insurance.
In summary, our previous analysis of demand is confirmed when comparing Fig-
ures 3.5 (b) and 3.5 (c); that is, the preference region for insurance with contract
nonperformance risk is a subset of the preference region for insurance without con-
tract nonperformance.
When considering the impact of ambiguity on insurance demand in our simula-
tion, we need to make an assumption on the functional form of ambiguity aversion.
Therefore, for choices involving ambiguous probabilities, we assume constant relative
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(a) Insurance with r > 0 versus r = 0 (b) No insurance versus insurance with r > 0
(c) No insurance versus insurance with r = 0
Figure 3.5: Demand for Insurance with Known Contract Nonperformance Risk
ambiguity aversion (CRAA) of the form φ(EU) = EU
1−ζ
1−ζ for EU ∈ IR+ and, thus,
for ρ < 1. For all ρ > 1, we apply the adapted CRAA function for negative utilities
φ(EU) = −(−EU)
1−ζ
1−ζ defined in Gollier (2011). For simplicity, we assume loading α to
be the loading defined in our experimental setup for TAmb (i.e., 25 percent).
The simulation results in Figure 3.6 clearly suggest that the preference region for
insurance with ambiguous contract nonperformance risk in the binary trade-off be-
tween insurance and no insurance is a subset of the preference region for insurance
with known contract nonperformance risk (i.e., the grey horizontal line at CRRA
ζ = 0) for ambiguity-averse individuals (i.e., ζ > 0).82 Thus, we confirm our previous
analysis of demand in that the demand for ambiguous probabilistic insurance is al-
ways lower than that for non-ambiguous probabilistic insurance, for ambiguity-averse
individuals.
82This result holds irrespective of the premium loading α.
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Figure 3.6: Demand for Insurance with Ambiguous Contract Nonperformance Risk
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C Linear Probability and Probit Models for Average Treatment Ef-
fects
Table 3.7 Average Treatment Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (Probita)
TNoDef 0.171*** 0.172*** 0.187*** 0.223***
(0.0626) (0.0629) (0.0638) (0.0718)
TAmb -0.145* -0.143* -0.133* -0.124*
(0.0768) (0.0782) (0.0763) (0.0713)
TFr -0.121 -0.119 -0.111 -0.103
(0.0803) (0.0796) (0.0771) (0.0722)
TAmb−Fr -0.104 -0.101 -0.1 -0.0943
(0.0795) (0.0791) (0.0769) (0.0725)
Typhoon 0.038 0.0319 0.0324
(0.0442) (0.0430) (0.0422)
Round 0.00294 0.00267 0.00309
(0.00371) (0.00371) (0.00376)
Constant 0.707*** 0.678*** 0.632***
(0.0580) (0.0631) (0.158)
Observations 4,896 4,896 4,872 4,872
R-squared 0.0612 0.0629 0.0832 0.0709
F-test 15.02 11.17 4.84
Covariates No No Yes Yes
Notes: Linear probability models are used, with the dependent variable set to 1
if the subject takes up insurance. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are
corrected for clustering at the session level. Covariates are age, gender, financial
responsibility, marital status, education, employment, owning a dwelling, owning
land, reduced meals in last month, score in mathematical and numerical capa-
bilities, insurance ownership, health or accident shocks, and weather or livestock
shocks. a The probit model results are provided in terms of marginal effects.∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 per-
cent, respectively.
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D Bayesian Updating
In this appendix, we present the results of simulated Bayesian updating under perfect
information transmission, for all participants. This serves as a benchmark for how
well rational and well-informed individuals could, in principle, decrease ambiguity
over time in our setting. We assume that all participants in a session share their
experiences. Then, we follow a Bayesian updating rule to predict the probability
that the insurer pays a claim in the case of a loss, and the uncertainty around this
probability. In our setup, the number of orange balls (#γ) determines the contract
nonperformance probability (r(γ) = #γ/10) under the different states of the world γ.
Formally, each participant is assumed to calculate the probability that the state of
nature γ = h ∈ [0, ..., 10], given the observation of K orange balls out of N draws, as:
P (γ = h|K of N ) = P (K of N |γ = h) · P (γ = h)∑
i
(P (K of N |γ = i) · P (γ = i))︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (K of N )
,
where P (γ = i) is the initial prior for the probability of the respective mix in the
ambiguous bag. The ambiguous bag is a random subset of a big bag with known
content (see Section III.B for more detail). Hence, the initial prior can be calculated
using a hypergeometric distribution. In addition, the probability of observing K
nonperformance outcomes out of N draws (P (K of N |γ = i)) is easy to compute for
each of the different possible numbers of orange balls #i in the ambiguous bag. Thus, a
Bayesian updater can calculate the likelihood for each probability state (γ = h) based
on the history of draws, according to the above formula. In other words, this enables us
to calculate the distribution of possible contract nonperformance probabilities based
on past experiences, as well as any moment of this distribution.
Table 3.8 shows two main statistics. The first column describes how the expected
number of orange balls, given the experiment history, deviates from the actual number
(|E[#γ |K of N ]−#|). This “prediction error” decreases slightly over the rounds. The
second statistic describes the “remaining uncertainty” agents face, given the exper-
iment history. This is calculated as the standard deviation of the possible contract
nonperformance probabilities (SD[#|K of N ]); that is, we calculate how much a ra-
tional Bayesian updater should expect the real number of orange balls to deviate from
the expected value. Consistent with the bias of best guesses, uncertainty also decreases
over the rounds. However, this downward trend is very modest, and most of the bias
and the uncertainty remain until the end of the experiment. The reason is that, until
round six, only 5.2 insurance performances can be observed, on average, which is not
sufficient to considerably compress the belief distribution around the correct value.
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Table 3.8 Bayesian Updating Simulation for TAmb and TAmb−Fr
Mean Deviation Mean Remaining Uncertainty
Round 1 0.734 0.89
Round 2 0.725 0.855
Round 3 0.708 0.824
Round 4 0.669 0.795
Round 5 0.621 0.763
Round 6 0.614 0.733
Notes: “Deviation” measures the difference between the expected number of or-
ange balls, given the experiment history, and the actual number of orange balls
for the Bayesian updaters. “Remaining Uncertainty” is the standard deviation of
orange balls, given the updated probability distribution for the number of orange
balls.
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